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Abstract 
This research is a historical-theoretical examination of how colonisation was 
operationalised in Queensland, Australia. It argues that colonisation was constituted 
as a form of government that had two constitutive dimensions: one metaphysical 
framed by aesthetic judgement and one technico-political framed by administrative 
functionality. The mapping of both dimensions provides a more accurate description 
of the operationalisation of colonisation.  
This research applies a Foucauldian archaeology to the ongoing process of 
colonisation, and its findings are outlined in two parts. The first part discusses the 
global origins of how the colonial West first aesthetically conceptualised 
aboriginality and blackness in the Caribbean, and the second part discusses how this 
conceptualisation was wielded locally in Queensland through the administrative 
design of the Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act 1897 
(1897 Act). Foucauldian archaeology is understood as a historical engagement with 
the origins of a given notion, concept, or praxis, and with its relationship to forms of 
governance (Agamben, 2009; Deleuze, 1985; Foucault, 1974).  
This thesis begins with mapping the global origins of colonisation, which are 
found in the first European colonial experiences in the Caribbean in the 15th and 16th 
centuries where the Western conceptualisations of aboriginality and blackness were 
formed. I argue here that these conceptualisations were aesthetic assemblages that 
predate the post-Enlightenment discourses of anthropology. The first of these 
conceptualisations, aboriginality, was assembled at the end of the 15th and the 
beginning of the 16th centuries from the aesthetics of monstrosity. Through casting 
aboriginality in the imagery of the monstrous, and particularly of the cannibal, this 
conceptualisation justified the enslavement of aboriginal peoples, the first slavery in 
the Americas. A second conceptualisation, blackness, was assembled later in the 16th 
century. Blackness became historically tied through the conceptualisation of 
aboriginality to slavery. These two conceptualisations - aboriginality and blackness - 
were later used interchangeably in the 1897 Act as tools used to subjectify Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Queenslanders. 
The thesis continues with analysing the functions of colonisation as a local 
form of governance. I term this the Blanket Approach, a wordplay that describes the 
pure function of colonisation as a form of governance. The operation of colonisation 
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in Queensland is illustrated through the triple functions of the Blanket Approach: 
totalisation, multiplicity, and the creation of desire. Thus, the 1897 Act through its 
Blanket Approach imposes Western colonial conceptualisations of aboriginality and 
blackness through its totalising effect on the possible relationships between colonial 
subjects and the state, is distributed through a multiplicity of functions, and creates 
the conditions for a tailored relationship in the space of subjectivity.  
Lastly, this research concludes that the two-fold operation that I describe links 
the local governance processes with global historical conceptualisations through a 
conceptualist movement, which is an administrative non-political movement whose 
concern, in the manner of conceptualist art, is with the appearance of things or of 
relationships in the world rather than with their substance. This conceptualist 
movement as a form of power aids colonisation as a localised form of governance. In 
this sense, colonisation is understood not only as a local process, or only as global 
machinery, but also as machinery that simultaneously operates micropolitically and 
macropolitically.   
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Part 1: Introduction  
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“Aboriginal” 
In this research I will be using the capitalised words “Australian Aboriginal” 
and “Aboriginal” to refer to a plethora of nations in Queensland and around the world 
with the intention to communicate the utmost respect to its peoples. Turrbul, 
Jagara/Jagura, Mutumui, Mutjati, Muragan, Muluridji, Mitjamba, Mitaka, Mingin, 
Mimumgkun, Mian, Mbewun, Marulta, Marrago, Maranganji, Maithakari, Mijabi, 
Madjandji, Lanima, Kuungkari, Kwantari, Kutjala, Kungkalenja, Kunggari, Kulumali, 
Kukatja, Korenggoreng, Kokowalandja, Kokokulunggur, Kikojawa, Koko-Yimidir, 
Kokangol, Koamu, Karingbal, Kangulu, Kambuwal, Kalkadunga, Kalali, Kaiadilt, 
Juru, Jungkurara, Juipera, Jirandali, Jiman, Jetimarala, Jathaikana, Jarawair, Jangga, 
Jambina, Jalanga, Jagalingu, Irukandjii, Ilba, Idindji, Gulngai, Goeng, Giabal, Gia, 
Ewamin, Djirubal, Djiru, Djakunda, Darambal, Buluwai, Bitjara, Biria, Bindal, 
Bigambul, Barrungguan, Barna, Barbaram, Barada, Bandjin, Bakanambia, Baiali, 
Badjiri, Atjinuri, Araba, Ankamuti, Ajabatha, Ajabakan, Nawagi, Ngandandara, 
Ngaro, Ngathokudi, Ngatjan, Ngaun, Nggmadi, Ngoborindi, Ngugi, Ngulungbara, 
Ngundjan, Ngurawola, Nguri, Njuwathai, Nunukul, Olkolo, Ombila, Otati, Pakadji, 
Pitapita, pitjara, Pontunj, Punthamara, Rakkaia, Ringaringa, Rungarungawa, Tagalag, 
Taior, Taribeland, Tepiti, Thereila Tjapukandji, Totj, Tulua, Undanbi, Unjadi, Wadja, 
Wadjabangai, Wadjaland, Wakabunga, Wakaman, Wakara, Wakawaka, Walangama, 
Walmbaria, Waluwara, Wanamara, Wangan, Wanjuru, Warakamai, Warungu, 
Warakamai, Wanjuru, Warakamai, Warungu, Wik-kalkan, Wik-Munkan, 
Wikampama, Wikapatja, Wikatinda, Wikepa, Wikianji, Wikmean, Wiknantjara, 
Wiknatantja, Winduwinda, Wiri, Wongkadjera, Wongkumara, Wulgurukaba, Wulili, 
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Wulpura, Yir-Yoront1, and many more nations are the Queensland Aboriginal peoples 
and were those nations who existed well before colonisation and who still assert their 
nation status. This is the same with Aboriginal nations in Australia, Aboriginal 
nations in the Caribbean, Aboriginal nations in the Americas and Aboriginal nations 
around the world. This research acknowledges that the use of the category of 
“Aboriginal” and other racialised terms are problematic because it reifies the 
coloniser-colonised binary and, by that, “the binary of superior and inferior beings 
that justifies the logic of domination” (Chalmers, 2014, p. 28). However, in order to 
critique the operationalisation of colonisation this work is limited by the problematic 
language of colonisation to use, at times, the word “Aboriginal” to refer to the subject 
position of the end point of the operation of colonisation, and this “naming” can be 
problematic because it can (re)produce colonising practices. Note that the use of the 
non-capitalised term “aboriginal” is also prevalent in this thesis and refers to the 
adjectival descriptor of an object rather than the proper noun for people and countries.  
 Racialised categories have been used as a vehicle to enable a subject position 
of disadvantage in colonisation (Chalmers, 2014; Grosfoguel, 2008a; Quijano, 2000). 
In the cultural and legal sphere, terms such as “Aboriginal” have been ‘defined’ in 
hierarchal lower positions to function as a tool for colonising practices. In order to 
problematise racialised terms, Yanyuwa scholar Gordon Chalmers calls for: 
A decolonial analysis of taken-for-granted terms like “Aboriginal” [to] 
provide us with another option to reorient ourselves away from continuing to 
make the same mistakes regarding indigenous peoples’ place in this nation 
[Australia]. (Chalmers, 2014, p. 29) 
																																																								
1 Names retrieved from the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Studies website, http://aiatsis.gov.au/  
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Though this research attempts a decolonial critique of the mechanism of colonisation 
and how it is operationalised, it must be acknowledged that problematic racialised 
categories are used throughout the thesis to address the end point of colonising 
practices. Therefore, there is a danger of (re)producing the colonising practices that 
this research aims to critique in the first place.  
 While my intention is to communicate respect through using the capitalised 
words “Australian Aboriginal” and “Aboriginal” in this thesis, these terms do not 
cease to be problematic simply by writing about my intentions. The potential 
problematic nature of this term must be acknowledged; however, this 
problematisation is not the focus of this research. In sum, this thesis uses the 
capitalised words of “Australian Aboriginal” and “Aboriginal” in order to attempt to 
communicate the utmost respect to Aboriginal nations in Queensland and around the 
world; however, this research must begin by acknowledging that the function of the 
word “Aboriginal” and its complicity with colonisation must be problematised.  
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Chapter I 
 Archaeology of Colonisation: A Transversal Approach 
Every society, and every individual, are thus plied by both segmentarities 
simultaneously: one molar, the other molecular. If they are distinct, it is 
because they do not have the same terms or the same relations or the same 
nature or even the same type of multiplicity. If they are inseparable, it is 
because they coexist and cross over into each other… In short, every-thing is 
political, but every politics is simultaneously a macropolitics and a 
micropolitics. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 213, emphasis in original)  
The following research is a historical-theoretical critique of colonisation that 
attempts to answer the broad question of “How has colonisation been micro and 
macro politically operationalised?” It will be argued that colonisation was constituted 
as a form of government and it is operationalised micropolitically (locally) and 
macropolitically (globally); colonisation’s global operation originated within the 
frame of aesthetics (not within the frame of the discourse of anthropology) and its 
local operation is defined by the pure function of the administration of the colonised 
in the specific way that the context dictated (in this case the context of Queensland, 
Australia). In order to understand how colonisation has operated specifically, this 
research engaged in a Foucauldian archaeology of colonisation. Though this 
archaeology of colonisation draws from a Caribbean and Latin American political-
theoretical perspective in conversation with an Australian Aboriginal political-
theoretical perspective, Foucauldian archaeology is used here as a methodological 
tool to unearth the fundamentally Western operationalisation of colonisation. This 
archaeology of colonisation unearthed the origin of the conceptualisations for the 
colonised and the way in which they were used as tools for domination. This research 
finds that the conceptualisation of the subject in the historical materials that surround 
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the Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act 1897 (1897 Act) 
was located in the Western conceptualisations of aboriginality and blackness2. These 
conceptualisations were not originally formed in the 18th or 19th centuries, but rather 
this research argues that they were first formed and conceptualised aesthetically in the 
15th and 16th centuries in the first colonial experiences in the Caribbean (from 1492 to 
1538). Drawing from the literature and historical processes, and from the theory of 
colonisation of the Australian experience and of other parts of the world, particularly 
the experience in Latin America (coloniality/decoloniality network), this thesis 
applies a Foucauldian archaeology to the ongoing process of colonisation. The 
findings are outlined in two parts: the first discusses how the Colonial West first 
conceptualised aboriginality and blackness, and the second discusses how this 
conceptualisation was exerted in Queensland through the Aboriginals Protection and 
Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act 1897 (1897 Act). The three key findings of this 
archaeology are as follows: 
(1) The Western conceptualisation of aboriginality in the 15th and 16th 
centuries revolved around an aesthetic imagery informed by 
‘Monstrous Anthropology’;  
(2) The Western conceptualisation of blackness in the 15th and 16th 
centuries was not directly associated with slavery and slavery was 
inherited from aboriginality. However, the conceptualisation of 
blackness became entangled with the conceptualisation of 
aboriginality, which were the first colonial racial devices not 
																																																								
2 The intention of unearthing the origins of colonisation located in the objects that it 
‘spoke of’ is not to define these conceptualisations, but rather to present the processes 
that historically constituted and animated the praxis of colonisation. 
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informed by the discourse of anthropology but by an aesthetic 
discourse; and 
(3) Utilising these conceptualisations, the mechanism that exerted 
colonisation was manifested in the local administrative operation of 
the 1897 Act in a ‘Blanket Approach’ manner.  
Colonisation in Australia has been rigorously researched, locally, by numerous 
Australian scholars (Augoustinos, Tuffin & Rapley, 2007; Evans 2007; Kidd, 1997; 
MacCorquodale, 1987, Moreton-Robinson, 2003; Nakata, 2007; Reynolds, 1993; 
Uhlmann, 2006); when looking at this abundant scholarship, it is evident that there is 
a close relationship with the colonial issues that are faced globally (Smith, 1999). In 
addition, the literature on colonisation almost collectively indicates that it has strong 
global systemic influences (Anzaldúa, 1999; Bhaba, 1994; Castro-Gómez, 1996; 
Dussel, 1993; Fanon, 1990; Grosfoguel, 2008b; Maldonado-Torres, 2008; Mannoni, 
1991; Mignolo, 1995, Oliver, 2004; Pagán-Jimenez & Rodríguez-Ramos, 2008; Said, 
1978; Smith, 2000; Spivak, 1999). Therefore, it is not an oversimplification to 
conceptualise colonisation as a process that encompasses multiple countries and, by 
extension, it is not limited by distance. Thus, colonisation has been regarded as a form 
of globalisation that has unified the “old” world with the “new” world: a globalisation 
that is constituted by the praxis of domination (Rivera-Santana & Fryer, 2014). The 
coloniality-decoloniality studies network conceptualises colonisation as a global 
process that occurs simultaneously with modernity, capitalism, and patriarchy; rather 
than colonisation being a domination that is resolved through self-determination, the 
coloniality-decoloniality studies network argues that colonisation is historically rooted 
within the forms of thought that are informed by Eurocentrism (Dussel, 1993; 
Quijano, 2000; Grosfoguel, 2011; Mignolo, 1995). Consequently, in this thesis, 
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colonisation is understood as an ongoing global process (Dussel, 1993; Smith, 1999; 
Wallerstein, 1982) that includes yet is not limited to nationalism issues; however, this 
research investigates the local historicity of colonisation in Queensland, Australia, and 
this becomes the grounds that this archaeology excavates.  
	9		
Inquiry Stance 
Carlito’s Way (1993) 1:21:053 
 
Gail:   Can I ask you a personal question? 
Carlito:  Anything 
Gail:   Did you ever kill anybody, Charlie? 
Carlito:  … (snorts) 
Gail:   I’m sorry.  
Carlito:  Well, you know, it’s just like, ahh, it’s just not a simple question. - I mean, I just can’t answer it like… 
Gail:   That’s all right.  - You don’t have to…  - You don’t have to answer.  
Carlito:  When I was a kid in East Harlem… - … the wops4 said… - … no spics 5 could go east of Park Avenue. - Spooks6 said: “No ‘Ricans west of Fifth Avenue.” - Now, that don’t leave you much room to manoeuvrer. Say you 
want to go to Central Park, play with the ducks. You’re shit outta 
luck. So what do you do? You go anyway.  - I’m up on 106th Street, Central Park, near the lake. I get caught by 
these Copiens7. Right?   - They surround me. So I get my blood up, pulls out my blade. I 
said: Como one! I’ll take any of you mothers!” - They say: “No, man. We’re gonna kill your ass”. Out come the zip 
guns. Homemade gun. You pull the hook back, catch the bullet 
square, ping. Hit your head, man, you got serious problems. - That was the last chase on me like that…because from then on I 
carried my own piece. - Guys went down, yeah, but it ain’t like, you know, you just… 
decide one day, and then that’s it. No. - You just do what you gotta do to survive. Somehow, you know, 
you just end up where you are.  
Gail:   That’s how everybody ends up where they are. Everybody.  
 																																																								
3 The film Carlito’s Way (1993) is the story of a Puerto Rican man living in the 
‘barrio’ or the ‘Spanish Harlem’ who cannot escape his history. Carlos Brigante is a 
former heroin drug lord who is released from prison due to a legal technicality, and he 
is determined to abandon his criminal past and retire to the Caribbean. The film, 
directed by Brian de Palma, is based on two novels (Carlito’s Way, 1975 & After 
Hours, 1979) written by Edwin Torres, who is a former Supreme Court judge for New 
York. The film is far from being a masterpiece, but it achieves a brilliant presentation 
of East Harlem in the 1970s, privileging the atmosphere over the individuality of the 
main characters (Maison, 1993).  
4 Pejorative word for Italian Americans.   
5 Pejorative word for Puerto Ricans.  
6 Pejorative word for African Americans.  
7 Another pejorative word for African Americans. 
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In this dialogue from the film Carlito’s Way, Carlito’s answer to Gail 
illustrates the inquiry stance of this archaeology of colonisation. The fact that Carlos 
Brigante (the real name of the main character in the film Carlito’s Way) is a Puerto 
Rican entrapped in a racially segregated, impoverished, and subalternised part of New 
York is a just “happy coincidence”, and there are many coincidences that are found 
throughout this research. To “honestly” answer the question of how colonisation 
operated or operates, the arché must be determined. According to Agamben (2009), 
archaeology can be defined as the search for the arché, which is the Greek term with 
two meanings: the origin and the command8. Agamben (2008), who is a post-
Foucauldian scholar (Clemens, 2008), states that Foucauldian archaeology is the 
search for the beginning and the command, and their constitutive complicity because 
“the beginning not only commands the birth, but also the growing, the circulation, and 
the transmission…in one word the history, of whatever this may be, an idea, a praxis, 
an institution, etc.” (Agamben, 2009, p. 100). Therefore, the origin is not merely a 
start that disappears in what follows: on the contrary, the origin never ceases to 
command, to govern, and to control. This inseparable relationship between the origin 
and the command is the central discussion in Foucault’s Archaeology of Knowledge 
(1974) when he locates the origins of Western knowledge in their threshold of 
formation and their inseparability from power, with knowledge being the commander 
of the exertion of power (Agamben, 2012a; Rachjman 2007). Perhaps Carlito or 
Edwin Torres knew about Foucault or other similar philosophies; however, it appears 
that Carlito’s answer to Gail draws upon that exploration of the origin that will dictate 
the command of surviving through (at times) killing people. Carlito’s answer, rather 
than a simple yes or no with times, names, and dates, provides a more complete 																																																								
8 A more elaborate discussion on the methodology is presented in Chapter II: Theory, 
Methodology and Method: Foucauldian Archaeology.  
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answer that begins with the origin of the behaviour and continues through the 
command; in this thesis, it is argued that a focus on the origin and the command will 
similarly provide a more complete answer to the operationalisation of colonisation. 
How is this quote from Carlito’s Way related to the question of colonisation in 
Australia and Puerto Rico, or more broadly the Caribbean? The short answer lies in 
how Carlito honestly and insightfully answered Gail’s question. The purpose of this 
Foucauldian archaeology is to answer the question of colonisation with the same 
honesty that Carlito did when asked if he ever killed anybody.  
What was colonisation (with the assumption that the process is over, which 
contradicts the argument in this research)? The answer for this question should be 
simple if colonisation is only defined. Colonisation is defined as “to settle and 
establish control over the indigenous people in a given area” (Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary, n.d.). Therefore, colonisation can be understood simply through the 
settlement and establishment of control in Australia, Puerto Rico, Mexico, and every 
other colonised country. However, as has been foreshadowed, just like Carlito when 
he answered the question “Did you ever kill anyone?”, the question of “What is 
colonisation?” is not easy to answer. Carlito’s question has an individual element to it, 
expressed using the pronoun “you”, that he appears to resist. Instead of answering 
with a simple “Yes, I did” or “No, I didn’t”, Carlito begins to tell a story that is 
located in the event when he first encountered explicit territorial violence. The story 
sets the grounds for what would be the climax of the answer, which is “Guys went 
down, yeah, but it ain’t like, you know, you just… decide one day, and then that’s it. 
No.” This answer disregards the “Yes, I did” and “No, I didn’t” answers that would 
indicate that killing is simply an isolated and independent incident, or as though the 
answer can be located in one or many individual moments of time buried in the past. 
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The response that describes the history of his environment locates the answer of the 
question in a more or less accurate place where the situation might be found along the 
pathway from which it came and where it is going. Carlito’s response maps the 
answer that starts drawing his story in the beginning where he can recall not killing 
people. That threshold moment not only maps the location of the answer, but it also 
demonstrates the direction of the narrative that his life has taken and will likely 
continue to take. The dialogue concludes with locating the nature of Carlito’s answer 
in a specific place, or as stated by Carlito, “Somehow, you know, you just end up 
where you are”; then Gail states, “That is how everybody ends up where they are. 
Everybody.” Similarly, the answer to “What is colonisation?” cannot be fully 
answered using isolated events in history or the times and places where it happened. 
The answer must be mapped starting at the threshold moment of colonisation. From 
there, the task is to map how we all ended up here, the colonisers and the colonised. If 
this is true, then the question of “what is colonisation” must be reconceptualised to 
“How has colonisation occurred and worked (operated) to produce different peoples 
(both colonised and coloniser) who ended up where they are now?” This research is 
interested in the mapping of colonisation rather than the specifics of how colonisation 
can be defined as an outcome of a linear logical sequence.     
Literature Review 
In other words, the essential thing here is to see clearly, to think clearly – that 
is, dangerously- and to answer clearly the innocent first question: what, 
fundamentally, is colonization? To agree on what it is not: neither 
evangelization, not a philanthropic enterprise, nor a desire to push back the 
frontiers of ignorance, disease, and tyranny, nor a project undertaken for the 
greater glory of God, not an attempt to extend the rule of law. To admit once 
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and for all, without flinching at the consequences, that the decisive actors here 
are the adventurer and the pirate, the wholesale grocer and the ship owner, the 
gold digger and the merchant, appetite and force and behind them, the baleful 
projected shadow of a form of civilisation which, at a certain point in its 
history, finds itself obliged, for internal reasons, to extend to a world scale the 
competition of its antagonistic economies. (Cesaire, 1972, p. 33).  
This brief literature review attempts to review and connect (integrate) the 
works addressing colonisation from different parts of the world, with a focus on the 
Latin American and Caribbean, and Australian theoretical contexts. It follows the 
complexity of Cesaire’s question that he proposed 60 years ago and that remains 
relevant today. Even though there is general agreement that colonisation is strongly 
influenced by a global ongoing process (Anzaldúa, 1999; Bhaba, 1994; Castro-
Gómez, 1996; Dussel, 1993; Fanon, 1990; Grosfoguel, 2008a; Maldonado-Torres, 
2008; Mannoni, 1991; Mignolo, 1995; Oliver, 2004; Pagán-Jimenez & Rodríguez-
Ramos, 2008; Quijano, 2000; Said, 1978; Smith, 2000; Spivak, 1999), its theorisation 
is often limited by the segregated spaces that are dictated by the coloniser’s agenda. 
Colonisation studies are usually regarded as beginning with the works of Frantz 
Fanon in the context of the global fight for self-determination. After self-
determination was achieved in most countries, colonisation lost relevance and a new 
body of research was formed called “post-colonialism”, which focuses on the 
subaltern, deconstruction, and decolonization of the “mind” focused mainly on post-
structural studies on subjectivity (Castro-Gómez, 2007). In Latin America, another 
form of colonial studies emerged from the context of social justice, and it was closely 
linked with theology of liberation; together, they have been labelled as coloniality-
decoloniality studies (Grosfoguel, 2008b). These studies have focused on intellectual 
	14		
colonisation and later the way that colonisation focused on the thought forms rather 
than only on the occupation of the land. In contrast, theorists from New Zealand, 
Australia, and other countries have declared that for them, particularly for Aboriginal 
peoples, colonisation is not over and decolonisation must still happen (Anzaldúa, 
1999; Moreton-Robinson, 2003; Nakata, 2007; Smith, 2000). Therefore, ways to 
critique racism and Eurocentric thought, and to decolonise knowledges have been 
researched and theorised. This exceptional body of research, regardless of the 
consensus that colonisation is an ongoing process, is often divided by national 
Western practices such as languages. For example, Latin American (Spanish and 
Portuguese-speaking) literature is often not considered in Anglo (English-speaking) 
countries, and vice versa. Although some theorists have begun to reference each other 
given the useful concepts and critiques that they have developed, e.g. Nakata, Nakata, 
Keech & Bolt (2012) and Pagán-Jiménez & Rodriguez-Ramos (2008), significant 
work remains to be undertaken. A key intention of this research is to re-instate that 
colonisation is a global process of domination, without losing the mainly historical 
local complexities of a given place, and to integrate research from Latin America, 
specifically the coloniality-decoloniality studies, with that from Anglo countries 
(predominantly Australia), i.e. colonisation-decolonisation studies.   
Colonisation: Coloniser and the Colonised Across Borders 
Every colonised person—in other words, every person in whose soul an 
inferiority complex has been created by the death and burial of its local 
cultural originality—finds itself face to face with the language of the civilising 
nation; that is, with the culture of the mother country (Fanon, 1952, p. 55).  
Through various international events and, somewhat constituted between the 
First World War and Second World War, the issue of colonisation was ideologised 
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through the promotion of national sovereignty, which positioned colonisation as a 
nationalistic issue (Berríos, 1972). The United Nations created the Special 
Decolonization Committee and this institution dominated the discussion and 
meanings of colonization (UN, n.d.). The Committee went on to promote the 
independence of the nations. In this context, the subjugating processes of colonisation 
in other forms roamed free9 and authors including Fanon, in the context of Algeria, 
and Said (1978), in the cultural context of Palestine, theorised about colonisation. It 
could be said that colonisation, which is understood as the relationship between the 
colonised and coloniser that is a battle to the death, was inaugurated with Frantz 
Fanon’s work portrayed in Black Skin, White Mask (1952): 
A Negro behaves differently with a white man and with another Negro. That 
this self-division is a direct result of colonialist subjugation is beyond 
question… No one would dream of doubting that its major artery is fed from 
the heart of those various theories that have tried to prove that the Negro is a 
stage in the slow evolution of monkey into man. Here is objective evidence 
that expresses reality. (p. 32) 
This theorisation that is located in the relationship between the coloniser and the 
colonised implies a subjugating relationship, not only from the coloniser as a person, 
but also the coloniser as a representation that can be located in the coloniser-as-
person, coloniser-as-institution, and even in the colonised-as-person. In Prospero and 
Caliban: The Psychology of Colonization, Mannoni (1991) projects the image in an 
“attitude” of colonisation as the colonised hopelessly accept domination but with the 
																																																								
9 Garcia-Canclini (1995) and other authors argue that Capitalist and Neoliberal 
practices, such as the Americanisation of various countries, roamed free as non-
nationalistic entities and directly impacted these countries, for example through pop 
culture.   
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unsatisfying expectation to support themselves; here, he projects the structure of a 
discourse or imaginary ideology, and not the literal voice of the people.  
However, before this, the accumulation of knowledge, socio-political 
processes, and particular moments in history have provided the discursive devices to 
create this constituted body of knowledge. For example, the master-slave relationship 
first unveiled explicitly10 by Nietzsche and Hegel, has been broadened to include the 
civil movements of African Americans in the United States, the post-Second World 
War debate on the Decolonization of the Nations promoting their self-determination, 
the Indian civil movements against British domination, Napoleon invading Egypt 
using science (Said, 1978), and so on.  From the context of the French domination in 
Martinique and later in Algeria, Fanon engaged in a strong critique of the process of 
colonisation and its subjectification to the self. However, from that critique, a defined 
socio-political agenda of liberation emerged in which Fanon participated actively for 
the self-determination of Algeria and to reach the free post-colonial subject (Fanon, 
1990). Ironically, Fanon’s work was echoed in academia, where it created a 
multiplicity of works from different contexts. One such work was Edward Said’s who 
in 1978 wrote Orientalism, from a Palestinian context, that critiqued the way in which 
the Westernised gaze portrayed and subjected a particular gaze on the Orient that 
could not be seen in any way other than the “ideal other” that accepted particular ways 
in which the Middle East was idealised that served the specific purpose of a 
subjugating agenda of Western culture. These authors did not only claim the 
independence of their nations, but they also denounced the coloniser and colonised 
struggle in everyday life practices.  
																																																								
10 Hegel in his Phenomenology of the Spirit discusses the master-slave dialectic yet it 
is not as explicit as Nietzsche’s discussion (Fukuyama, 1992). 
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It appears that the significant colonisation theorists have been subjected to the 
dominating discourse of the cause of nationalism. When most countries acquired their 
“independence”, the debate grew older and older. Therefore, the domination drive 
from the colonisers from a nationalist logic did not align. From here, however, the 
postcolonial approach aligned and it pinpointed subjectivity and subjugation from a 
poststructuralist perspective that predominantly utilised Westernised theoretical 
elaborations to understand domination. Spivak (1988) theorised that a double form of 
domination was embodied in Indian women. This was the domination of Westernised 
practices and male domination. Spivak and the New Delhi School drew from 
Derridian, Marxist, Foucauldian, and Deleuzian theories in order to understand 
subjugation.  
Intellectual colonisation (Martín-Baró, 1986) is a vivid form of subjugation, 
the same as land conquering. Firstly, Western forms of thought “others” native and 
subjugated forms of knowing and understanding particular phenomena. In order to 
privilege, rigorous reading of a historicity of philosophers and, reading itself, 
subjugates particular forms of knowing and imposes imported understandings of 
colonisation, in particular, that come from a coloniser’s context. Linda Tuhiwai Smith 
(2000) was very aware of these notions of colonisation and she argued that the “post” 
prefix suggests that colonisation is over. However, her Maori-Indigenous background 
cannot accept that it is over; she refuses post-colonialism as a political stance and re-
politicises the colonisation notion through re-taking the de-colonizing gesture, 
particularly regarding methodology and Indigenous ways of knowing.  
In Latin America, colonisation and decolonisation were extensive as a result of 
the Eurocentric dominating perspective and the US interventions in the sovereign 
nations of El Salvador, Chile, and Guatemala, among others. These conditions created 
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a body of academic theorisation that is heavily influenced by Marxism with a socio-
political agenda that addresses Eurocentrism and colonising interventions of the US 
and that engages in a praxis of decolonising practices that were manifested through 
disciplines such as Liberation Psychology, Liberation Pedagogies, and Liberation 
Theology (see Freire, 1970; Matín-Baró, 1986; Montero, 2004), in which concepts 
such as intellectual colonisation have been coined in order to address different forms 
of imperialism and colonisation. The colonisation and decolonisation influences are 
also evident in the Caribbean where the French, British, US, and Spanish colonies 
exist(ed), in which colonisation is an everyday life reality. While this debate was 
transpiring, the historical reconstitution of the international socio-political processes 
re-framed the debate from a colonial debate to a post-colonial one through various 
moments in history. For example, India was “officially” independent of British rule; 
the United Nations Decolonization Committee pressured colonised nation-states to 
create the conditions that enabled them to self-determine themselves; for example, the 
Algeria occupation was no longer an issue (Algeria was a “Mecca” for the 
intelligentsia to socially “intervene”); these, among other moments, made it possible 
to discuss a “post-colonial” time. This also functioned to expand the notion of 
colonialism (primarily referring to nationalism) into even more oppressed subjects, 
such as women, African-Americans in the US, and self-determined countries that still 
lived in the hegemony of subalternity. From here, theorists such as Gayatri Spivak 
and Edward Said were framed as post-colonial thinkers who produced a particular 
body of work such as Can The Subaltern Speak (1988) that drew from post-structural 
perspectives and Marxism; it could be argued that such works inaugurated another 
way to understand colonisation. Postcolonial thinking assumed different perspectives, 
such as Subaltern Studies that focused on contemporary hegemony studies from the 
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works of Gramsci (Gramsci, 1986; Spivak, 1988), Critical Race Theory (Williams, 
1992), Post-structural Feminist approaches, Comparative Literature (Said, 1978), 
Critical and Liberation Pedagogy (Freire, 1970), Liberation and Critical Psychology 
(Martín-Baró, 1986; Montero, 2004; Prilleltensky & Nelson, 2009; Sonn, 2006), and 
so on.  
Colonisation and subjectivity are concepts that at first glance can be 
understood as a transition from a general process to a particular process, with a 
deductive directionality. However, when it is understood as a process that interlocks 
in the relative space where the global process intersects with subjects, colonisation 
cannot assume this logic. Furthermore, the notion of subjectivity in this research is 
understood not in relation to the differences of each other or even the understanding 
of subject position and subjectivity as a “lived experience” (Oliver, 2004), but in 
relation to the subjectivity that is located in the power relations (re)produced by 
knowledge and normativity (Foucault, 2005). More closely related to colonisation, 
Fanon theorised on the subject positioning of the colonised in relation to the coloniser 
in which the colonised needs the coloniser in order to constitute its subject 
positioning, as much as the coloniser needs the colonised in order to maintain its 
subjugation (Fanon, 1952, 1990). Within this theorising, a psychoanalytic tradition 
was inaugurated in order to understand the self (also with Mannoni’s work in 1950). 
Subjection implies subjectivity, and the subject positioning and its processes 
(particularly the dialectic logic) is a way to understand the ‘inferiority complex’, the 
battle to the death gesture of the coloniser and the colonised position. Psychoanalytic 
versions of subjectivity, which continue to place particular attention on representation, 
language, non-linguistic visceral responses, and any bodily responses (which mediate 
affects, will, and drives), require responsivity and relation in order to (re)constitute 
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the subject positioning (Oliver, 2004). This indicates that contemporary Freudian 
psychoanalysis perspectives on subjectivity separate the subject position and the 
subjectivity or the lived experience of the self (Soler, 1997). Furthermore, the 
oppressed-oppressor relationship operates within these coordinates of subject 
position, where the colonised are in the subject position of the oppressed and lived 
experience of the self becomes a by-product of that subject position (Fanon, 1952; 
Oliver 2004). The outcome feelings of colonisation, such as inferiority, melancholia, 
and even psychotic reverberations, are located in the psyche (Oliver, 2004; Soler, 
1997).   
Post-colonial thinkers such as Spivak (1988) and Bhabha (1990) have 
assimilated the post-structural perspective on subjectivity. The deconstruction of the 
subject of Modernity demonstrated that subjectivity focuses solely on subject 
formation (Derrida, 1995). That is, behind subject formation – i.e. behind the social 
and historical constructions that subjected the self – there is nothing else. The very 
idea of an individual, a centred self with a psyche, a personal lived experience, and 
emotions, was contested because in its deconstruction (Derrida, 1995) or in its 
genealogy (Foucault, 2007) it was found that these notions were produced and 
situated in a particular time, in a particular social context, and with a particular 
agenda. When referring directly to subjectivity and colonisation, Spivak states 
“between patriarchy and imperialism, subject constitution and object formation, the 
figure of the woman disappears, not into pristine nothingness but into a violent 
shuttling which is the displaced figuration of the "third world woman" caught between 
tradition and modernization" (1988, p. 102). The constitution of colonisation is 
affected in the constitution of subjectivity, obliterating the previous subject formation 
of a woman and the subject formation of cultural processes.  
	21		
Another aspect of subjectivity and colonisation that is found in Australian 
academia is subjectivity as praxis in an ethnographic exertion from Bourdieu’s (1977) 
perspective. However, in Uhlmann’s ethnographic study on Australian kinship and 
family (2006), which was undertaken in Newcastle, New South Wales, subjectivity is 
seen in how the theory of practice engenders a particular set of constitutions of 
families in Australian subjectivity (Uhlmann, 2006). In contrast, colonisation and 
subjectivity are elaborated from psychoanalytic and discourse analysis perspectives 
that engage in the way subject positions have constituted the projection of the 
Australian Aboriginal as a threat to the “Australian nation” or nationalism (Riggs & 
Augoustinos, 2005).  
Latin American subaltern studies, which were influenced by the works of post-
colonial thinking and the theology of liberation, have found echoes in many fields, 
particularly in Latin American and North American universities (Castro-Gómez, 
2007). Theorists such as Immanuel Wallerstein, Anibal Quijano, Nestor García-
Canclini, Enrique Dussel, Walter Mignolo, and Ramon Grosfoguel, among others, 
initiated coloniality-decoloniality studies and their coloniality-modernity network, 
which will be used in this thesis indistinctively. Theorists such as García-Canclini, 
Dussel, and Grosfoguel from the field of cultural studies assimilated colonisation, 
assuming the idea of subjectivity, in this re-appropriated space for theory in which the 
social is dissolved in the category of the self, because they are one, the same, and 
mutually inclusive (Castro-Gomez, 1996; García-Canclini, 1995; Mignolo, 1995). In 
this method of theorising, the categories of analysis refer to the person rather than to 
society, although they add that it is an effect of post-modern times in which 
globalisation and neoliberal practices, de-territorialisation, and the evident classes of 
epistemic frameworks that constitute contemporary times (Harvey, 1990; García-
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Canclini, 1995; Mignolo, 1997). With this diffusion in mind, in which the subject is 
lost, the Latin American perspective has identified certain particularities of 
colonisation including that it operates simultaneously with the processes of 
modernity, capitalism, and patriarchy (Dussel, 1993; Quijano, 2000). In particular, 
colonisation was described in the triple formation of the colonisation of power, the 
colonisation of knowledge, and the colonisation of the being (Castro-Gómez, 1996; 
Dussel, 1993; Mignolo, 1997). According to some coloniality-decoloniality theorists, 
the colonisation of power operates through the system of social classifications 
established in the 16th century in which social privileges are established according to 
the symbolic and phenotypic race of the subjects (Castro-Gómez, 2007; Grosfoguel, 
2012; Mignolo, 1997). These triads of symbolic indicators have their genealogical 
roots in the ideological processes of the Biblical story of the descendants of Noah who 
populated the Earth after the Great Flood (Castro-Gómez, 1996; Dussel, 1993; 
Mignolo, 1997). The descendants of Jafet, Sem, and Cam respectively represent the 
socially implied hierarchy of European, Aboriginal, and African peoples (Castro-
Gómez, 1996; Dussel, 1993; Mignolo, 1997). The colonisation of knowledge refers to 
the way that technocratic science rationality represents a determinant factor of the 
“progress” of industrialisation and the movement from a “Third World” ideology to a 
“First World” ideology. Castro-Gómez (1996) illustrated how after the Borbonic 
Reforms in Spain (18th century), the idea was imposed that “to know” was to distance 
oneself from the world and to see it in a “passion-free” and systematic manner. This 
supposes a colonisation of the mind that threatens and directly battles the epistemic 
multiplicity of the world. This notion is what is referred to as coloniality.   
The form of the colonisation of the being is the direct colonisation of the body 
(not only the organism itself but also the social construction of it), which refers 
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directly to the Foucauldian concept of bio-politics (Castro-Gómez, 2007; Foucault, 
2005; Grosfoguel, 2012). Transcending the Westernised-European notion of the 
centred self through which the colonisation of the being is not about manifestly 
making the subaltern die, but rather it is about making them live within the logics of 
the project of modernity, which implies a governmentality and control of the subject 
(Castro-Gómez, 2007). Furthermore, within the structures of subjectivity, the 
colonisation of the being is not only perceived as a process that oppresses but also as 
an element of desire because it produces the material and dialectic conditions of a 
particular existence of populations.  
Psychoanalysis, subjectivity, and colonisation in Australia have been discussed 
in many forms including the research on whiteness studies that does not only explore 
this concept as discourse but also serves as a decolonising agenda of pointing the 
White-Western-European weapon of research “right back” at them (Sonn, 2006). For 
example, Riggs & Augoustinos, (2005) located the dominant discourses of whiteness 
in subjective investments through analysing white Australian talk in relation to 
indigenous title claims. They located exclusion in the discourses and in the 
projections of the (re)constitution of white hegemony as a device that represents a 
logic of pragmatism and of Australian national identity in the “one flag” rhetoric 
(Riggs & Augoustinos, 2005). Furthermore, Augoustinos, Tuffin & Rapley (2007) 
located the subject positioning of Australian Aboriginal peoples in the media within 
the discourses of an: 
…imperialist narrative of Australian history exculpatory of colonialism; an 
economic-rationalist/neo-liberal discourse of ‘productivity’ and entitlement 
managing accountability for a contemporary Aboriginal ‘plight’; a local 
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discourse of balance and even-handedness which discounted the seriousness of 
discrimination and racism in Australia. (p. 721) 
These discourses that present subject positions that are presented as “imperialist 
anxieties” attempt to further visualise the self of the coloniser in an explicit 
decolonising and socio-political agenda.  
Given the context of this work, knowledge claims about the Australian 
Aboriginal community would be unproductive. Thus, it would be more interesting to 
determine the extent that colonisation has operated to re-constitute subjectivity in a 
seemingly contradictory condition, albeit no less true. Perhaps the most contradictory 
discourse that operates on the subjectivity produced by colonisation is that the 
Aboriginal inhabitants of Australia are subjected to the logics of disposition and 
migration. Moreton-Robinson (2003) argues: 
The subsequent legal regimes we all live under are outcomes of post-
colonising conditions. Indigenous people’s circumstances are tied to non-
Indigenous migration and our dislocation is the result of our land being 
acquired by the new immigrants. We share this common experience as 
Indigenous people just as all migrants share the benefits of our dispossession.  
(Moreton-Robinson, 2003, p. 37) 
In the most ironic of ways – and also in the most perverse – the discourses and 
explicit manifestations that Australian Aboriginal peoples are subjected to are within 
the logics of a dispositif or a conceptual apparatus (immigration) that first ironically 
dispossesses the native subject of their neoliberal land rights and that second positions 
the first migrant as the native owner (Moreton-Robinson, 2003). This is contradictory, 
even using Aristotelian logic, but the colonisation process is shaped by the logics of 
white possession.  
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In one manifestation of Australian Aboriginal resistance – native title claims – 
many argue that the Koiki Mabo decision and the Native Title Act (1993) have 
positioned Australian Aboriginal people as “trespassers” in their own land until 
proven otherwise (Moreton-Robinson, 2003). Claimants are obliged to convert and 
frame an oral history perspective into a Westernised-European constituted medium, 
such as written reports, constructed by people working in “valid” disciplines such as 
anthropologists, historians, lawyers, police, and public servants. The (re)constitution 
of the title and land ownership is dependant on White-Patriarchal-Westernised-
European decision making. Within the logics of the Common Law and the Crown 
(terra nullius), there is still a policy driven debate revolving around the juridical 
effects of the invalidation, and therefore the illegal occupation of Australia (McNeil, 
1998). 
Closer to where the context of this archaeology of colonisation was performed 
is Rosalind Kidd’s (1994) doctoral thesis “Regulating Bodies: administrations and 
Aborigines in Queensland 1840-1988”, which was later published as The Way We 
Civilise: Aboriginal Affairs, the Untold Story (1997), which is a ground-breaking 
work that tells the stories of Australian Aboriginal people’s subjugation through the 
numerous control procedures that the government has exerted through labour, health, 
and many other institutional devices. Kidd’s book also serves the political purpose of 
these files being accessible and making visible the terrible things that Australian 
Aboriginal people have been subjected to. Since that time, Kidd’s work has been an 
obligatory citation when discussing the history of Aboriginal Australia in Queensland 
and elsewhere, particularly from the coordinates of the Aboriginals Protection and 
Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act 1897. Kidd’s extensive and rigorous historical 
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analyses is a significant contribution that, in one way or another, guides this research, 
particularly in the common agenda of telling a story of oppression.  
Lastly, the renowned academic Torres Strait Islander Martin Nakata produced 
a historical-theoretical problematisation of colonisation in his book Disciplining the 
Savages, Savaging the Disciplines (2007). Like this research, Nakata’s book has also 
been influenced by Foucault’s framework, focussing on the notions of power and 
knowledge, and using archaeology as his methodological framework. His book 
critiques the knowledge provided to Torres Strait Islanders by Westernisation; it 
rigorously critiques the production of knowledge in the fields of education, language, 
spirituality, and other Western inscriptions. Nakata revises more than 200 years of 
history in order to contest the knowledge produced from the coloniser’s eye. For 
example, when critiquing the reports on Torres Strait issues written to feed the broad 
field of social sciences, he states: 
…these were academic treatises designed to expand the intellectual landscape 
of the then infant social sciences. Their purpose was to objectively observe 
and document, not to change or distort what they were observing and 
documenting. Yet, in effect, the work of these scientists was later to do 
precisely this. For they were to shape and inform disciplines, leaving behind a 
legacy embedded in knowledge that has not yet been properly recognised or 
acknowledged (e.g. Roldán, 1993). As such, this invisibility makes the legacy 
of their work more insidious. (Nakata, 2007, p. 28) 
This ‘legacy’ was the construction and inception of a classification system that made 
Torres Strait Islanders, but arguably Australian Aboriginal peoples in general, slip 
into the hierarchy of racial inequality determined by social Darwinism (Nakata, 
2007). Nakata’s work, and others from different perspectives, unearths the social 
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Darwinist discourse of modern anthropology. Through problematising the “taken for 
granted” knowledge that is built, by social sciences for example, for Aboriginal 
peoples, another sense of being can be imagined. Nakata decisively describes his 
problematisation to social sciences as follows: 
The data contained in the Cambridge team’s reports (1904, 1908 & 1912) is 
impressively extensive and detailed. The product of a lengthy intellectual 
gestation, it was not to be published in its entirety as a general ethnography of 
the Torres Strait until 1935, decades after the studies were carried out. As 
noted earlier, this report is increasingly regarded by both Islanders and non-
Islanders a valuable source of data on the Islander beliefs and traditions and, 
by definition, of Islander people. Yet, despite the wealth of detail, these 
remain little more than random snapshots. In fact, they can never more than 
this no matter how carefully they are reinterpreted or filtered simply because 
the viewpoint from which they were framed was, from the beginning, 
constrained both historically and intellectually. (Nakata, 2007, p. 101, 
emphasis added) 
Certainly, the problematisation of the discourse of modern anthropology is powerfully 
described here. However, has it always been the case that Western culture 
conceptualised Aboriginal peoples along the lines of this Darwinist system of 
inequality? If not, how then have Aboriginal peoples been conceptualised before this? 
How has colonisation operated to initiate its ‘viewpoint’, which can be the origin of 
this ‘historical and intellectual constraint’? How has colonisation’s conceptualisation 
started in order to enable this mechanism?   
In order to critique the ongoing global process of colonisation, research must 
be united and not segregated, linking and not alienating, and transversal and not 
	28		
isolated. This does not mean that arguments of the diagnosis of colonisation should 
not be contested; it means that the direction of the critique or the politics should all 
aim towards the same problem with a united overarching goal. This research critiques 
colonisation through an unearthing of the phenomena following the inquiry stance of 
Michel Foucault; that is, archaeology. The colonisation literature described above 
provides the foundations for this research, with a particular focus on the theorisations 
of the coloniality-decoloniality studies and the colonisation-decolonisation bodies of 
works primarily from Australia. Through using Foucauldian archaeology in the 
context of the colonisation of Australia, unearthing both the origin of colonisation in 
the Caribbean and the command in Queensland, a transversal critique of colonisation 
can be performed that will not be limited by the colonisers’ segregation agenda.  
The first part of this thesis is devoted to describing the global origins of the 
formation of Western conceptualisations of aboriginality and of blackness, because 
they determine the instituting relationships of how colonisation understands and 
captures the colonised subjects that it considers. The chapter on Monstrous 
Anthropology argues that the first Western conceptualisation of the colonised subject 
was aboriginality as framed in reference to anthropocentric monsters as understood in 
the 15th and 16th centuries. The historical thresholds, i.e. the entry point of the 
beginning, of the aforementioned Western conceptualisations demonstrate the original 
relationships (processes) that determine the outline within which to capture the 
colonised subjects. The conceptualisations of monstrous anthropology and Western 
blackness are discussed separately, but the initial historical path of colonisation 
connects them. Differing to the Western racial conceptualisations of blackness and 
aboriginality, which are located in the narrative of racial inequality predicated by 
social Darwinism, this research discovers that the origins of this conceptualisation are 
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located in the space of Western anthropocentric aesthetics. When reading the first 
Chronicles of Christopher Columbus from 1492 to 1493 and analysing the first 
drawings and paintings from the most influential kingdoms of Western culture, the 
aesthetic of ‘ugliness’ appears to be the place where this first conceptualisation of 
aboriginality emerged. Furthermore, this Western aesthetic appreciation locates the 
conceptualisation of aboriginality in the readily available imagery of monstrosity 
framing it in the illustration of the cannibal from where it can be captured and 
enslaved. The historical threshold space of colonisation is located from when it was 
the route through which to grasp an ‘understanding’ of the colonised to when there 
was a solidified sense of what can be the colonised, predominantly Aboriginal or 
African slaves; this illustrates the historical processes that encode the Western 
conceptualisations of colonisation. Chapter III Monstrous Anthropology argues that 
the Western conceptualisation of aboriginality was formed through aesthetics in the 
historical threshold that depicted Aboriginal peoples as monstrous, and specifically as 
cannibals, which served the initial purposes of colonisation.  
In Chapter IV Blackness, it is argued that the second Western 
conceptualisation emerged in the history of colonisation encoded in the context of 
Western aboriginality and of slavery, and finalised through granting relevance to 
colour in determining social positions. The historical threshold of Western blackness 
in this chapter is described beginning with an account of slavery when it was not 
associated with blackness and an account of blackness when it was not associated 
with slavery; then, it is personified by the first documented black conquistador, Juan 
Garrido. Thirdly, a (short) historical pathway of slavery is presented, and the 
connection between the historical process in which slavery (first being associated in 
the Americas with Aboriginal peoples) was linked with blackness, which initiated the 
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colouring of social positions, is clarified. At the end of this chapter, the first painting 
of the Américas, Los Mulatos de Esmeralda by Adrián Sánchez Galque in 1599, is 
used to demonstrate the linked chain of historical processes that constituted the 
relationships of the Western conceptualisations of blackness and aboriginality. This 
painting illustrates the solidification of the historical processes contextualised in the 
monstrous anthropological conceptualisation of aboriginality, constituted by 
narratives of tragedy and of capture from an anthropocentric gaze, and motivated by 
conquest (tragedy-capture-anthropocentrism-conquest). It also presents the historical 
processes of the Western conceptualisation of blackness that follow and that are 
constituted by the relevance of colouring and of cultural practices, the positioning of 
social status, and association with value (colouring-cultural practice-social status-
value11).  
The third part of this thesis is the description of the command of colonisation 
that locates its model in the operationalisation of the 1897 Act in Queensland, 
Australia, which I refer to as the Blanket Approach; this is the main topic of Chapter 
V The Blanket Approach. It is argued that the 1897 Act, as an illustrative case study of 
the operation of colonisation, has a triple function that used the mechanisms that are 
defined by the Blanket Approach. In the same manner that Foucault (1973) described 
the exertion of power via the taxonomy or classification system dictated by Western 
																																																								
11 The Taíno-Awarak language, which is the language group of the Taínos who were 
the first Aboriginal group that made contact with colonisation and from which I am a 
descendant, named complex notions using various concepts. For example, the origin 
of humanity was conceptualised as Atabey-Apito-Yermao-Guacar-Zuimaco and the 
notion of hurricane was conceptualised as Guabancex-Guatauba-Coastrisquie. Each 
notion referred to a process; for example, the hurricane referred to one process of 
capturing the winds, the other lifting the waters, and lastly the process of releasing 
both. The numbers of concepts were odd, usually 3, 5, or 7 when referring to nature. I 
have used the numbers of 4 and 8 in order to position the colonisation notions as 
unnatural. However, I have chosen not to subject this theoretical strategy to formal 
logical scrutiny. 
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knowledge, or the spatial distribution of the mechanism of power described as 
panoptism (Deleuze, 1985; Foucault, 1976), the 1897 Act used a complex mechanism 
described using the ‘wordplay’ of this Blanket Approach notion. This non-discursive 
operation (Deleuze, 1985) is a pure function that is used to subjectify the object it 
speaks of. That is, this research discovers that the Blanket Approach, which is only 
constituted by its function, is a modern mechanism that delivers the origin and 
command of colonisation. In general, a Blanket Approach refers to something that is 
used to cover everything or everybody; when it is used to describe the 1897 Act, it 
refers to this Act being imposed on every aspect of the Australian Aboriginal 
subjectivity that is defined by Westernisation for every individual person. The Blanket 
Approach delivered the Western conceptualisation of aboriginality and blackness, 
constituted by their historical linkage, through the triple function of totality, 
multiplicity, and the creation of desire. The historical processes of tragedy-capture-
anthropocentrism-conquest and colouring-cultural practice-social status-value are the 
threads used to weave the Blanket of the 1897 Act. The Blanket Approach’s triple 
function of totalisation, multiplicity, and the creation of desire is the modern formula 
for the pure function of colonisation. Through an example of contemporary aesthetics, 
in the form of art, the last chapter in part three uses an example from contemporary art 
and aesthetics to illustrate how colonisation integrates its colonial content or 
discursive devices with a movement to transform the landscapes of the colonised. 
Dannie Mellor’s technique of blue-and-white Spode china (blue-china) is used to 
exemplify how the origin of colonisation connects with the command or the 
movement of colonisation to surround the landscapes and the mental landscapes of the 
subjectivity of the colonised. The blue-china technique is also used to exemplify the 
double fold mechanism of colonisation, the discursive formations or 
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conceptualisations of aboriginality and blackness, and the operation or pure function 
of colonisation described as the Blanket Approach, and the specific technology or 
form of power that carries out this operation is considered to be the conceptualist 
movement.  
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Chapter II 
 Theory, Methodology, and Method: Foucauldian Archaeology 
 
…what would it mean to invent a new kind of critique based neither in the 
supposition of God’s infinite understanding (or its “hermeneutic” equivalents) 
nor in the sort of finitude of Man central to Heidegger’s reading of Kant. 
Foucault’s own solution to this problem in the 60s was to imagine a form of 
critique elaborated in his talk of a “historical a priori” in the Archaeology of 
Knowledge. Could we not see the conditions of what we say and see as a 
matter of changing, materially rooted “regimes”, with no basis in a larger 
philosophical anthropology (or related human sciences), but in relation to 
which there could arise a new archaeological style of critical investigation 
based instead in the supposition of critical moments in which we start to 
depart from those conditions or “regimes” and invent new ways of talking 
about and seeing? (Rajchman in Foucault, 2007, p. 21) 
 This archaeological research critically investigates colonisation in order to see 
it and talk about it in new ways. Using this archaeological method also aids in 
conceptualising colonisation outside philosophical anthropocentrism. However, in 
order to achieve this, archaeology must be (re)discovered. That is, the theorisation of 
this notion as a method must be navigated. In this research, archaeology refers to the 
investigation of specific historical processes through the identification of their origin 
and command12, as well as their intimate relationships (or the mechanisms through 
which the commands are delivered) (Agamben, 2009). The etymological definition of 
archaeology signifies both origin and command. Therefore, this notion explicitly 
refers to the notion of history, but not a history founded in Kantian anthropocentric 																																																								
12 The specific use of these terms is explained later in this chapter.  
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philosophy or philosophical anthropology. Archaeology is the history of words and 
objects, and their relationships. Furthermore, the words and objects are understood 
and perceived by their positivities (presence), and this positivity implies a topological 
distribution of history, power, and discourses (Deleuze, 1985). The archaeology of 
knowledge that Foucault engaged with in his work The Order of Things (or literally 
translated as On Words and Things) is the beginning of the search for the history of 
knowledge in Western culture through unearthing its origins and the operation of its 
command. From here, Foucault maps the almost interchangeable relationship between 
power and knowledge (Agamben, 2008; Deleuze, 1985; Rajchman, 2007). Later, 
Foucault attempts to make this form of inquiry more explicit in his book The 
Archaeology of Knowledge (Foucault, 1974). Deleuze and Agamben’s readings of 
Foucault’s work guide my theorisation of the Foucauldian archaeology in this 
research.  
This chapter elaborates on the theoretical and practical implications of 
Foucauldian archaeology. It argues that Foucauldian archaeology is not an inquiry of 
formal or interpretative history, nor is it a structuralist method like the history of 
ideas. Foucauldian archaeology is an inquiry that navigates between origin and 
command, and maps the historical threshold processes of the concept, notion, or 
praxis in question in order to construct a history of the presences (positivities) and 
their correlation with the absences (negativities) in order to identify its constituting 
processes. In order to support these arguments, an initial elaboration on the notion of 
archaeology is outlined; a set of distinctions regarding notions of history is 
constructed; and Foucauldian archaeology is separated from the structuralist method 
of the history of ideas. Furthermore, The Order of Things and The Archaeology of 
Knowledge are discussed in order to support the interpretation of Foucauldian 
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archaeology that has been undertaken in this research. Lastly, a contemporary 
understanding of Foucault is discussed using the Italian philosopher Giorgio 
Agamben’s insights on Foucault and aided by Gilles Deleuze’s book Foucault (1985). 
A key reason for this discussion is not only to clarify the methodological stance of the 
Foucauldian archaeology, but also to elucidate the perspective of Foucault’s works 
used in this research given that there are diverging interpretations (Rajchman, 2007).  
Michel Foucault (1964) attempted to exorcise the demon of philosophical 
anthropology instituted by Kant, starting with his work on Madness and Civilisation. 
Psychology was a very comfortable place to speak of subjects in philosophical 
anthropology, and this was the revelation that Foucault endeavoured to explain. He 
argued that to think from the logos of anthropocentrism is the space where psychiatry 
and psychology organised and controlled people. This organisation and control of 
people had a specific space that he also investigated. Instead of investigating 
knowledge from an anthropocentric perspective, Foucault investigated it from the 
furthest perspective that he could find. He hoped that the archaeology of knowledge 
would escape the anthropological philosophical discourse and would force the 
demonstration of new ways to think about Western culture. For many philosophers, 
works such as The Order of Things (1973) and The Archaeology of Knowledge (1974) 
proclaimed that the ‘man’ that defined modernity in Western culture was dead 
(Deleuze, 1995). Who is this ‘man’ that Western culture often speaks of? Geertz 
(1979) provided an illustrative definition of ‘him’: 
The Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less 
integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic centre of 
awareness, emotion, judgement and action, organised into a distinctive whole 
and set contrastively against such wholes and against social and natural 
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background is, however incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea 
within the context of world’s cultures. (Geertz 1979, p. 229) 
The centre of modernity in philosophical anthropology is this conceptualisation of 
‘man’. This is not the description of a person, but rather it is the primary tool for the 
discourse of modern philosophical anthropology in Western culture (i.e. the discourse 
of anthropology). Foucault excavates this important cultural artefact and instead of 
allowing this artefact to speak for itself like the modern sciences such as anthropology 
and psychology pretend to do, he slowly removes the dirt from it in order to see and 
say new things about it. He sees it and speaks of it as it would speak of us; this is 
Foucault’s archaeological method.  
The notion 
Archaeology is better understood through accessing the original meanings of 
its roots in Greek: ‘origin’ and ‘to command’. A simple search for the word 
archaeology will immediately assume that its origin comes from the Greek word 
arkhaîos (αρχαίος), which means ancient history, or the later modern Latin 
archaeologia that comes from the Greek arkhaiologia (αρχαιολογία), which means 
the science of ancient things. However, if the root arché (ἀρχή) is isolated, then the 
original understanding and use by the Greeks in philosophy reveals that it has a 
double meaning. The first meaning refers to the origin or beginning, and the second 
meaning refers to command, execution, or even domination (Agamben, 2012a). 
Therefore, it can be said that the meaning of archaeology finds its origin in arché and 
not in its institutionalisation as an academic discipline. The meaning of the concept 
archaeology is broadly the link between the concept of origin or beginning and the 
concept of command or domination.  
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The study of origins does not aim to uncover the “authentic” meaning of 
words in this case, but rather to locate the initial place of historicity where any given 
concept first emerged. Authenticity or claims to truth are problematic in Foucauldian 
and other postmodern approaches because they reflect a claim to power rather than a 
claim for a continuing understanding of the complexity of the object in question. That 
is, to refer to the ‘origin’ is to find the place from which it all started. However, this 
does not mean that the first meaning is the authentic meaning; it means that from the 
origin onwards, there is a pathway (more specifically, a history) that must be 
constantly referred to in searches. This also means that the origin is the creation and 
remains the creator of the concept in question because it can still be traced back to the 
place of origin. When Agamben (2009) traced the origin of the concept ‘paradigm’ in 
the first elaborations in Aristotle, then in Kant and in Kuhn (1971), he did not claim 
that the authentic meaning of paradigm is what it means in Greek para meaning ‘next 
to’ and deigma meaning ‘example’, which would mean that paradigms are examples 
or metaphors for understanding the world. In his genealogy of ‘paradigm’, Agamben 
(2008) provided a counter-history that stems from one of the initial conceptualisations 
of paradigms. This provided not only the counter-history that genealogy usually seeks 
out, but also the pathway of the origin through which he could highlight the places 
where the counter-history could be found. Therefore, the part of the meaning of arché 
that refers to origin cannot be understood as the place where “real” meaning can be 
found, but rather the place where the first meaning was created, which is like the 
initial commands that God gave during creation: “Let there be light… Let there be a 
vault between the waters to separate water from water… Let the land produce 
vegetation…” (John 1:1-5). God in the beginning created objects with a command; he 
did not create the world through assembling its pieces. In other words, God did not 
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build the world; he ordered the objects in the world to be created. Towards the end of 
this chapter, the notion of commandment is investigated further.  
Interpretative history vs. archaeology 
Archaeology does not concern itself with searching for a reconstruction of the 
past in the same way that mainstream history does. Certainly, interpretative history is 
useful, entertaining, and even necessary in order to narrate an account of the past that 
can be intelligible. It also can have the function of appearing to shed light on 
seemingly intentionally obscured histories. However, the method of accessing this 
narrative is constructed through the objects that are considered positive evidence, 
which are usually tangible objects, with some space for interpretation framed by the 
rules of formal logic. Foucauldian archaeology aims to excavate words and objects, 
and it describes the processes surrounding the object of study in their complexity and 
in their disparate nature. This means that Foucauldian archaeology is an approach that 
requires us to think topologically.  
Interpretative history is important because it can also be used to shed light on 
subjugated stories and it can resist dominating discourses. It must be noted that there 
is a very productive body of scholarship that uses many historical approaches, even 
Foucauldian approaches, to history in order to tell subjugated stories from the 
perspective of Australian Aboriginal peoples and to highlight their silenced 
resistances. Authors such as Kidd (1997), Nakata (2007), Morris (1992), and 
Reynolds (1993), among others, have used interpretative history and Foucauldian 
perspectives to subvert the effects of colonisation through privileging the voices of 
those whom have been historically ignored. For example, the book The Way We 
Civilise: Aboriginal Affairs, the Untold Story (1997) is a groundbreaking work that 
tells the stories of Australian Aboriginal peoples’ subjugation through the many 
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control procedures that the Australian government exerted through labour, health, and 
many other institutional devices. It also serves a political purpose for these files in 
making accessible and visibilising the atrocities that Australian Aboriginal peoples 
were subjected to in the state of Queensland. Kidd (1997) and others have rigorously 
navigated the official documentary record in order to narrate a story evidenced by 
letters, reports, diaries, newspapers articles, and other creative sources to positively 
validate the interpretations of events that happened and to bring them into the status of 
history. The interpretations are heavily dependant on objects (materials) and on words 
or what the words hide in terms of their meanings. The words written in objects are 
the nucleus of what is history, which is extended through interpretation. Normal 
evidence must hold a claim to authority regarding its ‘reliability’; furthermore, it 
needs to be ‘present’ or positive.  
Interpretative history aims to narrate a generalised and evidenced history that 
relies on formal logical deduction. Historical materials are not evidence by themselves 
because objects (materials) in interpretative history require explanations and stories to 
be told about them. This interpretation, which is told in narrative form, is the result of 
a formal Aristotelian logic; that is, the interpretation of materials is ruled by the 
formal system of logic (Husserl, 2009). This type of linear logic is commonly 
expressed in the statement: “All men are mortal. Socrates is a man. Therefore, he 
must be mortal.” (Aristotle in Pierce, 1893). This is what Derrida (1995) and Husserl 
(2009) refer to as a formal ontology in the Western system of knowledge, which rules 
over interpretative narratives of history. If valid evidence of linear asseverations is 
found, then interpretative history can make the claim that this conclusion is valid. 
However, any contradictory information regarding any part of the asseverations will 
make this conclusion false or questionable. This formal ontology has been 
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demonstrated to be useful in many disciplines, including physics, biology, and other 
‘hard sciences’. However, are non-linear logical elements, such as contradiction, 
possible? Does the conclusion provide the only information about the situation? Is a 
reason that follows a linear outcome absolutely necessary? These questions point 
towards history being porous and subject to multiple interpretations, as well as 
perhaps not only being informed by linear logical assumptions. If this is true, then it 
generates further questions that revolve around there being other ways to enact 
historical inquiries.  
Foucauldian archaeology is not driven by the linear ontology of interpretative 
history because it excavates the materials as events and aims to describe these objects 
and ultimately the non-linear processes that surround them. Archaeology ‘thinks’ by 
describing positivities that surround words and objects in order to paint a picture of a 
concept or topic in its true multidimensional nature (Deleuze, 1985). Interpretative 
history relies on the authority of materials or objects that is granted by a given system 
of knowledge. That is, evidence is granted the status of evidence by the system of 
knowledge that authorises the object to be evidence. Once this is achieved, the 
interpretation of the object can be permitted. This also results in other objects not 
being authorised as evidence, because evidence cannot have an interpretation. This 
unavoidably transmits the power of the system that authorises and de-authorises, and 
the system becomes legitimatised through being able to grant an interpretation of one 
object and not the other. This reproduces the power of a given system of knowledge. 
These authorities speak volumes about the topology of the grounds of power and 
history, but these grounds occur in tensions, linear and non-linear relationships, and 
bi-polarities that not only make these grounds visible/constituted but also determine 
them through making us see them. Foucauldian archaeology presents these tensions 
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and paints a different picture with a different set of colours that interpretative history 
might not use.   
History of ideas vs. archaeology 
Foucault’s notion of archaeology differs from the structuralist method of the 
history of ideas because the latter focuses on changes in the manifestations of 
thoughts (opinions), whereas archaeology abandons this focus and aims to excavate 
the very “monuments” that make discourses (and therefore domination) possible 
(Foucault, 1974). That is, the history of ideas focuses on the dominating thought in 
peoples, whereas archaeology endeavours to escape this anthropocentric view through 
focusing on the elements that enable these ideas to be thought. Therefore, it is 
understandable for readers to assume that the method used in The Order of Things 
was a history of ideas. However, the inquiry into the manifestations of thoughts 
through ideas attempts to describe, as much as possible, when discrete general ideas 
were formed, how long these dominant ideas lasted, what were the material conditions 
that surrounded them, and where the ideas were explicitly seen. It can be said that The 
Order of Things focussed on the grounds on which these thoughts were possible, 
which Foucault called episteme. Foucault (1973) discussed a progressive narrative of 
the history of ideas that was framed using the multiple ontological natures of truths 
throughout history. However, he attempted to de-naturalise this ‘progressive’ 
narrative as he stated in The Archaeology of Knowledge, “[b]ut archaeological 
description is precisely such an abandonment of the history of ideas, a systematic 
rejection of its postulates and procedures, an attempt to practice a quite different 
history of what men have said” (Foucault, 1974, p. 138).  
 The history of ideas revises the discrete and already formed ideas throughout 
the history of a concept (Foucault, 1974). Its purpose is to understand as much as 
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possible the manifestations of thoughts during a determined period of time throughout 
all possible areas in which these manifestations of thoughts could be located. For 
example, the manifestations of thought can be similarly found in different forms of art 
and disciplines such as philosophy, sociology, anthropology, and psychology. 
Foucault states, “[t]he history of ideas, then, is the discipline of beginnings and ends, 
the description of obscure continuities and returns, the reconstitution of developments 
in the linear form of history” (Foucault, 1974, p. 137). Therefore, the history of ideas 
follows the form of interpretative history through only displaying a linear narration of 
what might be the story of discrete “ideas” in determined periods of time. The linear 
narrative takes a progressive form in which it tells the stories of evolving ideas 
(Foucault, 2007) into an intuitive perfection of thinking. That is, it tells the story of 
how “problems, notions, themes may emigrate from the philosophical field where 
they were formulated to scientific or political discourses” (Foucault, 1974, p. 137).  
Archaeology endeavours to implode the linear narration of history in order to tell a 
different story to that which interpretative historians have told. 
Archaeology tries to define not the thoughts, representations, images, themes, 
preoccupations that are concealed or revealed in discourses; but those 
discourses themselves, those discourses as practices obeying certain rules and 
being constituted by certain processes. (Foucault, 1974, p. 138) 
Archaeology inquires about these formed ideas, but it focuses on the rules and 
conditions in which these ideas were formed and became possible in the first place. 
Rules are understood in Foucault (Deleuze, 1985; Foucault, 1974) from a theory of 
law perspective that focuses on the productive and reproductive nature of rules and 
law, because its institution creates the command and the illegality (Dworkin, 1998). 
The correlative nature of laws and illegalities – similar to the almost interchangeable 
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nature of knowledge and power – explains the way Foucault understood rules and 
processes. As Deleuze outlines: 
One of the strongest themes in Foucault’s book consists of replacing the crude 
opposition of law and illegality with the subtle correlation made between 
illegalisms and laws. Law is always a structure of illegalisms, which are 
differentiated by being formalized. We need only look at the law of 
commercial societies to see that laws are not contrasted worldwide with 
illegality, but that some are actually used to find loopholes in others. (Deleuze, 
1985, p. 29, emphasis in original) 
  This distinction between the history of ideas and archaeology must be 
understood in the context of The Archaeology of Knowledge being written to clarify 
the frustrating interpretations of The Order of Things (1973). The frustrated tone can 
be detected when in The Archaeology of Knowledge Foucault dedicates an entire 
chapter to differentiating the history of ideas from archaeology (see in Part IV, 
Archaeological Description: Archaeology and History of Ideas, pp. 135-141). 
Foucault states that archaeology is not interested in the apparent content of ideas nor 
in “hidden obsessions in discourses”, which is a reference of the Marxist 
interpretation of the history of ideas (which focuses on ideology or false conscience); 
he further states: “Archaeology is not an interpretative discipline; it does not look for 
another hidden meaning” (Foucault, 1974, p. 235). Foucault rejects the status of 
hidden meanings: 
Lastly, archaeology does not try to restore what has been thought, wished, 
aimed at, experienced, desired by men in the very moment at which they 
expressed it in discourse; it does not set out to recapture that elusive nucleus of 
processes in which identities are exchanged; in which thought still remains 
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nearest to oneself, in the as yet unaltered form of the same, and in which 
language has not yet been deployed in the spatial, successive process of 
discourse. (Foucault, 1974, p. 236) 
Archaeology as history 
History is always the object of a construction in an un-constituted place. It is 
not constituted by homogenous time but by a full-time, time-of the now.” (14 
Thesis for a Philosophy of History, Walter Benjamin, 1934) 
The direction of inquiry in archaeology is from a history of the present; that is, 
archaeology as a form of history projects its inquiry from the now to the positivities of 
the past. The only positive objects that can be unburied from history are in the 
perpetual present. Therefore, they can only be understood from the perpetual present 
frame of mind (the past remains in an absent or negative space). Archaeology aims to 
unearth the regularities of enunciation in order to locate how these enunciations are 
manufactured through the positive accumulation of historical processes. Unearthing 
the historical sedimentation means to first follow the footsteps of the processes 
surrounding the conceptualisation that makes it possible and, second, to 
simultaneously follow the footsteps of the rules of the formation of this concept as it 
illustrates the initial place of origin and, through that, its command.  
History is only understood from the place of the present and never from the 
past. In the philosophy of history, the past cannot be captured in the place of the past, 
but it is always from the grounds of the present (Benjamin, 1934). Furthermore, 
history can be informed by its practices of memory, repetition, and conservation 
(Derrida, 1995). In the notion of the archive, history finds its practice of conservation 
in the outside, as Derrida (1995) highlights: 
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The archive…can never be the spontaneous memory and amnesia, lived only 
inside. Quite the contrary: the archive has its place in the original and 
structural death of such memory. There is no archive without a place of 
consignation, without a technique of repetition and without a certain 
exteriority. No archive without an outside. (Derrida, 1995, p. 9)  
The ambivalent movement of an archive from the point of origin to the operation of 
law can be simultaneously institutionalizing and conservative. Once it is constituted, 
the archive makes society remember what its duty is to remember through 
assembling, which is a dispositive whose function is to conserve, to repeat, and to 
memorise. However, there is no archive without a frame of mind in the present, or an 
enunciation of current discourse. Therefore, in this regard, there is no history without 
a thought system to process it. The duty and the command to remember its origin, and 
the process that (re)constitutes it (in the present) is history; archaeology is the reversal 
of that history. In this sense, archaeology can be seen as history because it draws a 
picture of the process of a concept as it is (with its surrounding processes) and as it 
ought to be (the command).  
The history analysed and, in someway, constituted by archaeology makes 
claims for a new form of presences, or a new form of positivities. Positivities are 
constituted through discursive or non-discursive practices (Foucault, 1973) given that: 
Its scope, the depth of the strata it has affected, all the positivities it has 
succeeded in disintegrating and recomposing, the sovereign power that has 
enabled it, in only a few years, to traverse the entire space of culture, all this 
could be appraised and measured only after a quasi-infinite investigation 
concerned with nothing more nor less than the very being of our modernity.  
(Foucault, 1973, p. 220) 
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This suggests that the present in archaeology, i.e. the positive form of history, is no 
longer determined by positive evidence, which is determined by material 
epistemologies that are objects that are present and can be perceived by our senses. A 
new positivity is the possibility of describing the presences of discursive and non-
discursive practices as they are captured through the constitution of words, 
propositions, and enunciations, and as seen in the ‘objects’ it constitutes. In a way, the 
words, propositions, language, enunciations, and discursive practices at large gain the 
status of perceived things in the traditional sense of positivism. However, objects, 
particularly non-discursive practices, gain the status of words and discursive practices 
because they are all constituted by discourses, their histories, and the knowledges 
(also power) that make them be a pen and not a computer, a cup of coffee and not a 
sandwich, and so on. For example, a coffee cup is used to hold coffee and it is not 
used as a hat, because the coffee cup is constituted by its practices and its history, the 
knowledge that deploys a command to use the coffee cup for coffee. This implies a 
different way to consider presence or positivities, and a new way to consider 
materialism (St. Pierre, 2011).  
Foucauldian archaeology: The Order of Things/On Words and Things 
The Order of Things is not an excavation of the structures underlying the 
thoughts of different periods of history, but rather it is an excavation of what 
surrounded the things and words in order to map the history of discursive and non-
discursive processes (Deleuze, 1985). Foucault summarised it well when he attempted 
to explain that “an episteme is archaeology” (Foucault, 1973, p. 377). It is not the 
structure or even the order of thoughts in a given time, but rather it is “the group of 
relationships that makes discourses possible” (Foucault, 1973, pp. 322-323) and that 
group of relationships is the grid in which is “imposed to discourses” (Foucault, 1973, 
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p. 323). Considering this as the aim of Foucauldian archaeology, as mentioned before, 
archaeology is not focused on words or things (Deleuze, 1985). Foucault has a 
characteristic way of writing in which he uses words sarcastically to take them away 
from the meanings that he was opposed to and he played with them through placing 
them in meanings that would be their anti-thesis. This is the case with words such as 
order, structure, words, things, and so on. As Deleuze states: 
Foucault never considered writing as a goal or an end in itself. This is 
precisely what makes him a great writer and imbues everything he writes with 
an increasing sense of joy and gaiety. The Divine Comedy of punishment 
means we can retain the basic right to collapse in fits of laughter in the face of 
a dazzling of perverse inventions, cynical discourses and meticulous horrors. 
(Deleuze, 1985, p. 23) 
However, if this “profanation” (Agamben, 2012b) of concepts is understood, it 
becomes apparent that Foucault becomes the “new cartographer” as Deleuze refers to 
him (1985, p. 49). This refers to Foucault’s method of re-understanding space that 
enables a new form of mapping that is not so much about locating words, things, 
objects, etc., as it is about locating the background in which all these things become 
intelligible and therefore possible. In The Order of Things, Foucault writes a map in 
which Western knowledge is produced and he identifies where these processes are 
located. This map was presented in a particular order, but an order that becomes 
transient, liquid, chaotic, and polarised in contradictions; it has a structure but it is 
mapped on the surface of the relationships and distributed into the field of 
multiplicity; and they refer to things and words but as a synthesis of the borders that 
created and drew these objects.  
	48		
The episteme in The Order of Things is sometimes wrongfully framed as a 
worldview perspective. It can be understood in this way because Foucault describes 
epistemes from within rather than from without; he describes them as landscapes of 
knowledge formation, focussing on their features rather than their content. For 
example, he describes the episteme of the 16th century, but then he specifically 
mentions that he will “brutally generalise it in a period” (Foucault, 1973):  
Such, sketched in its most general aspects, is the 16th century episteme. This 
configuration carries with it a certain number of consequences. First and 
foremost, the plethoric yet absolutely poverty-stricken character of this 
knowledge. Plethoric because it is limitless. Resemblance never remains stable 
within itself; it can be fixed only if it refers back to another similitude, which 
then, in turn, refers to other; each resemblance, therefore, has value only from 
the accumulation of all other, and the whole world must be explored if even 
the slightest of analogies is to be justified and finally take on the appearance of 
certainty. (Foucault, 1973, p. 29) 
Here, Foucault describes the episteme of the 16th century as he would describe a 
painting through highlighting what features brings the topological formations of 
knowledge together.  Later on in the text, he states: 
In fact, it is not from an insufficiency of structure and rigour that the 16th 
century knowledge suffers. On the contrary, we have already seen how very 
meticulous the configurations that define its space. It is this very rigour that 
makes the relation of magic to erudition inevitable- they arc not selected 
contents but required forms. (Foucault, 1973, p. 31) 
He continues on to describe the possible forms of the epistemes not in a prescriptive 
or formed in manner, but in a continuing flux. This accords with Foucault’s 
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understanding of the notion of episteme, which focuses on its capacity to produce 
multiple discursive and non-discursive forms (Foucault, 1973). Later in The 
Archaeology of Knowledge, he attempts to explain what the notion of episteme 
entails: 
By episteme, we mean, in fact, the total set of relations and processes that 
unite, at a given period, the discursive practices that give rise to 
epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly formalized systems; the way in 
which, in each of these discursive formations, the transitions to 
epistemologization, scientificity, and formalization are situated and operate; 
the distribution of these thresholds, which may coincide, be subordinated to 
one another, or be separated by shifts in time; the lateral relations that may 
exist between epistemological figures or sciences in so far as they belong to 
neighboring, but distinct, discursive practices. The episteme is not a form of 
knowledge (connaissance) or type of rationality which, crossing the 
boundaries of the most varied sciences, manifests the sovereign unity of a 
subject, a spirit, or a period; it is the totality of relations and processes that can 
be discovered, for a given period, between the sciences when one analyses 
them at the level of discursive practices. (Foucault, 1974, p. 191) 
In the notion of episteme, there is careful explication of the possibility of 
different processes occurring or not, or what Aristotles terms the “potency of no”, 
which is discussed later in this chapter (Agamben, 2009). Foucault’s careful writing 
allows the potential for something not occurring in the space of the episteme; hence, 
the use of the speculative grammatical model of can. His rigorous mapping allows for 
all possible events that can occur in a given space in a given time period. Foucault is 
systematic in inspecting every possible aspect, but he does not have a system to do 
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this; that is, there is no single story. If epistemes were understood along the 
aforementioned lines in The Order of Things, they would develop into a different 
book. Thus, it is no longer the explication of a set structures of reasoning that 
Foucault ‘unveiled’ under specifically discussed periods of Western culture history: it 
is a mapping of the places of discourses illustrated in a determined time period. It is 
no longer a narration of the time periods from the times that can no longer be 
accessed: it is an illustration of how epistemes illustrate how we can relate to these 
places of history that are in the present and, if they feel distant, it is not because they 
are in the past but because they are in a different place as distant as another country or 
continent.  
The French translation of Foucault’s book title was not The Order of Things, 
but On Words and Things (Les mots et les choses or in Spanish Las palabras y las 
cosas). Following this line, even from the title, Foucault plays another trick because 
the book is about everything but words and things. Deleuze explains this through 
reading Foucault in the following way: 
In On Words and Things, Foucault explains, was not about things or words. 
The task of archaeology is firstly to discover a true form of expression, which 
cannot be confused with any linguistic study, be it a signifier, word, phrase, 
proposition, or linguistic act. In particular, Foucault lays into the Signifier, 
where ‘discourse is annihilated in its reality by entering the processes of the 
signifier’… We must therefore break open words, phrases or propositions and 
extract enunciations and its processes of formation… (Deleuze, 1985, p. 52) 
Therefore, this title should be understood ironically. The historical tensions of 
structuralism need to be considered when reading this book because Deleuze and 
Foucault reject structuralism. If anything, Foucault’s work is broadly about liquefying 
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the empire of the structure in order to have some degree of freedom. This is not the 
place to explain what was happening intellectually in France regarding structuralism, 
Marxism, and later on what was coined as post-structuralism; however, it can be seen 
how Foucault rejected these notions in his particular way, but he faced co-optation by 
many structuralists through coining The Order of Things as structuralist. Evidently, 
Foucault was either unsuccessful in explaining what he attempted to do, as many 
thought he made a highly sophisticated structuralist work, or the book was a trap that 
he would unveil in his later work, The Archaeology of Knowledge. Regardless of this, 
Foucault knew too well the power conferred to the debate through rejecting 
structuralism or Marxism. Therefore, he took the words structure, order, system, 
language, things, and propositions, among others, and profaned them through using 
them outside of the realm of structuralism. Order meant what it meant for Borges 
(1960) in his famous essay The Analytical Language of John Wilkins13. Order is not 
organised, but rather it is an arbitrary arrangement. Foucault seeks the order of the 
possible configurations of the episteme, but in its chaotic and dispersed nature. There 
is no order of things occurring, no prescriptive order, that was the order of things and 
words. Something similar happened with the notion of structure, but Foucault 
addressed this notion quite specifically as he traced its relationship with 
“classification”. Foucault not only uses the notion of structure profanely (albeit fewer 
times than order) to explain the mapping of discourses, but he also searched its origins 
alongside its command to classify it (Foucault, 2007) and its relationship with power 
and domination.       
In The Order of Things, Foucault traced a map using spatial references to see 
the processes surrounded by Western knowledge that are not ‘left’ in the past but are 																																																								
13 Foucault states in the preface that this book (The Order of Things) was born out of 
the “trembling laughter this essay causes when one reads it” (1973, p. 1) 
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left somewhere else in the epistemic map. Rather than through a structural 
understanding of discontinuity, it is understood in opposition to the discrete separation 
of systems; it is understood in the elongation of one episteme from another conserving 
the link constituted by its tension. Foucault further states: 
Discontinuity – the fact that within the space of a few years a culture 
sometimes ceases to think as it had been thinking up till then and begins to 
think other things in a new way – probably begins with an erosion from 
outside, from that space which is, for thought, on the other side, but in which it 
has never ceased to think from the very beginning. (Foucault, 1973, p. 57) 
Origin is not understood as a place only in the past but as an arché, i.e. the place of 
the configuration of the start (spatially) that never ceases to command, to govern, and 
to control. In sum, The Order of Things can be understood as a constant mapping of 
the history (as archaeology) of Western knowledge and of science, which shows the 
relationship between power and knowledge. Later, Foucault states his conclusion of 
The Order of Things in The Archaeology of Knowledge the complicit relationship 
between power and knowledge.  
Foucauldian archaeology: The Archaeology of Knowledge 
This work can be understood as an extended epilogue to The Order of Things 
in which Foucault aims to answer some misunderstandings from his previous book 
and to solidify his conclusions regarding the non-linear relationship between 
knowledge and power. In the first part, this book clarifies Foucault’s method through 
unpacking the language contesting the idea that his analysis might be structuralist or a 
traditional form of historical inquiry, such as a history of ideas. He differentiated 
words through prepositions, enunciations (d'énonciation, a notion that he highlights), 
and the rules of these discursive formations, and behind all that constitutes discourses. 
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In this book, Foucault makes his thesis of the intricate relationship between 
power/knowledge and discourses digestible. In this new form of analysis, away from 
the linguistic interpretations and structuralist analyses, Foucault coined the word 
positivity: 
…to describe a group of enunciations (d'énonciation)… is what I am inclined 
to call positivity. To analyse a discursive formation therefore is to deal with a 
group of verbal performances at the level of the enunciations of the form of 
positivity that characterises them; or, more briefly, it is to define the type of 
positivity of a discourse. (Foucault, 1974, p. 125) 
This is not only a re-appropriation of positive approaches, but it suggests a 
new form of empiricism. If words and things are equated in the same field and their 
processes can be described, then these processes, practices, and objects are present 
and positive, and they can constitute evidence to support the mapping of a concept. 
This new cartography aims to locate the point in which the map is possible. The 
Archaeology of Knowledge almost functions as an aid or a legend of the map drawn in 
The Order of Things: from the beginning, it establishes that power and knowledge, as 
the origin and the command, are intrinsically related, and this is the beginning and the 
end of archaeology.  
Propositions and phrases are surrounded by enunciations, and these are 
surrounded by formation rules located in the grounds of a discourse, which is a 
command constituted by power and knowledge. Prepositions are the closest notion to 
words governed by the rules of grammar, semantics, and syntax. Foucault states that 
they are “found in the limits of discourses; they give what objects can be spoken of, or 
better yet they determine the set relations and processes that discourses must effect so 
objects could be talked about” (Foucault, 1974, p. 75). Prepositions are in the space of 
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language as the dispositive or mechanism of discursive practices. Therefore, 
sentences, phrases, or in sum prepositions are understood in their configuration and 
not what they communicate semantically. This is the entry point of discursive 
practices, but it is a frontier as well (Foucault, 2007).  
The next important notion discussed in The Archaeology of Knowledge is 
enunciations. If Foucault mentions a specific definition of enunciations, it would be “a 
finite grouping of rules that authorises a finite group of relationship processes” 
(Foucault, 1974, p. 44). This is sufficiently open to discus all possible processes that 
occur in the regularities of discursive practices and it is notable by its productive 
capacity to exert knowledge/power backed by the push of history. Enunciations are 
the point of connection with power, fuelled by history; they are the space where 
objects are formed and something can be said and also can be seen (and also can be 
unseen or unsaid). They are the rules, but Foucault does not mean rules in the sense of 
scientific laws. For Foucault, laws and rules do not only state what can happen or 
cannot happen (by prohibiting it), but they also set the grounds for the ‘other’ to 
happen (Deleuze, 1985). For example, a formal rule or law (the same applies with 
informal rules) could be “slaves are not citizens”, but that rule does not only refer to a 
prohibition, but rather it also sets the grounds for an illegality or unlawfulness, and 
makes possible the idea that “slaves could be citizens”. If the rule were not present 
(positive), then it would not make sense to even consider the citizenship of slaves. 
Another important notion that Foucault clarifies in this book is discursive practices. 
Discursive practices are not discourses: they are the practices mediated by language 
forms or related dispositives (but are not limited to these because they form objects) 
that abide by the weight of discourses, power/knowledge, and the sediment of history. 
This notion is further explicated in the method section of this chapter.  
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The conclusion of The Archaeology of Knowledge, which is stated in the 
beginning (perhaps because Foucault believed that he demonstrated it in the previous 
book), is that the intrinsic relationship between power and knowledge can be 
demonstrated in the excavation and in the mapping of Western knowledge. In this 
way, The Archaeology of Knowledge names the places in the map and attempts to 
explicate how the ‘voyage’ provides the ‘what’ and ‘how’ of the map. The 
archaeology of Western culture illustrates that it is a framework ruled by discourses 
and movements of power, and its complicity with knowledge. However, it is a 
framework that presents various ontological and epistemological implications for 
inquiry that are better presented here by Deleuze (1985): 
…the world is constituted by layers of surfaces… The world is also 
knowledge. But the layers are intersected by a line that distributes them into 
visual frames, and into sonorous curves; enunciations (d'énonciation) and 
visibilities in each layer, the two forms of irreducible ways of knowing, light 
and language, two vast forms of exteriority in which the origin and the 
command are reconstituted. We are trapped in this double movement. 
(Deleuze, 1985, p. 61) 
This system, bi-polar but not dichotomous, is what prefaces the archaeology of the 
knowledge of Western culture. In the case of Foucault’s inquiry of knowledge, he 
determined that this double movement is knowledge and power. 
Contemporary archaeology 
Since Deleuze’s eulogy to Foucault’s work in which he highlights the creative 
nature of his archaeological approach, little work has been undertaken along the 
coordinates of archaeology. However, there is one contemporary theorist who has 
closely followed Foucault’s project who can shed more light on archaeology as 
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inquiry, and that is the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben. Agamben is considered 
a post-Foucauldian theorist, and he is very careful to present his work in that way. 
Agamben’s (2009) work uses a methodological approach that is always an 
archaeology of bipolarities; bipolarities that can never be resolved because they are 
constituted by the ongoing processes of tensions. In this sense, Agamben also engages 
with genealogical approaches; however, his genealogies are considered his early 
political attempt to contest power, as he believed that Foucault did. Agamben (2009) 
himself explains his overall methodological approach as “philosophical archaeology” 
in his work The Signature of all Things: One Method, where he clarified that the 
archaeological approach overarches all his inquiry.  
Topological understanding of archaeology 
Foucauldian archaeology is an approach that enables a spatial understanding 
of concepts through navigating in, between, and around words and objects. However, 
Foucault discussed their location in relation to the direction of history and proposed a 
re-understanding of space in order to enable this form of inquiry. The key to enabling 
this topology is to locate objects and words in the same space. That is, through an 
unconventional way of understanding space and locations, a different form of 
interpretation of historical processes can be reached. This form of inquiry maps 
history, which is defined by the pathways and locations that different elements of 
thought take, in order to inform the direction of specific concepts. In this sense, and as 
mentioned before, to undertake an archaeology is to undertake a cartography14 of the 
concept, notion, or praxis in question (Deleuze, 1985).  
Foucault used archaeology for the first time to diagnose the problem with 
contemporary philosophy in a complementary thesis that he submitted with his 																																																								
14 In his book Foucault, Deleuze dedicates a complete chapter entitled A New 
Cartographer; see pages 23 to 47.  
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doctoral thesis. In his thesis A Brief Reading of Kant: Introduction to Anthropology in 
a Pragmatic Sense (Foucault, 2009), Foucault states that a science centred on 
anthropology (which he referred to as anthropocentrism at large) would be a science 
reduced to the standards of people and therefore a means through which the normative 
forms from which thinking takes place would be deployed (Rajchman, 2007). It is 
better stated in Foucault’s own words: 
Accompanying the critique in favour of an anthropological teaching, that 
monotonous reference point in which Kant has doubled his efforts of a 
transcendental reflexion by lobbying for a consistent accumulation of 
empirical knowledge about people. His 25 years of teaching anthropology is 
related to the university context of the time; that obsession is linked to the very 
structure of the Kantian problem: How to think, analyse, justify and how to 
build finitude, inside a reflexion that cannot be thought from an infinity 
ontology, and doesn’t regret a philosophy of the absolute? A question that 
effectively is within the realm of anthropology, but it can’t form a genuine 
dimension, since it cannot be reflected by itself from an empirical form of 
thought. (Foucault, 2009, p. 217) 
This anthropological reasoning, or logos of anthropocentrism, is doomed to find a 
narrowed understanding of philosophy and fails to find its purpose, which is 
transcendentalism. In contrast, archaeology – Foucault states in accordance with 
Heidegger – allows for different surfaces of understanding that might be an antidote 
to the poison of anthropocentrism (Foucault, 2009).   
The formal ontology, which was stated earlier, is the way in which “men 
think” accompanied by a vast history of what a “man is”. A different approach to the 
way men think is a topological approach: topology is the approach that understands 
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abstract space (imagined) in relation to how things are related, connected, and 
arranged (Rajchmann, 2007). It has its historical roots in mathesis and is often related 
to geometry as Husserl stated and further elaborated (Husserl in Derrida, 1995). From 
this perspective, topology cannot be only linear. It cannot be prepositional. It is not 
concerned with identifying the true meaning of the content of lines, or the meaning of 
dimensions and space; after all, they are often imagined figures. It does not hide 
anything, as its function is to be seen but often it is not visible. Topology is a pure 
form, pure space, pure surfaces, with depressions and elevations, emptiness and 
substance. Deleuze (1985) states: 
And not only is each enunciation (d'énonciation) in this way inseparable from 
a multiplicity that is both ‘rare’ and regular, but each enunciation is itself a 
multiplicity, not a structure or a system. This topology of enunciations 
contrasts both with the typology of propositions and with the dialectic of 
phrases.  (Deleuze, 1985, p. 31) 
Thus, an enunciation is a rare but related monument in a set accumulation of objects 
that speaks volumes, but does not talk. To think topologically is to be able to map and 
describe the forms of these discursive practices as the objects are described and to be 
able to recursively see non-discursive practices such as objects that are formed in the 
same way that propositions and words are formed.  
If mapping becomes a natural form of the exertion of thinking topologically, 
then the inquirer becomes a “new cartographer”.   
And what a strange twist of the line was 1968 [referring to the events in 
France of May ‘68], the line with a thousand aberrations! From this we can get 
the triple definition of writing: to write is to struggle and resist; to write is to 
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become; to write is to draw a map: ‘I am a cartographer’ [Deleuze cites 
Foucault from a 1975 interview]. (Deleuze, 1985, p. 71) 
Cartography is defined by the separate Greek notions of chartis, which means map, 
and graphein, which means writing. Thus, to map is to write and to describe the 
forms, the directions of lines, and to allude to the depth and altitudes of the surfaces. 
Therefore, to do cartography or to map, is not to illuminate a determined pathway that 
is caused by sole predetermined elements that highlight the end of the line as 
conclusions or results. To cartograph is not to follow a given formula about assumed 
consistencies in quantity (Deleuze, 1985; Derrida, 1995; Hussel, 2009); to cartograph 
is not to establish closed dichotomies of choosing one or the other (different from 
polarities that are constituted by their tensions).  
Without a doubt the “exterior form of thinking” is going to show that in 
Foucault nothing really completely closes. Power relations lie beneath (the 
diagram) the history of the forms, the archive. Power ‘appears’ in “every 
relationship (tension) of one point with another”; a diagram is a map, or better 
said a superposition of maps. (Deleuze, 1985, p. 71) 
The relationships, constituted by the tensions of the polarities, are what constitutes the 
map of a given notion, concept, or praxis. They can be between an infinite set of 
relationships, such as the origin and the command, positivities and negativities, power 
and knowledge, constituted power and constituting power, signifier and sign, etc. The 
topological interpretation of archaeology enables the mapping of these relationships 
as processes that tell different stories from those that the anthropological discourse of 
Western culture has told.  
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The Power of Negation 
A contemporary example of Foucauldian archaeology is the research of 
Agamben (2012a) entitled The Archaeology of Commandment. This is also a good 
example of the implementation of an archaeology that can become a “kind of 
paradox” (Agamben, 2012a, p. 3). As mentioned earlier, arché means both origin and 
command. This means that the archaeology of commandment is the search for the 
origin and command of commandments. This apparently contradictory task is at the 
heart of language – assuming that the nature of language is polysemic (i.e. one word 
has the potential to have multiple meanings) and constituted by polarities. When 
searching for a history of commandments, Agamben (2012a) found that no 
philosophy scholar had written about commandments in more than a few lines or 
phrases. Agamben went to Aristotle to find a hint on commandments, which provided 
a route to understand why commandments and other similar activities are not written 
about in philosophy and other similar disciplines. In On Interpretation, Aristotle 
distinguishes two forms of statements: apophantic and non-apophantic statements. 
Apophantic statements are those that can be shown to be true or false; for example, “I 
am sitting and typing on my computer”. This statement is apophantic because it can 
be shown to be true or false. Non-apophantic statements cannot be shown to be true or 
false, such as when communicating a command. That is, I can say, “Sit down” in its 
imperative form. Regardless of whether the command is obeyed or not, it remains a 
command; whether the statement is true or false is outside the realm of the order. 
Another example of a non-apophantic form is a prayer: it is not the concern of the 
prayer if it is or becomes true or false. The prayer states a petition based on faith. 
Aristotle states in his book that philosophy is only concerned with apophantic 
discourse, and that non-apophantic discourse is a matter for other practices such as 
poetry (poesis). Therefore, Agamben recalibrated his gaze into non-apophantic 
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practices, which the discourse of philosophy has intentionally ignored. He turned to 
theology and found the first book of the Bible, Genesis, and the books of John. He 
found that God created the world with a command: “Let there be light…Let there be a 
vault between the waters to separate water from water… Let the land produce 
vegetation…” (John 1:1-5). In the Alexandrian translation of the Bible, the specific 
word used was arché. From there, Agamben (2012a) continues to theorise how 
Western culture is constituted by this complicity between origin and command, which 
are expressed together in the one word, arché.  
As mentioned previously, the origin is never the past in the sense that the 
origin disappears from the concept. In contrast, the origin sends the command to 
constantly be in the present. Thus, the origin and command can impart a significant 
understanding about power. This implied a series of processes outside formal logical 
thinking, because apophantic forms of expression rule it. An important aspect that it 
implies is that power is not defined by truthfulness or wrongfulness; it is not 
constituted only by its capacity to give a command and for that command to be 
obeyed or not; rather, it is defined by its capacity to give orders. When a government 
is weak, the commands expressed by laws do not necessarily fail, because commands 
are not concerned with the power of the government; rather, they are concerned with 
laws that are broken. The structure of a weak government will remain almost intact 
because it will still determine what is legal and what is illegal – even if illegalities are 
often perpetrated. For example, only when the Berlin Wall fell did the capacity for 
command and the law of the State disappear; it was then that its power was broken 
(Agamben, 2012a).  
Thus, the mechanism of power can be understood not necessarily by the 
positivities of what happened, but by the positivities of potency, in particular the 
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power of negation or, as Aristotle calls it, the potency of no or that which ought not to 
happen (Adorno, 1994; Agamben, 2012a; Clemens, Heron, & Murray, 2008). This 
way of thinking is based on Aristotle’s notion of potency. For example, a child has the 
potency (colloquially, the capacity) to build a house. However, he or she might have 
to study, grow, and probably go to university, maybe study some architecture, and 
then he or she can build the house. The difference between the child and an architect 
(in the same time frame) is that the architect has, today, the potency to build a house 
and not to build it, exactly like the potency of law. The architect has the capacity 
today of not doing it given that he can. The child, in the present time frame, cannot 
not do it, but can only do it one day in the future. This potency of no is what Foucault 
constantly frames as the productive capacity of discourses and power in its negative 
form, and he attempts to describe the topology of discourses and power considering 
the grids of potency in any given space. That is, archaeology in the description of a 
topological dispersion of propositions, enunciations, visibilities, etc. of what ought to 
happen in correlation with what ought not to happen. These relationships or processes 
are what draws the picture of the notion, praxis, or phenomenon in question.  
In sum, Foucauldian archaeology is the historical inquiry that aims to map the 
origin and its relationship with command through drawing the relationships that 
determine the object in question. It achieves this through mapping the areas of a given 
concept, notion, or praxis, and illustrating the various situations that can occur around 
where its productive and reproductive capacity is coalesce in historical processes, 
usually located in historical thresholds.  
The Foucauldian archaeology in this study has the following six elements. 
(1) Relationships are not only determined using linear associations but are 
also explained using the correlations between polarities or close concepts 
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such as words and things, origin and command, power and knowledge, or 
as in the non-discursive relationship between the architecture of the 
Panopticon and judicial system; it is understood as a non-linear 
relationship. 
(2) The relationships or processes between words and things, for example 
power relationships, discourses, discursive and non-discursive practices, 
history, etc., is understood in the same level that empirical objects are 
understood in traditional positivism; that is, they are considered as ‘real’ 
as that which is experienced through the senses. 
(3) The origin is not understood as a place in time, usually the past, but as a 
place from which the command originates. Therefore, the classical 
genealogical assumption of an implied hierarchy of the origin is not 
suitable here. The origin is simply where the non-linear ‘line’ begins to be 
drawn via specific bipolar relationships and its processes begin to be 
formed. 
(4) The non-linear relationship of the origin and command speaks to the same 
relationship with power and knowledge, which is how this relationship 
emerges, at least in Western culture. 
(5) Discursive practices are differentiated from non-discursive practices 
(visibilities) because the latter refers to ‘things’ defined by their pure 
function in relation to the concept of inquiry, and the former refers to the 
productive capacity of words to speak of a subject from the concept, 
notion, or praxis in question. 
(6) Law, rules, and their derivatives (e.g. customary law or cultural 
conventions) are defined by their positivity and their capacity to command 
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and to institute illegalities. This is where the potency of no becomes 
relevant when laws or rules are formed in the capacity of not abiding by 
the rule is predicated by itself.  
 
Method 
 
Justification 
There is a very productive field of indigenous methods (Smith, 2000), 
decolonizing methods (Denzin & Smith, 2008; Smith, 2000), decoloniality-inspired 
methods (Mignolo, 1996, 1997), and other non-Western methods to engage with 
research; thus, why use the Western-located Foucauldian archaeology? Is it an attempt 
to use ‘the master’s tools to disassemble his house’? Or, better phrased by Spivak 
(personal communication, May 5, 2012): is it an attempt to perform “affirmative 
sabotage of regularly hybridised European Enlightenment thinking, corrected in the 
process, turning poison repeatedly into medicine, since we are contaminated 
historically”? A key element of Foucauldian archaeology is that it is not interested in 
the individual; it is not interested in the communication forms for self-expression; it is 
interested in the language and the ‘things’ that destroy all circular, enclosed, 
narcissistic forms of the subject and oneself. Foucauldian archaeology assumes that 
the Western culture has attempted to build the figure of man in this anthropocentric or 
egocentric way. Foucault stated this in an interview in 1971: 
…from the moment when Western culture will actually be liberated from the 
system of constraint- not only the systems of economic constraint but the 
system of political, moral, cultural constraint, that capitalism has oppressed 
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man with for centuries- from the moment that liberation will have been 
achieved; then, what kind of knowledge will be possible? (Foucault, 1971) 
Foucauldian archaeology assumes that in Western culture, in order to ‘know’ 
something, it must be first excluded. That is, in order to ‘know’ madness, sexuality, 
laws (prisons), and other civilisations, they must be constrained by the Western 
system of knowledge. In order to ‘know’ non-Western cultures, they must be 
marginalised, looked down upon, and exploited in order to be conquered. As Smith 
(2000) suggested not so long ago, Indigenous peoples around the world have been for 
far too long the object of research of the Colonial West. Other methods can be used to 
produce non-Western knowledges directed at Indigenous peoples, but we can also 
turn the research back onto the Colonial West.  
This research is an attempt to avoid the problem of subjecting peoples to 
Western research. It does so through using a proven method to move away from the 
narcissistic obsession of Western culture with the method of Foucauldian 
archaeology. Foucault’s work attempted to destabilise the arenas of madness, the 
systems of Western knowledge (such as many sciences), the penal and judiciary 
systems, and the systems of moral regulations expressed more prominently in 
sexuality. If these systems prove to be a product of specific situations, in a specific 
context in history (and not pre-existent as the ‘law’ or ‘nature’ of humanity), then they 
could be overturned politically (2007). If we accept that Foucault was somewhat 
successful in destabilising the Western institutions he attacked, then his methods 
worked. Thus, to use Foucauldian archaeology is to use a proven method to 
disestablish Western cultures’ subjectifying institutions. However, this is not a 
decolonising method. Moreover, through focussing its inquiry on the process of 
colonisation, its discursive and non-discursive devices, and its systems of 
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knowledges, the Foucauldian archaeology in this research aims to have a decolonising 
effect.  
Origin of colonisation: Monstrous anthropology 
The materials used to map the conceptualisation of aboriginality include 
traditional historical materials to tell the story of the origins of colonisation in 1492, 
such as the diaries of Christopher Columbus, but also it includes other texts such as 
drawings and paintings. These drawings and paintings inform how the historical 
threshold constituted the conditions for what later became a solidified imagery of 
aboriginality. The first descriptions of the Aboriginal peoples of the Americas – the 
first ones being the Taínos in the Caribbean – were not prefaced with the hierarchy of 
races as it was understood after the 17th century. Therefore, racial classification was 
useless to aid the analysis of the first conceptualisation of aboriginality; the first 
colonisers thought that they arrived at the Indies, a civilisation that Europe had 
commercial relationships with for centuries. The first descriptions of aboriginality can 
be read in the diaries of Christopher Columbus from 1492 and 1493; these diaries are 
also aided by the coloniser’s first drawings of aboriginality. The colonisers’ first 
drawing depicted Aboriginal people as monsters. This is consistent with the first 
descriptions of Aboriginal peoples in the diaries of Christopher Columbus (see the 
chapter titled Monstrous Anthropology for direct quotes) and the writings of Fray 
Bartolomé de las Casas and Juan Acosta. For this reason, an analysis of monstrosity is 
performed from the framework of the anthropocentric perspective that Europe held in 
the 15th and 16th centuries. The analysis is from the perspective of aesthetics, 
specifically the aesthetic of ugliness, in which monstrosity is seen in the realm of 
Hell’s creatures in Christianity. This is why The Temptations of St. Anthony, a triptych 
by Hieronymus Bosh, provides a useful inventory of monstrous creatures that can be 
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used as a framework to understand the first conceptualisations of aboriginality in the 
Americas from 1492. From there, various drawings are analysed and the consistent 
thread throughout these images is depicted in the imagery of the cannibal and the 
Aboriginal group named the Caribes. Following this thread, a contested history of the 
very existence of the Caribes is found in the essay by Juan Ignacio de Armas. Below 
is a list of the described materials. 
• The Temptations of St. Anthony, triptych by Hieronymus Bosh, 1505-1506 
• Diario del Primer Viaje, Cristóbal Colón, 1492 
• Diario del Segundo Viaje, Cristóbal Colón, 1493 
• Historia natural y moral de Indias, Juan Acosta, 1589 
• Brevísima relación a la Destrucción de las Indias, Fray Bartolomé de las 
Casas, 1552 
• Uslegung der Carta Marina, Johannes Grieninger, 1525 
• Map Kunstmann II, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, 1505 
• Wahrrhaftige History, Hans Staden, 1557 
• La Fábula de los Caribes, Juan Ignacio de Armas, 1884 
Origin of colonisation: Western blackness 
The materials used for the conceptualisation of blackness were limited to one 
specific story of blackness before it was interchangeable with slavery, the story of 
Juan Garrido, and the painting that illustrates the solidification of the 
conceptualisation with blackness, Los mulatos de Esmeralda. The remainder of the 
excavation of blackness is informed by a historiography (a study of the interpretation 
of history), critically engaging with authors including Sued-Badillo (2008), Alegría 
(1990), and Saco (1879). Following the historical thread of Western aboriginality, the 
stripe of slavery has entangled Western blackness. Therefore, the historical threshold 
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of Western blackness is analysed using the history of blackness in the first decades of 
colonisation when blackness was not aligned with slavery. The processes of the 
conceptualisation of Western blackness include blackness when it was not 
interchangeable with slavery and slavery when it was not interchangeable with skin 
colour. The history of Juan Garrido personifies blackness before African slavery, 
because he was the first documented black conquistador. Furthermore, a brief review 
of the history of slavery in the 15th and 16th centuries illustrates slavery not being tied 
to skin colour, but rather being commanded by royal decree and other influential 
institutions. The emergence of African slavery in the Americas is also revealed as a 
cornerstone for the solidification of capitalism. Lastly, the first painting from the 
Americas, Los Mulatos de Esmeralda (Zambo Chiefs), confirms the unification of 
Western blackness and aboriginality in an aesthetic that reveals the processes 
solidified in the Western conceptualisation of aboriginality and blackness. Below is a 
list of the analysed historical materials. 
• Probanza de Juan Garrido, 1538 
• Los Mulatos de Esmeralda (Zambo Chiefs), Adrían Sánchez Galque, 1599 
Command: The Blanket Approach 
The materials used for this part of the research refer to specific policies and the 
materials surrounding them such as Parliamentary debates, reports, etc. The focus was 
first on the discursive saturation of the conceptualisation of aboriginality and 
blackness, and then on the non-discursive way in which the policies enacted the 
praxis of colonisation. The command of colonisation is illustrated in the operation of 
the Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act 1897 (1897 Act) 
in Queensland, Australia. This Act is analysed as a case study example of the way 
colonisation dominates the subject it speaks of, in the specific machinery described as 
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the Blanket Approach. In order to analyse the pure function of the 1897 Act, former 
laws and their Parliamentary debates were considered because they spoke of Western 
aboriginality and blackness. The 1897 Act itself was analysed alongside the main 
documents that the Queensland Government produced from 1898 to 1965 that 
explicitly related to the 1897 Act. Below are the specific historical materials analysed. 
• Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 1881 
• Pearl-Shell and Beche-De-Mer Fishery Act, 1881 
• Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 1884 
• The Native Labourers Protection Act, 1884 
• Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act, 1897, and its 
amendments in 1899, 1901, 1928, 1934, 1939, 1946, and 1965 
• Annual Reports from 1899 to 1959 (in 1917 and 1941 no reports were 
produced). 
Procedure 
In this part, I detail how the Foucauldian archaeology was conducted. It is 
important to note that these series of actions did not necessarily occur in a 
chronological fashion and, for the sake of replication, it must be highlighted that 
Foucauldian archaeology cannot be undertaken using a step-by-step procedure. 
Therefore, the description of these actions can be considered as guidelines or specific 
tools for the tasks required in this method. This procedure exemplifies how the origin 
of colonisation was conceptualised in the coagulated space of Western aboriginality 
and blackness, and how the command was exercised in the non-discursive function of 
the Blanket Approach.   
Framework 
 When undertaking a Foucauldian archaeology, the first step is to assume a 
Foucauldian ‘frame of mind’. This refers to the theoretical framework that 
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understands the following axioms or assumptions. The question that guides this 
research is ‘how is colonisation operationalised?’ given that it is an important problem 
for the subject it speaks of. The history of the problematisation of colonisation is 
guided by this framework.   
(1) Words and things, and what lies between them, constitute the corpus that 
informs the research. That is, the ontology or reality of the world assumes 
that theoretical productions and processes are as real as the things and 
words that are seen, heard, and touched.  
(2) History is not the history of the past, but a history of the present. History 
is the accumulation of situations that define societies today and they are 
readily available to be inquired.  
(3) Knowledge, and Western knowledge in particular, is not only the outcome 
of how we see the world, but also they way we capture it. Therefore, 
knowledge claims are not only the explanation of an object but also the 
command that wills the object to be the “one” and not anything else.  
(4) The experience of individuality (the first person experience) is determined 
by the accumulation of a history of experiences in a given culture. In this 
case, the experience of individuality in Western culture is determined by 
the modern discourse of anthropology.  
A more specific Foucauldian theoretical framework can be seen in full in the 
introduction of this chapter; however, the following elements are important and must 
be considered for the Foucauldian archaeology. 
(1) Topological understandings of words, things, language, systems of 
knowledge, history, discourses, power relationships, institutions, and 
subjectivity are crucial. If words and things, and their relationships, are 
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positive (present), then they can be located and illustrated by mapping 
them.  
(2) Power is relational and it is not self-generated. The complex diagram of 
society is constituted by the core relationships between peoples. Like any 
other relationship, they live in tensions. As a result of the convoluted 
history of Western culture, layers of complex social mechanisms that 
deliver these tensions shelter the power relationships. The focus of power 
indicates where these complex mechanisms are located.  
(3) Archaeology is the way in which Western culture defines the intrinsic 
relationship between power and knowledge. The origin of the object of 
study delivers the command because it is the origin, and vice versa. In this 
sense, to ‘know’, in Western culture, is to be able to talk about what an 
object ‘is’ by excluding it from what it ‘is not’.  
(4) The architecture of social structures is defined through discourses that are 
delivered in discursive, and sometimes in non-discursive, practices 
legitimated by social institutions. The way this architecture operates is 
manifested in most Western societies’ cultural productions (science, art, 
literature, etc.); some are more illustrative than others.  
(5) Language, in Western culture, predicates how social processes occur. The 
tensions between words and things dictate how Western culture functions 
most times. Here, the semiotic processes define the broad operation of 
language. In this sense, discursive practices can be painted and things can 
define the discussion.  
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Reading 
Reading in this part does not only mean reading words, sentences, and 
paragraphs in written documents, but it also means reading the discourses in 
discursive and non-discursive practices. This is where the topological understanding 
of words, propositions, enunciations, things, and their references to discourses and 
institutions in history functions. For example, when reading the Queensland 
Parliamentary Debates from 1881 to the 1960s, the discursive practices of 
aboriginality and blackness were deployed to subjectify Australian Aboriginal peoples 
into these two, often times, interchangeable categorisations. The manner in which 
they were deployed (the strategy or the operation) could be described functionally, but 
the content that constituted the conceptualisation of aboriginality and blackness was 
already solidified historically in the 19th and 20th centuries. Therefore, a further 
historical unearthing of the colonial artefacts of aboriginality and blackness needs to 
be excavated. The specific actions taken in this stage of the method of Foucauldian 
archaeology are described as follows. 
(1) Conceptualisation: This element of archaeology refers to the coagulation 
of the tension that power relations provide. This is what Foucault refers to 
as enunciation or d'énonciation: the irreducible unit of discursive practices 
though it is framed as conceptualisation due to the aesthetic construction 
of the identified discursive practices in colonisation. Some English 
translations use the notion of statement and others use enunciation. 
Conceptualisation means locating where power places its pressure through 
reading of whom the text speaks of. Throughout most of the analysed 
documents, the coagulation of power is located in the conceptualisations 
of blackness and aboriginality. The Colonial West spoke of their 
conceptualisation of blackness and aboriginality, and hence why they are 
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the Western conceptualisations of blackness and aboriginality, and not the 
other way around. This was a discursive practice; however, the Australian 
Colonial West also spoke in a non-discursive manner when it referred to 
blankets. These three clues, i.e. blackness, aboriginality, and blankets, 
indicate the ‘landmarks’ in which the monuments of colonisation would 
most likely be found. From there, the task is to excavate them through the 
sediments of history. In contrast, the blankets were found repeatedly on 
the surface of the grounds of colonisation; given that it was a non-
discursive practice, it was only defined by its function. Therefore, the task 
for non-discursive devices is to unravel the mechanisms of its functions.  
(2) Polarities: Given that the nature of rule formation abides by the same 
relationship between power/knowledge, words/things, origin/command, 
etc., when reading discursive practices, the (bi)polarities must be 
identified. An illustrative example of how this can be undertaken is in the 
same way that the negative of a picture is seen. The negative of a picture 
is defined by the inversion of the colours, i.e. black is white and white is 
black. In a negative, the entire substance of the content of the picture is 
inverted: all that is white is blackened and vice versa, but the picture 
remains discernible. Therefore, we can identify what the picture shows, 
regardless of the complete inversion of its substance. This occurs because 
the relationships between the colours are intact. Every concept is 
constituted by its negative and defined by its relationships or processes. 
When reading the discursive practice of Western blackness, it can be 
found that in its origins there is an inversion of the substance of Western 
blackness defined by slavery: there are stories of black conquistadores. 
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The same applies to Western aboriginality: at its origin, a complete 
inversion of inferiority in monstrosity, or the supernatural civilisation that 
can destroy the Colonial West in the worst nightmare imagined in the 15th 
and 16th centuries, through cannibalism is found. The task here is not to 
understand its substance, but rather to understand its relationships or 
processes. For this research, processes are used to identify the constitution 
of a given conceptualisation.  
(3) Origin: When a conceptualisation or a coagulation of the pressure 
illustrated in history is identified, which is a manifestation of the 
command, the origin of such conceptualisation must be excavated. In 
order to fully understand the command, we must understand where the 
command originated and how it was constituted as a command. To read 
the origin is not to read its ‘real’ meaning; it is to find the point in which it 
was forming and, to an extent, to find when it was not the 
conceptualisation found on the surfaces. This research reads the origins of 
Western blackness and aboriginality at the moment in history when they 
did not refer to the Western aboriginality and blackness defined by the 
inequality of races (hierarchy of races).  
Discursive practices 
Discursive practices are defined by the enunciations (conceptualisations) of 
discourses through words, prepositions, sentences, texts (including paintings and 
imagery), and other language forms. They are practices understood as actions and are 
not only understood by their manifestations in writing, or talk, or other textual forms. 
That is, discursive practices are as much actions as moving a chair or swinging a 
sword. However, discursive practices must be identified as such in order to 
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distinguish them from the non-discursive practices. The discursive and non-discursive 
practices are both defined and ruled by discourses and their constituting knowledges.   
(1) Speech acts: These practices are defined by the expression manifested in 
talk. To read speech acts is dangerous because they can be relayed back to 
the individualistic-anthropocentric framework. As discussed earlier, 
Foucauldian archaeology aims to avoid that focus. In this research, the 
speech acts, which are mostly concentrated in the Queensland 
Parliamentary Debates, were read as documented histories of the artefacts 
in question. That is, these speech acts of the, mainly, Members of 
Parliament of Queensland, are understood as oral histories of the 
Parliament. Given that the context of the debates is institutionally 
constitutive of law (in some cases, the Parliamentary debates are 
consulted in order to interpret laws), this is an oral history of the law and 
not an oral history of the Members of Parliament.  
(2) Writing acts: These are practices defined by the expression manifested in 
writing. Writing acts are influenced by their genre, e.g. genres in 
literature, in philosophy, and in law and policy. The genre that this 
research focuses on is the genre in the broad topic of policy and laws, and 
early history (e.g. chronicles). The discursive practices read here were 
laws, reports, a probanza, the first colonial experience chronicles (that 
functioned as reports), etc. Some of these documents held the power of 
law (some even functioned as a constitution) and others functioned as 
official histories of the implementation of the law (e.g. the Annual 
Reports). These writing acts assumed a depersonalised stance in which 
other documents and institutions provided the rules for these writing acts 
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to be performed. Therefore, to read these discursive practices is to read the 
processes in which the discourses operated through their institutionalised 
practices.  
(3) Other textual practices: These are the practices that are defined by other 
ways of representation, e.g. through art forms such as paintings, drawings, 
and sculptures, or architecture, etc. For this research, the imagery 
expressed in drawings and paintings was read in order to locate the 
discursive practices used by the Colonial West. Most of these functioned 
as documents in history to state the method through which the 
conceptualisation of Western aboriginality and, to a lesser extent Western 
blackness, were read.  
Non-discursive practices 
Non-discursive practices are any other practice that does not operate on the 
language level and it is defined by its pure function. It is the ‘thing’ or the ‘object’ 
that discourses also rule, but in a non-discursive form: it can be seen; therefore, it 
becomes a visibility. However, they do not have the quality of representation. Non-
discursive practices can be an architectural distribution such as a Panopticon or any 
object or artefact. They do not refer to the thing in and of itself, but rather to the 
function it is assigned to the object. Non-discursive practices can be read because they 
can be seen and therefore their function can be described; they can describe the 
function of the command or the mechanism of the process in question. For this 
research, the way that colonisation functioned after the 18th and 19th centuries is 
described using the non-discursive practice of the Blanket Approach.  
(1) Positivity or presence: In order to read non-discursive practices, the object 
or visibility in question must be presently available. That is, it must be 
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part of the coagulation of history revolving the object of which it speaks. 
In this research, blankets were suspiciously available in part of the 
materials and describing their function is illustrative of how colonisation 
operated.  
(2) Function: Non-discursive practices are defined by their mechanism to 
perform, for instance, colonisation. To read non-discursive practices is to 
describe how the mechanism of colonisation operated: it is to describe the 
command. The play on words of the Blanket Approach illustrates the way 
colonisation functions to totalise using Western culture, but at the same 
time to distribute this totalisation to each person through creating 
individual power relations with colonisation delivered like a blanket.    
Rather than engage with the theorising of method, this chapter presented a 
discussion referring to theory, methodology, and method from a non-traditional 
reading of Foucauldian archaeology that was guided by the readings of Giorgio 
Agamben, John Rajchman, and Gilles Deleuze. The discussion of this reading of 
Foucauldian archaeology is unconventional primarily because it moves away from the 
structuralist interpretation of archaeology. It does so by reading archaeology as the 
topological inquiry that maps a given concept, notion or praxis outside the 
anthropological philosophical stance by identifying the composition of the origin and 
the machinery of its command. In this research this reading of Foucauldian 
archaeology translates into unearthing the origins of the praxis of colonisation, 
specifically the origins of the discursive tools that will be used to speak of the 
colonised, the conceptualisation of aboriginality and blackness; and unearthing the 
way the machine of colonisation functioned, or how the command operated. In this 
way the archaeology of colonisation will answer the question of “How colonisation is 
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operationalised?” through unearthing the solidification process of the tools that will 
be used for the operation of the machine of colonisation.  
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Part 2: Origins (1492-1538) 
Part 2 illustrates the founding aesthetic conceptualisations (d'énonciation) of 
colonisation that were used as tools for domination. This research found that the two 
main conceptualisations of colonisation were aboriginality and blackness. These two 
conceptualisations are usually deployed from the discourse of race and, as Quijano 
argues, “race is the most efficient instrument of social domination produced in the last 
500 years” (in Chalmers, 2014, p. 28). The next two chapters explain how 
colonisation aesthetically forged the conceptualisations of aboriginality and blackness 
as Western tools for social domination. Chapter III, Monstrous Anthropology, 
illustrates that the origins of the conceptualisation of aboriginality in a historical 
threshold were informed by aesthetics because the racial hierarchisation of 
aboriginality occurred with the emergence of the discourse of anthropology and social 
Darwinism, which was almost 300 years later. This aesthetics is located in the frame 
of ugliness, specifically in a monstrosity predicated by the logos (reasoning) of 
anthropocentrism that provides the first set of processes to enable domination, 
explicitly in the form of slavery. Chapter IV, Blackness, follows the historical thread 
of this form of domination where it meets with blackness, but when it is not yet 
interchangeable with slavery. The origins of the conceptualisation of blackness are 
recounted through illustrating a short account of the historical threshold of slavery, an 
example of blackness in the role of the coloniser personified by Juan Garrido, and 
how African slavery emerged as one of the most profitable industries by the end of 
the 16th century. The historical thread of domination, as explicitly expressed in 
slavery, ties blackness to slavery and produces another set of processes that also 
constitute the conceptualisation of blackness, which is the second tool for 
colonisation. Both tools of colonisation have important functions in operating the 
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machinery of the command of colonisation; their specific use is predicated by the set 
of processes that are incorporated in the historical threshold of the origins of 
colonisation.  
Working Notions 
In order to describe colonisation, the following set of Foucauldian notions 
must be converted in order for them to speak more appropriately in the context of 
colonisation. 
Colonial West 
The Colonial West refers to the space in which the episteme of Western 
culture is deposited in all its history. It is colonial because they are predominantly 
constituted by the histories of the countries that participated in the colonisation of 
non-Western countries. However, peoples and nationalities do not limit the Colonial 
West, as illustrated in the next chapter. This is not to say that real persons do not 
constitute the space and place of this episteme, because it is built by and through 
peoples. The notion of Eurocentrism is often used to express this idea (Borda, n.d.; 
Dussel, 1993; Grosfoguel, 2011; Quijano, 2000); however, this term is insufficient to 
highlight the colonial history of the episteme and the cultural centre of the origin of 
Eurocentrism.  
 
Western culture 
Western culture means the place where Eurocentrism is located and produced. 
Once it is used for the praxis of colonisation, it becomes the notion of the Colonial 
West. However, culture has many definitions and, as Rothman notes, “it is more than 
the sum of its definitions” (2014, p. 4). Therefore, culture will be understood as 
Foucault explained to Alan Badiou during an interview in 1965: “By culture, I 
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understand, given a determined cultural form, with specific forms of knowing and 
specific institutions; there is liberated a language that is proper to it, eventually a 
certain type of discursive practice is enabled” (1965). This apparently circular 
definition speaks to culture being the relational link that enables a set of discourses, 
institutions, and epistemes. Thus, Western culture is the whole and the links of a given 
civilisation; in this case, the civilisation whose history emerges in Europe, whose 
meta-narrative is predicated by modernity (Lyotard, 1987; Harvey, 1990), who is at 
the centre of capitalism and patriarchy, and who is responsible for the ongoing 
process of colonisation (Dussel, 1993; Quijano, 2000; Grosfoguel, 2003; Mignolo, 
1996).  
Discourse of anthropology 
The discourse of anthropology refers to the way Western culture (at least) 
engages with the world through making meaning from an anthropocentric perspective. 
At the centre of this discourse is the personification of how modern ‘man’ ought to 
be; as Geertz stated, “organised into a distinctive whole and set contrastively against 
such wholes and against social and natural background is” (1979, p. 229). 
Anthropocentrism is characteristic of the period when colonisation first occurred (15th 
and 16th centuries) and its knowledge-making was dominated by institutions, 
particularly those of Christianity. Foucault argued that Kant solidified this method 
through which Western culture conceptualised its ontology in his institution of 
philosophical anthropology in The Critique of Pure Reason, but he stated it better in a 
short paper published in 1784 entitled Was ist Aufkärung? (Foucault, 2007, 2009). 
Foucault elaborates further on this in many of his works, but it can be found clearly in 
The Politics of Truth (2007). He explains that Kant’s philosophical anthropology is 
the solidification of modernity and the birth of the modern technology of the self that 
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is defined by modern philosophical anthropology. When explaining this operation, he 
states:  
Even if it is relatively and necessarily vague, the Enlightenment period is 
certainly designed as a formative stage for modern humanity. This is 
anthropology in the Aufkärung in the wide sense of the term to which Kant, 
Weber, etc. referred, a period without fixed dates, with multiple points of entry 
since one can also define it by the formation of capitalism, the constitution of 
the modern man (defined by the bourgeois world), the establishment of nation-
state systems, the foundation of modern science. (Foucault, 2007, p. 57) 
Therefore, the discourse of anthropology refers to the “man” of modernity that is 
produced by capitalism, modernity, and patriarchy; for this research, colonisation 
from the Enlightenment period is embedded into race and social Darwinism.  
 
Conceptualisation 
As described in the method section of the previous chapter, the term 
conceptualisation is used to refer to the notion that Foucault called d'énonciation15 
(enunciation), because it highlights the specific phenomena of the aesthetic colonial 
historical dimension of the creation of the Western tools of aboriginality and 
blackness. This notion maintains the verbal fluidity that enunciation refers to; 
however, it changes the linguistic importance that it denotes and places greater 
emphasis on the imagery or abstract idea that the notion of the concept denotes. This 
is particularly important given that this part investigates the conceptual formation of 
aboriginality and blackness from the perspective of aesthetics. Conceptualisation, like 
d'énonciation, is defined as the irreducible discursive practice “that is constituted by a 																																																								
15  Both the concept of enunciation and the concept of statement can be found English 
translations.  
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finite body of rules that authorises an infinite number of performances” (Foucault, 
1974, p. 27).  
Processes 
Processes typically refer to what Foucault called rules, or rules of formation, 
or what he later termed as law (Foucault, 1973; 1974; 1976). However, the notion of 
processes that is used in this paper highlights the changing nature of the discursive 
formation. Foucault understood rules and law from a sophisticated perspective of the 
theory of law (Deleuze, 1985), which is predominantly informed by theorists such as 
Dworkin (1998) and Kelsen (2005). However, for this research, it is important to have 
readily available a naturalised series of changes to which the notion of processes 
implies. Therefore, instead of having a set of discursive rules or laws, which is 
constituted by its illegalities (Deleuze, 1985), for this research a conceptualisation is 
constituted using a finite body of processes that will “authorise an infinite number of 
performances”. 
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Chapter III  
Monstrous Anthropology 
This chapter focuses on the foundations that colonisation was built upon and it 
is argued that these foundations were the Western conceptualisation of 
aboriginality16. In order to investigate these foundations, the conceptualisations of 
aboriginality and blackness are examined in the Aboriginals Protection and 
Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act 1897 (1897 Act). The words ‘black’, 
‘indigenous’, and ‘aborigine’ are used thousands of times in the totality of the 
documents surrounding the 1897 Act. However, more importantly, the practices 
enacted by the 1897 Act were based on the combination of those words, which is the 
enunciation (conceptualisation) of aboriginality17. However, the Western Colonial 
conception of aboriginality was forged in the first colonial experience (15th and 16th 
centuries) when aboriginality had not yet been conceptualised using the racial 
inferiority-superiority and civilised-uncivilised binaries, which were informed by the 
social Darwinism used in the modern discourse of anthropology. It is argued that the 
Western Colonial conceptualisation of aboriginality was portrayed in the monstrous 
anthropology grounds informed by the aesthetic of ugliness of the times, in order to 
justify enslavement and other forms of domination over non-Western Colonial 
peoples. To start in the period of the first colonial experience is not to insinuate that 
the space of the proposed monstrous anthropology in the 15th and 16th centuries has a 
more significant causal hierarchy than the modern anthropological space; rather, it is 
as if the space of monstrous anthropology competes with the importance of modern 
anthropology. The importance of the space of monstrous anthropology in the 15th and 																																																								16	By aboriginality, I do not mean the concept utilised to create the Aboriginal and 
Indigenous people’s identity. In order to avoid confusion, “aboriginality” must be 
understood as it is accompanied by “Western” in order to identify this 
conceptualisation as predominantly constituted by the Colonial West.	
17 Note that blackness will be discussed separately in the following chapter. 
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16th centuries is that it is a privileged laboratory in which to view colonisation’s first 
assembly.  
In this chapter, the modern discourse of anthropology is discussed briefly with 
connections to the work that explicitly instituted inequality in the idea of races, The 
Inequality of Human Races by Gobineau (1852). This work is used as a landmark 
where the analysis of the conceptualisation of aboriginality and blackness must not 
cross. Once the grounds of the conceptualisations of aboriginality and blackness are 
separated from where they are not located, it is revealed that the grounds are located 
in the imagery of the Western aesthetic of ugliness. The Western aesthetic of ugliness 
is framed from what is known in Western culture and it says very little about the 
original civilisations in the Americas. Bosh’s triptych The Temptations of St. Anthony 
presents a large inventory of medieval representations of ugliness through the 
monstrosity of hell’s creatures. It is not surprising that the first drawings of the 
Americas follow this style and have similar representations of the content depicted in 
Bosh’s painting. Another important element is that in Bosh’s painting the depictions 
of the monsters have anthropomorphist representations that are located in the 
epistemological frame of anthropocentrism from that time, which will be transformed 
into an anthropology (the logos of anthropocentrism). Bosh’s monstrous 
anthropocentric representations are the frame of the monstrous anthropology that 
determines the Western conceptualisation of aboriginality.  
Following the thread of monstrosity, the depiction of the cannibal is the first 
monstrous depiction of the first colonial experience. This is not only seen in the 
writing in the diaries of the ‘cronistas’, such as those of Christopher Columbus, but it 
is also eloquently seen in the first pictures drawn that are found in those diaries 
(Acosta, 1589). The monstrous depiction of the Aboriginal civilisations of the 
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Americas marks the way in which they will be interpreted: colonised and therefore 
enslaved. The imagery descriptions and textual descriptions are the first 
conceptualisation that forms the narrative frame and the classification system of 
Western imagery of aboriginality. This is referred to as ‘monstrous anthropology’18 in 
the formed narrative frame and in the set of processes in practice in the first colonial 
experience in the 15th and 16th centuries.  
 Lastly, the manifestation of the first recorded example of monstrous 
anthropology in action is what anthropologists, historians, and some cronistas 
(Robiou, 2008; Sued-Badillo, 2003) describe as the Caribe tribe. The Caribe tribe are 
depicted as a warrior tribe that are cannibals, which at one point in history the terms 
Caribe and cannibal were used interchangeably. However, the veracity of the 
existence of this ‘tribe’ does not concern this research. The Caribe example is 
important because it portrays the first description of aboriginality using an explicit 
monstrous anthropology conceptualisation. The description of the narrative frame of 
the Caribe is a road map for the Western conceptualisation of aboriginality. The 
description of the tribe and the denial of their existence are described in the essay 
written by Fernando de Armas in 1884, The Fable of the Caribes. These historical 
processes encode the set of processes (rules of discursive formation) of the 
conceptualisation of aboriginality that are discussed at the end of this chapter.  
The Inequality of Human Races 
When examining every historical period, the boundaries of where one period 
finishes and the next period begins must be determined. That is, the beginning of the 
next period of colonisation must be identified in order to analyse the colonisation 
																																																								
18 This term is used briefly by Robiou (2008) in his book Taínos y Caribes en las 
Antillas to differentiate from a ‘humanistic anthropology’. However, the term is not 
further elaborated or referred to in other parts of his works (or in the works of others). 
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praxis of the 15th and 16th centuries. The explicit manifestation of modern 
anthropology’s epistemological period can be located in Count Joseph Arthur De 
Gobineau’s book The Inequality of Human Races (1852). He illustrates the outcome 
of his book in the following excerpt: 
I have shown the unique place in the organic world occupied by the human 
species, the profound physical, as well as moral, differences separating it from 
all other kinds of living creatures. Considering it by itself, I have been able to 
distinguish, on physiological grounds alone, three great and clearly marked 
types, the black, the yellow, and the white. However uncertain the aims of 
physiology may be, however meagre its resources, however defective its 
methods, it can proceed thus far with absolute certainty. (De Gobineau, 1852, 
p. 205) 
However, he did more than rigorously institute a racial hierarchy that still 
echoes today (in science and in everyday racism). De Gobineau marked the end of the 
period when inequality was directly commanded by institutions and the beginning of 
the period where inequality became naturalised in the space of race (Burnnet & Hutza, 
2008; Sabine, 1998). That is, he stated that the inequality of human races was not 
determined by royal decree that determines if someone would be a slave, a peasant, a 
count, a Christian, or any other social status, but that they were now determined by 
something more permanent: by racial differentiation predicated by skin colour. The 
research scope of this work does not allow a full elaboration on De Gobineau’s book; 
academics have rigorously undertaken this previously (Kale, 2010; Burnnet & Hutza, 
2008; Sabine, 1998). However, the scope of this research allows reference to this 
book in order to mark what it is not about. De Gobineau’s book marks the 
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manifestation of the solidification of the modern discourse of anthropology in 
colonisation.  
Once this boundary in history is drawn as an epistemological frontier, the 
question becomes even more apparent: before modern anthropology, what was the 
space where inequality was conceptualised? It is known that institutions determined 
inequality; however, the way in which it was conceptualised remains unclear. 
Although De Gobineau’s book marks the end of a period of inequality, it does so by 
drawing from its previous space that, to say the least, continues to have influence in 
the modern anthropological space where colonisation continues in places such as 
Australia. The differentiation and inequality between the Colonial Western peoples 
and non-Colonial Western peoples of the Americas started from their first contact; 
however, this differentiation was not predicated by skin colour. Therefore, how was 
inequality first conceptualised? What did the first conceptualisation of aboriginality 
look like and how did it function if they were not aided by the primacy of racial 
hierarchy?  
Aesthetics of Ugliness 
If the modern judgement of the biological notion of race and the 
anthropological notion of civilisation are removed, few ways are left to understand 
how the Colonial West first understood different societies and civilisations. The 
aesthetics of beauty and ugliness can provide a pathway into what was ‘seen’ in the 
first encounters that framed colonisation. In particular, ugliness provides an 
unexplored frame of analysis that can assist in determining a different perspective 
through which the Colonial West understood Aboriginal societies in the 15th and 16th 
centuries in their first encounters in the Americas. In the Colonial West, ugliness is a 
space where the socio-political conditions are symbolically manifested (Marx, 2002; 
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Eco, 2007), and it also manifested the moralisation of Western society (Rosenkrantz, 
1853). Finally, ugliness is all too human (Nietzsche, 1889) for the Colonial West as it 
is the mirror of what it can be and, to an extent, what it is. That is, ugliness is all too 
Western and it becomes a manifestation of its own anthropocentrism.  
The first comprehensive written elaboration of ugliness was composed by Karl 
Rosenkrantz in 1853 in his book titled Aesthetic of Ugliness. Rosenkrantz theorises 
ugliness from a framework in which it autonomously moralises ugliness assuming 
that beauty already has its own autonomous moralisation. Eco (2007) explains: 
Rosenkrantz performs a meticulous analysis of ugliness in nature, spiritual 
ugliness, ugliness in art (and the various forms of artistic incorrectness), the 
absence of form, asymmetry, disharmony, disfigurement, and deformation (the 
wretched, the vile, the banal, the fortuitous and the arbitrary, the gross), the 
various forms of the repugnant (the ungainly, death and the void, the 
horrendous, the vacuous, the sickening, the felonious, the spectral, the 
demoniac, the witchlike and the satanic). Too much to allow us to carry on 
saying that ugliness is merely the opposite of beauty understood as harmony, 
proportion, or integrity. (Eco, 2007, p. 16, emphasis added) 
Rosenkrantz argues that ugliness has a complexity of its own and is not dependant on 
beauty. This complexity is nothing other than the autonomy of the moralisation that 
Eco proposes that ugliness can be equivalent to evil. Rosenkratz’s (1853) argument 
assumes that aesthetics is the manifestation of a form of moralisation. Therefore, for 
him, evil manifests in ugliness and, contrastingly, goodness and virtue manifest in 
beauty. Rosenkratz rejects the idea that ugliness is dependent on beauty, because if he 
is right, then virtue is dependent on evil and vice versa. Therefore, he attempts to 
unravel the complexity of ugliness in order to distinguish it from beauty and to 
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demonstrate that these concepts are not dependent on each other. In contrast, Eco 
(2007) argues that the lack of appreciation of ugliness can stem from ugliness 
historically being less contemplated, less written about, and therefore less often 
researched.  
Karl Marx (cited in Eco, 2007) states that ugliness and beauty are often 
determined by “socio-economic and political conditions” (p. 116). Marx (2002) did 
not only refer to the power to buy that which could be the tools to become beautiful, 
but he also referred to beauty itself being an ideology that is constituted by the hidden 
interest of capital. This suggests that ugliness is part of the ideology of the binary of 
beauty and ugliness in reality; from this understanding, Eco stated that Marx 
intimated that a materialist dialectic is manifested in symbolic form through the 
beauty-ugliness binary. That is, the symbols manifested in beauty are represented in 
the buying power of the bourgeois position (and everything that surrounds that 
position), and the symbols manifested in ugliness are represented in the proletariat 
position. The ugliness of the proletariat position is characterised by an ideology of the 
need for consumption, which attempts to possess that which could function as an 
antidote to the ugliness-proletariat position. Beauty and ugliness become the symbolic 
dialectic that recursively confirms inequality.  
Nietzsche (1889) provides a more interesting account of ugliness in his piece 
entitled Twilight of the Idols, where he states: 
Ugliness is seen as a sign and a symptom of degeneration… Every suggestion 
of exhaustion, heaviness, senility, fatigue, any sort of lack of freedom, like 
convulsions or paralysis… all this provokes an identical reaction [just before 
he was discussing narcissism], the value judgement “ugly”… What does man 
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hate? There is no doubt about this: he hates the twilight of his own type. 
(1889, p. 78) 
Ugliness, in Nietzsche, is the parallax19 reflection of the Western notion of beauty. 
The twilight of humanity in Western aesthetics is ugliness, and this is an important 
part of what defines Western history (Eco, 2007). The value judgement of ugly is only 
understood from a judgement defined by a history that values vigour from exhaustion, 
lightness from heaviness, youth from senility, strength from weakness, and movement 
from paralysis. This history is the Colonial Western history. From this perspective, 
ugliness is as much part of the Colonial West as all that it deems to be beautiful 
because it is produced and reproduced through the value judgement of beauty. 
Ugliness is not hidden: it is as if ugliness needs to be decoded in order to find a 
treasure: it is there to be seen, but it is not exposed as much as beauty is exposed. If 
beauty is historically (and therefore socially) defined, then the same applies to 
ugliness. This indicates that the framing and mindset that makes us see beauty also 
makes us see ugliness. Moreover, beauty and ugliness do not refer to inherent 
attributes or all elements of that which is beautiful or that which is ugly. If anything, 
the attributes that define beauty or ugliness are inherent elements of the culture in 
question; in this case, the Colonial West. For example, the Colonial West often 
regards the desert as rough, lifeless, and sometimes ugly. However, these descriptions 
often convey very little about the desert itself (assuming that a distinction between 
desert and jungle, or valley, or forest, or any other landscape), but rather it conveys 
what the Colonial West values. It values that landscapes have smoothness and ease, 
and that it does not pose a threat to the way in which Western societies live. 
Moreover, it values abundance of what the Colonial West wants to ‘see’. The desert 																																																								
19 The effect whereby the position or direction of an object appears to differ when its 
reflection is viewed.  
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certainly has the aforementioned attributes and more, but not within the frame of the 
Colonial West. Therefore, a desert that is sometimes classified as ugly and is often 
regarded in low judgement values can reveal more about the Western frame of 
classification than about the desert itself. Through ugliness, we can understand the 
Colonial West frame of classification, which is to understand the Colonial West 
mindset including that which is highly valued and that which is poorly valued. In this 
sense, a history of ugliness in the Colonial West is a history of ugliness of the 
Colonial West’s ‘spirit’, and not the history of the object that it calls “ugly”.  
As an inquiry pathway, the Colonial West conceptualisation of ugliness 
provides an obscured and often ignored account of its inherent history (Eco, 2007). 
Through the realm of Western ugliness and motivated by domination, peoples were 
conceptualised and therefore captured in the Colonial West framework. For this 
reason, this is an important framework to consider in order to elaborate on how the 
Colonial West historically engaged in practices that continued to form and reproduce 
the first colonial discourses. These first West Colonial frames were deployed almost 
immediately to what were mostly unknown civilisations20 at the moment of first 
contact. These conceptualising practices were first manifested in writing and drawing 
in the colonial records of the diaries or “chronicles” (crónicas) of the 
conquistadores21. These recorded what they saw, but they also formed what became 
known as aboriginality in the 17th and 18th centuries, and even today. However, where 
																																																								
20 Marco Polo and other incursions can be considered as pre-existent historical 
processes that are prior to the frame of the Western narrative and therefore have 
influence on the colonial narratives; see Fedirici (2006) and Sáez-López (2011).  
21 Conquistadores was a specific term that was instituted by the Kingdom of Spain to 
differentiate the first colonisers that participated in the first wars, particularly in 
México, from the colonisers that continued to arrive from the Americas towards the 
end of the 16th century (Alegría, 1990).  
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can imagery references be located that convey how the ugliness of the unknown was 
represented in the late 15th century and the beginning of the 16th century?  
 
Bosh’s Triptych: The Temptations of St Anthony 
 
Figure 1 Hieronymus Bosh’s triptych: The Temptations of St. Anthony (1505-1506) 
Bosh’s triptych of The Temptations of Saint Anthony (1505-1506) is used in 
this part to map the framework of the aesthetic of ugliness of the 15th and 16th 
centuries. That is, this triptych was chosen as a rich chart of monstrosity enclosed in a 
given set of narratives. This brief description will follow the narratives from the left 
panel to the right panel in an attempt to highlight specific imageries but also to 
describe its potential narratives. The identified imageries will be considered as the 
arrangement for the conceptualisation (discursive devices) of aboriginality and the 
processes that form (rules of formation) the underlying narratives of this 
conceptualisation. Therefore, this mapping begins from an aesthetics of ugliness 
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focussed on monstrosity in order to follow the conceptual arrangement of these 
imageries and narratives.   
There are three panels in Hieronymus Bosh’s triptych of The Temptations of 
Saint Anthony (1505-1506). In the first panel on the left, and from the top to the 
bottom, the calmness is immediately disturbed by flying sea voyages that are being 
attacked by fish-like creatures. One fish-like religious man is praying, but his body is 
horizontal. On top of this man, there are wolf-like creatures that reassure the 
imminence of danger. Similar indescribable images disturb the calmness of the 
horizon, which indicates a stable past. Focusing on the top middle of the first panel of 
the triptych, the calmness precipitates the depiction of the aftermath of the battle in 
the second panel. The pale and dry colours in the first panel indicate death, the end, 
and the lack of hope. Then, the dark gradients of black, brown, and red in the first 
panel alter the perspective to an imagery that suggests a closer experience of ‘seeing’. 
There are numerous possible interpretations of the situations depicted in the painting, 
and as the focus moves to the bottom of the first panel, the perception changes and it 
makes the viewer believe that they are inside a wall. Then, it is clearly seen that two 
men are helping another, apparently injured, man and they are all walking on a 
boarded walkway. These images suggest that they are moving away from the battle 
scene, perhaps to a safer area. However, on their left, there is a blackness that 
suggests that anything could intercept them on their way to safety and put them in 
further danger. In the bottom right, closer to the viewer, there is an indescribable bird-
like creature. It is dressed in soldier’s armour and its dark eyes penetrate the viewer. 
In the picture, it is uncertain if this creature is malicious or not, dangerous or not, but 
the creature is from hell and therefore must be one of the devil’s servants. The image 
depicts the creature as being from hell, but in an odder more than terrifying manner. 
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The creature is handing a document in the direction of a representative of the Catholic 
Church. This man of the cloth is discretely reading another document. He is hiding 
below the boarded walkway with other indescribable things in the same blackness on 
the left of the three men walking on the walkway. The fish-like monsters, the wolf-
like monsters, the creature being used as a carriage, the non-Christian priest-like 
creatures, and the hatching egg giving birth to a bird, with a bird-fish-like creature on 
top: these images and imagery suggest that these monster-like creatures are not to be 
worried about just now, and thank goodness because they look terrifying. However, 
some are being represented as having the ability to attack, which indicates that an 
attack is imminent.    
The second panel represents war: fire, blackness, armoured ships, destruction, 
beasts, more strange creatures, men from the Church, an owl, a bird, crosses, evil fish-
like creature, giant rodents, dogs, soldiers, and a crucified Jesus Christ are the 
representations that aid the imagery of war. Combined, this imagery also attempts to 
highlight the chaos of war. With the same perspective as the first panel, the second 
panel moves from being distant to the battle to being in the midst of it. It appears to 
suggest a double movement that simultaneously depicts a long view and a close view. 
The last movement has the effect of bringing the viewer inside the picture. The truth 
is even further contested in this panel through the highlighting of the strangeness, with 
hell being the most feared form of monstrosity in that time period, and a re-
composition of Western objects of war (e.g. ships, carriages, armour, etc.) that are 
unique and had never been seen before this painting. 
A representation that is prominent in the second panel is the fish-like creature 
with the red cloth and a machine on top. This is the second creature in red that is 
prominent due to the intense red in comparison to the grey and black gloomy colours 
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that saturate the three panels of the triptych. This fish-like creature (with its part 
machine) converses with the bird-like creature and the man in red. At this point, red 
appears to communicate a form of noble distinction in men, while the red distinction 
in the (monster-like) creatures suggests a high ranking command in the forces of hell 
by Western standards. The strangeness of the bird-like creature and fish-like creature 
also appear to be important in the ranks of creatures from hell, which indicates that 
hell’s creatures have a similar organisation to those of Westerners.  
The colour red operates as a representation of battle, and it explicitly refers to 
blood, but it also refers to importance, officialdom, and hierarchy. The blood colour is 
shared by both humans and non-human creatures alike. The non-human creatures 
appear to have a degree of Western sophistication and intelligence, or simply Western 
similarity. The red colour appears to be a form of anthropomorphism rather than the 
mark of violence, of hierarchy, and of sophisticated civilisation. The representations 
indicate leadership, titles, and differentiation from other creatures of hell, which are 
anthropomorphisms. The hell creatures that bear red are “civilised” by Western 
standards and are not savages in the sense that is understood today.  
The third panel in the triptych has less darkness. Faded pastel colours 
comprise at least one-third of the picture. However, there is more red-blood coloured 
imagery than in the previous two panels. This panel presents the aftermath of a great 
battle, the aftermath of chaos. A flying fish-creature takes a man away from the 
ground from right to left, which suggests that they are moving away from the 
situation, towards sundown in the west. It is the third time that the city is being 
represented, and it is depicted as an invaded city with the remnants of a battle, with 
death very visible, and with many other post-war objects and activities. In the centre 
of the panel, an old woman, similar to the Virgin Mary, is pouring blood into a cup for 
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the Anti-Christ, who can be seen as an infant. A sizable red cloth covers part of the 
infant, and the cloth covers more than ten per cent of the picture and connects with 
other strange creatures. Also, there is a man under a dark cloth looking at the viewer. 
He is hiding his intentions of reading a book; in the context of the image, it suggests 
that the book is a religious book. At his feet lay blood and dead bodies of both 
humans and the monstrous creatures from hell. At first glance, the triptych as a whole 
gives a sensation of hopelessness. However, the aforementioned man, hiding in the 
black cloth and looking at the viewer, provides a sensation of action: an invitation, an 
announcement of action, and perhaps a clue that the war is not over. The man appears 
to suggest that this is a never-ending battle of good against evil, or Western men 
against Bosh’s creatures from hell. Men who respond to the holy story and command 
of being made in the image of God, and this carries with it a large responsibility. The 
non-human creatures from hell are monsters because they are not human. However, 
their origin and command in Bosh’s creation remain in the imagery of Bosh’s 
creatures and humans.  
 This brief description of Bosh’s triptych of The Temptations of St. Anthony 
(1505-1506) is not intended to decode this complex artwork or rigorously describe the 
denotative elements of the triptych. This beautiful piece is suspiciously complicit and 
relevant to the Colonial West’s depiction of the assembled frame of ugliness in the 
conceptualisation of aboriginality in the first colonial experience of the Americas. The 
construction of ugliness by the Colonial West to the Aboriginal civilisations of the 
Americas was a monstrous one. Bosh’s painting describes better than words the 
ugliness of monstrosity in the 15th and 16th centuries. Hieronymus Bosh (1450-1516) 
did not live to experience the Reformation in full; therefore, Eco states that he is a 
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“son of his epoch” (2007, p. 102)22. When theorising about The Temptations of St. 
Anthony, Eco also (2007) states: 
His infernal creatures are hybrids reminiscent of the diabolical collages in 
Baldus… They do not spring from a combination of “known” animal features 
but have their own nightmarish independence, and we do not know whether 
they come from the Abyss or whether they live, unobserved in our world. ( 
Eco, 2007, p. 101). 
What is known is that the natures of these monstrous creatures are unknown; 
the unknown feature is crucial given that it is the space in which Western culture 
attempted to conceptualise what was new for them. That is, that which was new or 
simply unknown had to be grasped and conceptualised using a set of existing 
imageries that Bosh introduced in this painting. The monstrous creatures, almost 
naturally in a battle with men, are odd, strange, and at times horrendously, terribly, 
and explicitly evil. The suggested attributes of having a hierarchal organisation, a 
class differentiation, and even the capacity to fight a battle using Western standards 
are characteristics that come from Western culture and are therefore cultural 
anthropomorphisms. The creatures from hell are the product of “men” (Western 
culture) because they are similar to them, culturally and politically. How does this 
anthropocentric view of fictional creatures from hell become relevant to the 
immersion and colonisation of the West to the Americas? How does this Christian 
fictionalisation relate to what would become known as the “New World”?  
The Cannibal 
According to French historian Jules Michelet (1798-1874), “the real discovery 
of men started when Christopher Columbus arrived to the islands of the Caribbean in 																																																								
22 This does not go against the art theory and art appreciation claims that Bosh was 
very influential in the surrealism movement in the 20th century (Breton, 1929).  
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1492” (cited in Sáez-López, 2010, p. 470). The importance of this “discovery of men” 
(men here could be used interchangeably with the Colonial West) was expressed very 
early after 1492. In his dedication in the book General History of the Indies (1522), 
Francisco López de Gómara said, “the discovery of the Américas was the biggest 
event since the creation of the world” (p. 156). Furthermore, Fernando de Oviedo was 
considered to be the first cronista (an early historian) of the Americas who captured 
what he was experiencing through both words and images; he felt that he had to also 
capture everything in drawings and images of the marvels he had seen (Oviedo, 
1533). He states: 
[i]t is like seeing painted by a Berruguete23 or another great painter like 
Leonardo Da Vinci… or other famous painters I met in Italy that words cannot 
fully describe their pieces… all this is better seen that written. (Oviedo, 1533, 
Fol. 91) 
That is, many cronistas agreed that the power of words was unable to fully describe 
this “New World” that they were colonising. As a result, the cronistas drew images 
alongside their words in their diaries24. These images, to say the least, provided a 
different account of how the Colonial West understood the Americas, and particularly 
their peoples. The following two drawings are from the beginning of the 16th century 
and they were the first drawings of the Aboriginal civilisations from the Colonial 
West perspective. In the obscured history of the ugliness and monstrosity of the 
Americas, the method of framing monstrosity was through cannibalism. It is 
immediately noticeable that the styles of drawing can be readily compared with 
Bosh’s creatures in The Temptations of St Anthony.  																																																								
23 Alonso Berruguete (1488-1561) was a Spanish painter.  
24 The drawings made by the cronistas were later re-drawn by artists usually located 
in Spain or other European countries. The cronistas did not have authorship other than 
in the books that were later published (Alegría, 1978; Sued Badillo, 2003).  
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Figure 2 Lorenz Fries, Auslegung der Carta Marina (Estrasburgo, Johannes Grieninger, 1525) 
The first time that the word ‘cannibal’ was written by the Colonial West (in 
the Spanish language) was on November 23, 1492. In Christopher Columbus’ diaries, 
he mentions: 
…y otros se llamaban canibales, a quien mostraban tener un gran miedo. Y 
desde que vieron que lleva este camino, dice que no podían hablar, porque, 
los comían y que son gente muy armada. (de Las Casas, 1522)25 
In this fragment of Columbus’ diaries, it is important to highlight that what he 
emphasizes is a tone of fear, the practice of eating human flesh, and the alleged 
presence of armed peoples. The narrative that Columbus presented was already a 
prelude to a battle against armed and flesh-eating peoples that set the scene for them 																																																								
25 …and others were called cannibals to whom they showed great fear. And since 
they observed that we shared the same route, they said that they could not say a word 
about them, because they could be eaten (by the cannibals) and that they were very 
armed people. 
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to be considered monsters. This description is not far from Bosh’s depiction of the 
monsters from hell. Columbus further proves this point in the days leading up to this 
entry on November 4, 1492, when interpreting the descriptions of these peoples who 
attacked the Aboriginal peoples from the Caribbean: 
…gente que tenía un ojo en la frente… entendió también que lexos de allí avía 
hombres de un ojo y otros con hocicos de perros… criaturas monstruosas… 
(in Varela, 1984,)26 
This description is quite similar to the drawing in Figure 2 of an Aboriginal 
group capturing and preparing a man to be eaten. In this drawing, which was finalised 
in 1525, Aboriginal men are represented with inhuman heads, i.e. dog-like heads, but 
with human bodies. From left to right, one of the creatures is riding a llama with a 
captured Aboriginal man. He holds a whip for the llama. In the centre, another 
creature (a cannibal) is chopping a man into body parts. The cannibal creature is using 
a cleaver to chop the body parts. The body parts that are hanging above him suggest 
that they are being preserved as the Colonial West would preserve meats (using salt) 
to be eaten later. Another cannibal Aboriginal creature is helping with related chores. 
At the far right, a fourth cannibal Aboriginal creature is observing the chores being 
done while eating a human body part, an arm, under a wooden structure. These 
monstrous creatures inspire fear and sorrow for the fate of the victims represented in 
this drawing.  
The ‘authenticity’ of the objects, peoples, practices, and cultural elements is 
the subject of debate in other important works (Alegría, 1978; Robiou, 2008; 
Chicangana-Bayona, 2008), yet mentioning them can help further illustrate the 
western historical formation of the imageries and narratives of aboriginality. It is 																																																								
26 …one-eyed people… he understood from those languages that they were men with 
only one eye and others with dog-like muzzles… monstrous creatures… 
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noticeable that a cleaver (or a metal knife) is used to cut the body parts, and it is well 
known that metal was not used for cutting devices in any recorded Aboriginal group 
in the Americas (Alegría, 1978; Federici, 2010). Furthermore, another historical error 
can be seen in the practice of hanging meat for preservation and the use of a whip to 
ride the llama. The preservation of meat, the use of the whip, and metal knives are all 
distinctive objects and practices from the Colonial West in medieval times. This early 
depiction of cannibalism depicts more than an explicit attempt to Westernise cannibal 
Aboriginal peoples and more than the fantasies of sailors that undertook long voyages 
on the high seas. Instead, it depicts a preconceived style of illustrating how the 
Colonial West understood and conceptualised Aboriginal peoples in the first colonial 
experience. That is, this image depicts what the Colonial West was bluntly imagining 
and conceptualising when they experienced the civilisations of the Americas.  
The portrayal of Aboriginal peoples here is evidently outside the “civilised” 
and “uncivilised” logic; this is seen in the picture through the Colonial West assigning 
Western cultural attributes such as similar cultural objects (metal knives, wooden hut, 
etc.) and similar quotidian practices (hanging meat for preservation, the way the 
captured person is carried using the llama, etc.). The Western attribution to the 
cannibal Aboriginal peoples can be compared with the portrayal of the creatures from 
hell in The Temptations of St. Anthony because Western culture is the point of 
reference in which these monstrosities are described. The cannibal illustration 
demonstrates how Western culture is the point of reference even in completely 
different civilisations, and it goes as far as recording historical errors. The cannibal 
monstrous creatures are not uncivilised or inferior; the Colonial West illustrated them 
with similar cultural practices, almost all identical except that they were monstrous 
creatures.  
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The beginning of the use of the term “cannibal” by Spanish colonisers 
occurred only one month after the arrival of the Colonial West in the Americas. The 
narrative of feared Aboriginal peoples began in the description of the first day of the 
arrival in the Americas on October 12, 1492: 
Ellos todos a una mano son de buena estatura de grandeza y Buenos gestos, 
bien hechos. Yo vi algunos que tenían señales de heridas en sus cuerpos, y les 
hice señas de qué era aquello, y ellos me mostraron como allí vienen de tierra 
firme a tomarlos por cautivos.27 
It is important to highlight that the Colonial West framed two distinct groups 
of Aboriginal peoples from the first moment of colonisation: those that collaborated 
with the Spanish conquistadores and those who appeared to be a menace to their 
conquest by fighting back.  
 
Figure 3 Map Kunstmann II, ca. 1505, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Múnich (Cod. Icon. 133). 
The picture in Figure 3 was finalised in 1505 and it is considered to be the first 
drawing of Aboriginal peoples in the Americas (Alegría, 1978; Sáez, 2010). The 																																																								
27 They all had good height and made proper face gestures. I saw that some had signs 
of injuries, and I asked them in signals that what have caused the injuries, and they 
showed me how other peoples would come and try to capture them. 
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drawing is thought to have been drawn by Americo Vespucio, but this has not been 
confirmed (Alegría in Sáez, 2010). This is a simpler representation of the Aboriginal 
civilisation of the Tupinamba: an Aboriginal man “roasting” another man. The 
drawing itself is a map, and at the bottom the man is using a rotating device to cook 
another whole man over a relatively intense fire. Given the white skin colour of the 
victim, it is believed that he is European (Chicangana-Bayona, 2008; Sáez-López, 
2011). Therefore, this functioned as a warning to the Colonial Western peoples, and it 
was a sign of the narrative around the dangers that needed to be addressed through 
defending themselves against the cannibals. Furthermore, this illustration is the first 
depiction of the immersion of the Colonial West as actors in a narrative of a possible 
tragedy in the Americas. As in the previous picture, the debate around the factual 
inconsistencies is not the focus of this research, yet the picture is a useful tool to 
highlight that the roasting method depicted is a European one. However, this again 
demonstrates the Colonial West cultural anthropocentric attributions to the Aboriginal 
civilisations of the Americas; furthermore, it depicts Aboriginal peoples as a menace 
to the colonisers.   
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Figure 4 Wahrhaftige History of Hans Staden (Marburg, 1557) 
In the illustration in Figure 4, which has not been preserved well, there is a 
later depiction of the “cannibal” Aboriginal peoples in the Americas. It is a group 
feasting on human body parts while cooking another human. From left to right, the 
integration of a woman in the practices of cannibalism can also be seen. In the 
background, there is a depiction of Aboriginal houses in the Americas called bohíos 
(Acosta, 1589). In the middle of the illustration, there are some men devouring the 
human flesh after it has been cooked. Men of all ages are represented here: bearded 
men (suggesting old age), bald men (suggesting middle aged), and young men. 
Notably, they all are effectively naked, but their appearances resemble the physical 
appearance of Europeans portrayed in the religious paintings of the time. In the 
middle, there are human body parts cut in pieces that resemble the way a chicken is 
cut by a butcher. The human body parts are on top of a roasting device that is fuelled 
by an intense fire and it is being kept intense using a fan that another Aboriginal man 
is holding. In the bottom right, there is a child eating a small piece of the cooked 
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human. The child also resembles the religious paintings of children or angels of the 
Renaissance. However, in this picture, this representation of innocence is disturbing 
given the context.  
The imagery in this picture appears to be less Westernised given that the 
bodies are represented without clothes, their houses resemble the structures that 
existed in the Americas at the time (of which some remain today), and the drawings 
suggest movement that feels like a foreign celebration or a foreign type of feast. 
However, the Westernised attribution remains and it appears to be located in the 
bodies and in the roasting device. The monstrous communication of this picture lies in 
the feast of human flesh. Notably, the picture also highlights a child eating the human 
flesh, which projects pure evil. This imagery of Aboriginal peoples in this cannibal 
feast presents a conceptualisation that is determined by a knot of horror and tragedy.  
Around the same time as the painting, the priest Fray Bartolomé de las Casas, 
who was a cronista and the first advocate for Aboriginal human rights, wrote a letter 
in 1552 to the Spanish Crown entitled Brevísimo en relación a la destrucción de las 
Indias28. This letter was a summarised account of the situation of the Americas that 
highlighted the horrible events caused by the Spanish conquistadores. In one part, 
when he describes the actions of an unnamed captain of the Kingdom of Guatimala 
(today Guatemala), he writes: 
Tenía éste esta costumbre: que cuando iba a hacer guerra a algunos pueblos 
o provincias, llevaba de los ya sojuzgados indios cuantos podía que hiciesen 
guerra a los otros; e como no les daba de comer a diez y a veinte mil hombres 
que llevaba, consentíales que comiesen a los indios que tomaban. Y así había 
en su real solemnísima carnecería de carne humana, donde en su presencia se 																																																								
28 A short letter about the destruction of the Indies: however, it was more than 100 
pages long.  
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mataban los niños y se asaban, y mataban el hombre por solas las manos y 
pies, que tenían por los mejores bocados. Y con estas inhumanidades, 
oyéndolas todas las otras gentes de las otras tierras, no sabían dónde se meter 
de espanto. (de las Casas, 1552 folio VIII)29 
This account (and much of de las Casas’s letter) tells a different story that 
portrays a picture of terror, of chaos, and of monstrosity as the context and as the 
underlying narrative, yet this was produced by colonisation and not by the Aboriginal 
peoples. It is not that the Aboriginal peoples were good or bad in Western culture’s 
terms. Many stories tell the history of the Aboriginal peoples being portrayed as 
victims of the conquistadores, and therefore being depicted as in the famous 
description of the “noble savage” (Alegría, 1978). Even the heroic narratives of 
certain Aboriginal peoples, such as the narratives of Tupac Amaru and Lautaro, 
among others, appear to follow the “noble savage” narrative given that even these 
warrior groups only went to war with the Spanish, the Portuguese, the French, the 
Dutch, and the British, in sum with the Colonial West, for valid reasons according to 
the Colonial West framework (Sued-Badillo, 2003). This horrendous narration from a 
position that condemns the colonisers appears to escape the monstrous 
conceptualisation of aboriginality, blaming the Spanish; however, it illustrates that 
even in the ‘reality’ of this tragic situation, a different view will conceptualise the 
situation of aboriginality in horrendous terms. There is no doubt that the first colonial 
experience was a genocide and a crime against humanity, starting with the 																																																								
29 This person had this practice: that when he went to war against any people or 
province, he took as many indigenous peoples he could so they could fight against 
them; and since he would not give them any food, 10 and even 20 thousand at a time, 
he persuaded them to eat the other indigenous people they would capture. Then, he 
witnessed a brutal butchery of human flesh, that in front of him infants were killed 
and roasted, and they killed men only to eat their hands and feet, which were regarded 
as the most delicious parts. When the other peoples would hear these inhumanities, 
they could not hide their fear.  
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enslavement of Aboriginal peoples; moreover, the historical process of tragedy and 
horror appears to stem from the framework of monstrous anthropology and not the 
other way around. That is, the conceptualisation of aboriginality began with the 
process of framing it in the horror and tragedy in the cultures of Aboriginal peoples; it 
did not begin with the process of horror and tragedy that came from the Colonial 
West’s violent murderous colonisation process.  
	110		
The Fable of the Caribes 
 
Figure 5 Stedman, II, IV, 1805. 
…aunque dice que el comienzo fue sobre el habla de los Caniba, que ellos 
llaman caribes, que los vienen a tomar, y traen arcos y flechas sin hierro, que 
en todas aquellas tierras no había memoria de él ni de otro metal, salvo de 
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oro y cobre, aunque cobre no había visto sino poco el Almirante. El Almirante 
le dijo por señas que los Reyes de Castilla mandarían destruir a los caribes y 
que a todos se los mandarían traer las manos atadas.30 
On December 26, 1492, one month after the first written use of the word 
cannibal and two months after Columbus arrived on the first island of the Caribbean 
in the Americas, the term Caribe was written as a way to correct the Aboriginal word 
caniba. They gave a name to the cannibals, and they grouped the cannibals in the term 
Caribe. Furthermore, Columbus promised to capture the Caribes because it appeared 
that they were the evil Aboriginals that needed to be stopped. The Caribes were 
depicted as warrior tribes that raped and pillaged the first Aboriginal peoples in the 
Caribbean. According to mainstream history, the Caribes were a warrior tribe that 
historically had an ancestral grudge against the Arawak group, which were mainly 
located but not limited to the north of South America (Alegría, 1990; Robiou, 2008). 
The Aboriginal peoples that Columbus first interviewed were called Taínos, which are 
an Aboriginal group from the Arawak group, located in what is known today as 
Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, Guadalupe, Jamaica, Cuba, and the Bahamas 
(Sued-Badillo, 2003). The Caribes would sail at specific times of the year, according 
to specific astrological constellation beliefs, and go to war capturing women and men. 
They would keep the women as slaves and marry them. The men were sacrificed in 
very elaborate ceremonies to honour their ancestral rivalries with the Arawak groups 
(Robiou, 2008). They lived in the smaller islands of the Caribbean including what is 
today called Martinique (Robiou, 2008). According to various historians (such as 																																																								
30 …although he said that they were called Caniba, that they call caribes, the ones 
who come to take them, and whom are equipped with bows and arrows not made of 
steel, that in all that land there is no memory of another type of metal, other than gold 
and copper, although copper was not so much seen. Columbus communicated through 
sign language that the Kingdom of Castilla would order the destruction of the caribes 
and would have them all bound by their hands.  
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Alegría, 1978; Robiou, 2008), the Caribes not only practiced ceremonies that 
involved the sacrifice of captured peoples, but they also practiced ritualistic 
consumption of human flesh (Alegría, 1990; Robio, 2008). The Caribes also played 
ritualistic ball games in which the winners would be sacrificed as well (Roboiu, 
2008). However, the existence of the Caribes as a distinctive ‘tribe’ separate to the 
Arawak is an ongoing debate (Alegría, 1990; Robiou, 2008; Sued-Badillo, 2003); later 
in this section, the first argument against their existence is presented.  
The Caribes were depicted early on as the monstrous creatures of these new 
lands, and the first Aboriginal peoples in contact with Columbus, i.e. the Taínos, were 
depicted as the good Aboriginal peoples, or at least the ones who could be ‘saved’. 
This statement is true to the point of being manifested in the naming of the ‘good’ 
Aboriginal peoples that ‘informed’ Columbus of the existence of these cannibals. The 
word tainú, and later known as Taíno, was the word used in the Arawak language to 
mean ‘the good ones’, and the Aboriginal peoples from Puerto Rico, the Dominican 
Republic, and Cuba were known (and today are still referred to) as Taíno (Alegría, 
1978). The Caribes appeared to become the explicit conceptualisation space where 
the Colonial West conceptualised all creatures from hell, as in The Temptations of St. 
Anthony, and to justify going to war with them, capturing them, and using them as 
slaves for mining gold and silver (Sued-Badillo, 2003). That is, the Caribes is where 
the conceptualisation of monstrosity began and followed through historically; thus, it 
is from this point that its “othering” and evolving processes must be examined.  
In 1884, Juan Ignacio de Armas, who was a Cuban anthropologist, published 
an essay entitled The Fable of the Caribes that critically analysed the concept of the 
Caribes. In his essay, de Armas argued that the famous tribe called the Caribes was a 
myth created in order to justify the enslavement of Aboriginal peoples in the 
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Americas (Alegría, 1990; de Armas, 1884; Sued-Badillo, 2003 ). de Armas supported 
this argument first through ‘demonstrating’ that the Aboriginal peoples only ate plants 
and small animals (frujívoros), second through arguing that the Kingdom of Spain 
passed a Royal Decree (Real Cédula de Gracia, 1503) ordering the conquistadores to 
not enslave the Aboriginal peoples unless they committed an unforgivable sin such as 
cannibalism, and third through exhibiting linguistic parallelisms with other known 
ancient groups in European history and literature that suggested that the name Caribe 
was plagiarised from other stories and myths. After elaborating on these arguments he 
concluded that: 
No había dos razas en las Antillas sino una sola… La fábula de los Caribes 
fue al principio un error jeográfico, luego una alusinación y después una 
calumnia. (de Armas, 1884, p. 34)31 
de Armas’ essay had been mostly ignored until the late 1970s (Alegría 1978; 
Roboiu, 2008; Sued-Badillo, 2003). Although it is located in the modern 
anthropological discursive space, this essay presented an explicit critical illustration 
of the monstrous anthropological conceptualisation: because it discussed the key 
points of the Caribes in relation to the capture and slavery of Aboriginal peoples, it 
contested the process in which the Colonial West imagined the Caribes as cannibals 
and it presented an argument of how this Aboriginal group was an imagined category, 
in an anthropocentric manner.  
de Armas’ first argument stated that the stomachs of the conquistadores were 
accustomed to meat and cannibalism was a practice that historically was an extreme 
act for Europeans (mainly sailors) to satisfy the apparent need for flesh (de Armas, 
1884). The Aboriginal peoples did not posses the material conditions to be 																																																								
31 In the Antilles there was only one race and not two… The fable of the Caribes was 
in the beginning a geographical mistake, then a hallucination, and then slander.  
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accustomed to eating meat and therefore did not have the organic capacity to crave, 
consume, and digest meat. When setting up this argument, de Armas suggested that 
the only ones that could actually have practiced cannibalism were the Spanish 
conquistadores and not any type of Aboriginal people in the Antilles: 
Los únicos casos auténticos de antropofajia en la conquista, fueron cometidos 
por los mismos conquistadores; porque el estómago de éstos, mui diferente en 
condiciones dijestivas al de los sóbrios i frujívoros indios, no pudo soportar 
algunas veces la carencia de carne… Los mismos infelices que injustamente 
acusados de antropófagos llevaba Colón a España… estuvieron a punto de 
ser devorados por la tripulación (13).32 (de Armas, 1884, p. 15)33 
de Armas argued that the Spanish were the only ones that were capable of 
eating human flesh when meat was not available. Therefore, this convenient 
accusation arose from the behaviour of the accusers in relation to what the colonisers 
could interpret in what they observed, from their anthropocentric perspective. Based 
on a careful revision of the diaries of some men on the voyages, some historians 
(primarily critical historians) support this account of the authenticity of Aboriginal 
cannibalism and they have called for historical revisionism (Borja, 2002; Chicangana-
Bayona, 2003). Notably, the underlying tone of horror and tragedy appeared to be 
present in the storyline of the conquistadores and the Aboriginal peoples: from the 
position of the colonisers through depicting Aboriginal peoples as monstrous cannibal 
creatures that terrorised other Aboriginal groups and potentially the colonisers or from 																																																								
32 The footnote in the essay refers to the diaries of Fernando Colón in which he 
describes how the men were about to eat the Aboriginal people that Columbus had 
captured to take as an offering to the Kingdom of Spain.  
33 The only authentic cases of anthropophagia in the conquest were committed by the 
conquistadores; because their stomach, they had very different digestive conditions 
from the sober and frujíveros aboriginals, they could not manage the lack of meat… 
The same damned people who were accused of cannibalism that where on the voyage 
with Columbus to Spain… they were almost devoured by the men on the voyage. 
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other positions, like the arguments of de las Casas and de Armas, that depicted 
Aboriginal peoples as the victims of the carnages of the Spanish.  
de Armas (1884) narrated how Columbus in 1493 captured 23 Aboriginal 
persons to sell as slaves: “seven from San Salvador, and 16 from Cuba” (de Armas, 
1884, p. 24). Only ten survived the voyage, and he sold four in Seville and took the 
remaining six to the Catholic King of Spain. The King and Queen ordered Columbus 
to return the Aboriginal persons back to their lands. However, most died in the second 
voyage back to the Americas and he used the remaining two as interpreters, in 
effective disobedience to the order from the Kingdom of Spain. During the second 
voyage in 1493, Columbus sent a full ship of Aboriginal “slaves” (700 in total) to be 
sold in Spain and he justified this action by stating: 
…lo han liberado de los antropófagos y ahora los pueblos indígenas podian 
estar en paz. (de las Casas, 1495, cited in de Armas, 1884, p. 26)34 
The Kingdom of Spain also forbade this. de Armas (1884) stated that 
Columbus proposed a slave trade, like that emerging from Africa commanded by the 
Portuguese. The Kingdom commanded the 700 aboard the second ship to be freed; 
however, this proved to be a futile action given that the Aboriginal peoples ended up 
being slaves in Europe where the Kingdom of Spain did not have immediate 
influence. In August 1503, Queen Isabel I signed a royal decree (Real Cédula) that 
allowed licenses to sell African slaves and that, in the case of the Aboriginal peoples, 
only the Caribes or other cannibal groups could be captured and sold as slaves: 
 …y contra los caribes y negros, de acá se pueden, con el nombre de la 
Santísima Trinidad, eviarlos todos como esclavos que se podrán vender 
4,000… (1503, in Acosta 1589)35 																																																								
34 …we have freed them from the cannibals and now the aboriginal groups can be in 
peace.  
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With allusion to the Real Cédula, de Armas strongly suggested that the Caribe tribe 
was an invention to capture and enslave the Aboriginal peoples of the Americas. This 
royal decree is important because it institutes the historical process of capturing and 
enslaving Aboriginal peoples in the Caribbean through the historical process of 
cannibalism at least 30 years before Aboriginal slavery was solidified after the 
conquest of Mexico.  
The Caribes were presented as a warrior tribe and horrifying group that 
capture other Aboriginal peoples without provocation. However, de Armas suggested 
the opposite, for which he declared that there was more historical justification that the 
creation of this monstrous Aboriginal imagery was for the purpose of justifying the 
beginnings of Aboriginal slavery. The complicit relationship between the monstrous 
cannibal imagery provides the grounds for instituting the process of horror and 
tragedy, which followed the process of capturing and slavery using a rationale that 
cannibals could be enslaved according to God and the Kingdom of Spain.  
The essence of de Armas’ argument lies on the ‘fable’ part of his title. He 
concluded that the Caribes were nothing more than a myth, a story; something 
legendary that repeats itself in ancient Western culture’s history. He located this fable 
three times in Western culture’s history. The first time he located the story in 
Armenia, a tribe that Herodotus (the Greek historian, 485-425 BC) described in the 
ancient times of 400 BC (de Armas, 1884) called the Calibes or Armeno-calibes. The 
second location was in Homer’s Iliad, where it retells a story about the Alibes and the 
Alizonas, which indicates parallelism with the word Amazonas and Caribes (Ilíada II, 
856 cited in de Armas, 1884). In the third historical location, the same word calibe 
appears in Spain: 																																																																																																																																																															
35 …and against the Caribes y negros, from now on they can, in the name of the Holy 
Trinity, send them all as slaves that can be sold 4,000… 
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…según Justino, había un pueblo de Calibes; por lo cual, por las diverjencias 
anteriormente notadas, puede creerse que ese nombre, que en griego significa 
hierro, se dió indistintamente a varios pueblos fuertes e industriales del 
antiguo mundo… (Jutino, lib. 44, cap. 3 in de Armas, 1884, p. 4)36 
From here, de Armas undermined the credibility of the existence of a group 
that had a suspiciously traceable history in ancient Western writings. Therefore, this 
completes the circle that returns us to the beginning of this chapter where the Colonial 
West frame of reference is located in Bosh’s The Temptations of St. Anthony. The 
narrative of the frame of the Caribes appears to have a pre-existing reference. As 
mentioned before, the fictionalisation of the Colonial West conceptualisation of 
aboriginality is not judged in its falseness or in its truthfulness; rather, it is judged in 
its presence or absence, or its positivity. The positivity of the narrative of the frame of 
the Caribes lies in a mythical Western group that may or may not have existed, but 
that is certainly located in a history of the Colonial West as a narrative that assists in 
the formation in ways to talk about peoples, i.e. as a language that can form a 
conceptualisation.  
In this research, the argument that the Caribes was a fable or a myth in factual 
terms is inconsequential; the importance of this argument’s discussion lies on the 
processes that constituted the narrative the Colonial West that was used to interpret 
the Americas. Certainly, as early as in 1884, de Armas built a strong case to question 
the intention behind the story of the existence of the Caribes, yet other academics 
built a strong case in favour of the Caribes existence (Alegría, 1990; Rabiou, 2008). 
The information on both sides illustrates the assemblage of the processes that the 
																																																								
36 …according to Justino a group of Calibes; because the aforementioned 
divergences, it can be believed that this name, that in Greek means steel, was given to 
many groups that were regarded as industrious and strong from the ancient world.  
	118		
Colonial West used to construct the narrative frame that is the grounds in which 
colonisation launched its enterprise of conceptualising the object that it spoke of.  
Processes that Constitute the Conceptualisation of Aboriginality 
The four processes that constitute the monstrous anthropological 
conceptualisation are (1) terror, horror and tragedy, (2) capturing and enslavement, (3) 
similarity and anthropocentrism, and (4) conquest. The first process allows for certain 
actions to be justified, for example wars, enslavement, assassinations or any form of 
degradation, because that which is strange and monstrous holds a non-human quality 
and for this reason the rules of humanity are applied in a negative sense, i.e. the 
formation of the rules of non-humanity. These rules of non-humanity initiated the 
pathway from the first day that Christopher Columbus saw the Aboriginal groups and 
wrote that the Aboriginal groups he first encountered said other evil Aboriginal 
peoples who ate human flesh were attacking them. The cannibal Aboriginal person, 
i.e. the Caribes in the first years of colonisation, was the discursive means for a 
conceptualisation that would aid domination in colonisation.   
The second process is the narrative frame of capturing and enslavement. 
Slavery and its links with blackness, which is the next important notion in the process 
of colonisation, are discussed further in the next chapter. Slavery in the 15th century 
became one of the most important representations of wealth since the discovery of 
gold. However, to understand that which is strange is in a sense to capture it. The 
Colonial West proved that it was not capable of genuinely understanding the 
civilisations of the Americas, much less their worldview. The historical process of 
capturing and enslaving from the Caribes and then the Aztecs, and later most other 
Aboriginal peoples, not only integrated the idea of Aboriginal cultures into the 
Colonial West understanding but also brought them into the space of Western 
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culture’s system of inequality, which started in the position of slavery if the Colonial 
West did not recognise their previous social status. To bring aboriginality into the 
Western Colonial narrative was to physically capture and enslave. This was the 
method of bringing aboriginality into the light of Western history, where a position in 
Western space could be provided. Slavery was not the only status provided in the 
capturing and enslavement process: titles were provided to caciques or Aboriginal 
leaders, nobility, and acknowledgements in the colonial endeavour to both Aboriginal 
men and women. In the early 16th century, it was institutionalised that Spanish and 
other Europeans should marry Aboriginal peoples, for example Hernan Cortes 
demanded that all colonisers in Mexico marry Aboriginal women, primarily to 
conquer using the mestizaje or mixed races (Alegría, 1990). The capturing process 
was manifested more explicitly in slavery, but it was not limited to this social status.  
The third process is similarity, which is closely related to capturing yet it 
refers to similarity in the anthropocentric sense. In this process, the interpretation of 
similar representations to the signs and symbols of the Colonial West is read in the 
narrative that man is the centre of the universe. This process was enabled by the 
assumption that the Colonial West was the centre of the universe and the similarities 
were positioned from that framework. That is, the interpretation was from the 
assumed Western culture’s vantage point where everything serves a purpose in an 
anthropocentric universe, primarily because God created the world and men were 
created in God’s image. Therefore, God’s main creatures must have a central role in 
the universe. Yet, everything outside the centrality of God is positioned in the space 
commanded by the Devil. This negative space maintains the centrality of God and of 
men because the position of the Devil and that which is monstrous is in reference to 
this centrality. The “discovery of men” that colonisation inspired refers to the 
	120		
discovery of the potential extension of the anthropocentric interpretations of a new 
and vast space, and for it to be captured. This means that the frameset of Western 
culture, which interpreted everything only in their terms, was extended to its fullest at 
the time of the colonisation of the Americas. As years went on, this anthropocentric 
similarity system formed a logos or an anthropology, because the readily available 
known references of the Colonial West were not sufficient. An extended language of 
anthropocentrism had to be created in order to make sense of the overwhelming 
diversity that the colonisers were encountering in the Americas. The process of 
anthropocentrism was the underlying position in which anthropology could emerge to 
conceptualise aboriginality.  
The fourth process is the process of conquest, which is derived from the 
former three processes of the conceptualisation of aboriginality and the engine of 
colonisation. It is the core of monstrous anthropology, because it is the force that 
makes interpretation possible and skews it to monstrosity when domination is 
required. The process of conquest is the seed of colonisation and what makes this 
conceptualisation its instrument as the Colonial history solidified it. The history of 
colonisation finds its significant impact in the conquest of the American mainland at 
least 30 years after the first arrival of the colonisers, starting with the invasion of 
Mexico (Alegría, 1990; Sued-Badillo, 2008). However, the historical threshold in 
which the conceptualisation of aboriginality was formed started where the colonisers 
first arrived, in the Caribbean (mainly what is currently known as Cuba, the 
Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Puerto Rico) from c. 1492 to 1525. The former three 
processes preceded later endeavours of conquest that confirmed and folded the 
conceptualisation of aboriginality. That is, the explicit invasion of the American 
mainland from 1521 with the “pacification of Mexico” (see following Chapter IV 
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Blackness for more details) added to the process of conquest, which sealed the first 
conceptualisation of aboriginality. Therefore, the processes of tragedy-capture-
anthropocentrism-conquest form the first conceptualisation of monstrous 
anthropology.  
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Chapter IV  
Blackness 
This chapter provides a short description of the often unexplored history of 
Western blackness that built this conceptualising tool. The conceptualisation of 
Western aboriginality defined by monstrous anthropology and institutionalised by 
royal decree through slavery has a common thread with the conceptualisation of 
Western blackness. Both conceptualisations spiral in the current of the history of 
colonisation, cross over each other at times, find themselves moving side-by-side, 
and, at one point in the history of colonisation, they converged into a created (infinite) 
multiplicity provided, no longer by royal decree, but by the sophisticated grids of 
modern anthropology. The historical threshold of the interchangeability of blackness 
and slavery predicates the complicity of Western blackness and colonisation. This 
threshold is defined by the history that occurred in the years before slavery in the 
Americas turned into slavery fuelled by African peoples. In this space, the close 
relationship of slavery, the conceptualisation of aboriginality, and the 
conceptualisation of blackness are seen more evidently than in other accounts of the 
history of the Colonial West. It is argued that the historical proximity of the 
conceptualisation of blackness and of aboriginality (and its direct relationship with 
slavery) in the first colonial experience resulted in other colonial contexts such as in 
Australia having blackness and aboriginality function (and continue to function) 
interchangeably. This is not to say that this research states or suggests a history of the 
causes or roots of colonial contexts such as Australia. Such a claim could not be 
achieved in the scope and in the perspective that this research assumes. The only 
claim that this research makes is that the conceptualisation of blackness and of 
aboriginality are the grounds on which the Colonial West, in contexts such as 
Australia, built the means through which domination occurred.  
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The second chapter of the history of colonisation in the 15th and 16th centuries 
focused on the second stage of slavery and how the conceptualisation of blackness37 
was entangled with slavery. The first stage of slavery was the enslavement of 
Aboriginal peoples in the Americas, which has been widely documented and 
persuasively argued (Alegría, 1978; Katz, 2003; Mann, 2006; Weber, 2007). The 
periods of Aboriginal and African slavery are closely linked, but they do not occur in 
a successive fashion. In chronological terms, both slaveries occur almost 
simultaneously in the 15th and 16th centuries. Grounded in the history of colonisation 
and specifically in the conceptualisation of Western aboriginality, the visible 
processes of slavery are found that function as the fuel for conquest. In these colonial 
grounds, it is also found that Aboriginal slavery, African slave trade, and Western 
blackness begin to be conceptualised as these conceptualisations are known today.  
In the 16th century, and in the following centuries, it is very difficult to isolate 
blackness, slavery, and colonisation because they are entangled in a convoluted 
history that is not a linear narrative. Therefore, it is very tempting to follow the pre-
drawn historical direct pathway of Western blackness that the Colonial West provided 
that flattens its history through equating blackness with slavery, and vice versa. 
Through providing a broader account of the history of Western blackness, the 
arbitrary nature of Western blackness will become more palpable and how the 
currents of the history of colonisation pushed it towards the direction that it took in 
order to assemble the tool or conceptualisation that functioned as part of the operation 
of colonisation.  
																																																								
37 By “blackness”, I do not refer the concept utilised to create the Black Identity that 
emerged in the civil rights movements around the world. In order to avoid confusion, 
“blackness” must be understood as it is accompanied by “Western” in order to 
identify this conceptualisation as predominantly constituted by the Colonial West. 
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Early colonial history interacted with Western blackness in a porous manner 
because, different to the conceptualisation of aboriginality, there was a relatively 
well-formed understanding of blackness and slavery in the 15th and 16th centuries. 
Slavery carried a non-black history that began its trans-Atlantic link with the 
Americas through its Aboriginal peoples. In contrast, blackness had no specific 
classificatory meaning in the 15th century and the beginning of the 16th century, as 
many black peoples (as long as they were Christians) occupied important roles in 
Western culture and in the colonisation of the Americas. The example of a short 
history of one man (Juan Garrido) provides an account of blackness inside the 
Colonial West and as active participant in colonisation. After the second half of the 
16th century, a formal slave trade was imposed in the Americas, which resulted in the 
African slave trade that lasted for more than 300 years. In the context of the slave 
trade, Western aboriginality, slavery, and blackness assembled the discursive tool or 
the colonial conceptualisation of blackness.  
Blackness and Slavery: Parallel Pathways 
This part of the research maps at least two pathways that blackness embarked 
on in the history of colonisation in the 15th and 16th centuries, and that resulted in the 
discursive formation of the conceptualisation of blackness. It is the intention of this 
work to avoid the history of Western blackness once it has transformed into the 
multiplicity of modern anthropology, i.e. into the social Darwinism predicated by the 
solidification of the different conceptualisations of races. As in Chapter III Monstrous 
Anthropology, this research stops in the modern anthropology period that was 
manifested in De Gobineau’s (1852) The Inequality of Human Races in which 
blackness has a central role in the hierarchy of races, being at the bottom of the 
hierarchy. In the Americas, the history of Western blackness is often told from the 
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perspective of modern anthropology in a progressive manner where the abolition of 
slavery is the climax of the narrative. This history is dominated by the United States 
account of Western blackness (Ocasio, 2011; Sued-Badillo, 2008). However, in this 
research, it is presented in an unexplored pathway to Western blackness, which starts 
long before the history of blackness that is told by the Colonial West (usually in the 
United States) when skin colour was not interchangeable with slavery.  
On May 29, 1453, Constantinople, the last Greek and Roman bastion of the 
Christian West, fell into the hands of the Muslim Ottoman Empire (Alegría, 1990); it 
was known as the Basileuousa Polis or “the Queen of Cities” (Hochschild, 1998). 
Constantinople was strategically located between the “Golden Horn” and the 
Marmara Sea and it was the crossroads for Western commerce between Asia, Europe, 
and Africa. Europe did not have gold mines; therefore, when Constantinople fell, a 
shortage of the precious metal was quickly reported (Hochschild, 1998). Gold was the 
principal currency material; however, other products were used for exchange such as 
spices, silver, and other objects (Alegría, 1990). Almost intuitively anticipating this 
crisis in the 1440s, the Prince of Portugal, Enrique “El navegante”, initiated 
expeditions to find alternative routes to Africa (Alegria, 1990; Saco, 1879). When 
Constantinople fell, Portugal had already established political relationships with some 
African kingdoms. Towards the end of the 15th century, Portugal dominated most 
routes to Africa and, by extension, most commercial relationships between Europe 
and Africa. Europe exchanged firearms, gunpowder, horses, textiles, and other 
European products for African spices, gold, ivory, and slaves (Saco, 1879). Soon, all 
other European kingdoms had to recognise Portugal’s monopoly in order to 
participate in the trade for fair prices. The first kingdom to recognise Portugal’s 
monopoly was Spain in 1479, primarily due to the alliance that they had across 
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lineages that lasted until 1580 (Saco, 1879). As the commercial trade grew, the only 
trade ports were the Port of Lisbon and the Port of Seville (Mann, 2006). Alvise 
Cadamoso, who was a Venetian trader, mentioned in his trade records what they 
exchanged: “…intercambiábamos buques caragados de paños, tela, trigos en 
abundancia y otros efectos por oro y negros.” (Mann, 2006, p. 171)38 
Slaves appeared to be a luxurious enterprise that was comparable to gold. In 
this context, slavery was not widely present and industries in Europe were not 
dependant on slave work like what would occur in the Americas for a brief period in 
the mining industry and later in the sugar cane industry from the late 16th century 
onwards (Saco, 1879).  
A black-skinned person was not something unseen in Europe, especially in 
Spain. In the 8th century, Muslims from the north of Africa invaded most of the 
Kingdom of Spain. From the 13th to the 15th centuries, large segments of the 
population of Lisbon, Seville, and other cities were black (Alegría, 1990). This can be 
seen not only in the different records of trade, contracts, decrees, and other legal 
documents, but also in the emerging literature of the time; for example, in the Golden 
Age of Spanish literature during the 15th and 16th centuries, many characters in novels 
were described as black. Authors including Miguel de Cervantes in his works El 
coloquio de los perros and El celoso extremeño, and Lope de Vega in his La Dorotea 
and Servir a señor discrete, among others, described the black presence in everyday 
society (Alegría, 1990).  
In Africa, Portugal established close bonds that guaranteed the monopoly of 
the commercial routes. In 1489, the Kingdom of Portugal established a very close 
relationship with the Kingdom of Congo, particularly with their ruler Nzinga Mbemba 																																																								
38 …boats full of fabrics, textiles, wheat in abundance, and other products for gold 
and blacks. 
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(Saco, 1879). In order to honour this friendship and to be accepted in the eyes of the 
Western kingdoms (particularly in the eyes of the Vatican), Nzinga Mbenba converted 
to Christianity in 1490 (Hochschild, 1998). He was given the Christian name Alfonso 
I. After this, he became the first king to bring Christianity to Africa. Soon, Nzinga had 
created a full Catholic infrastructure that responded to the Vatican in Rome. After the 
Kingdom of Congo was recognised as a Catholic kingdom by Pope Alexander VII 
(Rodrigo Borgia, a former bishop from Spain), Nzinga sent bishops from Congo to 
the Vatican; they would serve as representatives of the Kingdom of Congo. This was 
achieved as a result of the influence of Portugal over Spain, which is where the Pope 
was from at that time (and who was one of the most controversial Popes in the history 
of the Vatican), and of the Borgia family being one of the most influential families of 
Europe (Rolfe, 2010).  
In this context, it was not rare to find black-skinned men arriving in the 
Americas in 1492-1493 that were not slaves. Sued-Badillo (2008) and Alegría (1990) 
identified at least 12 black-skinned men arriving towards the end of the 15th century 
out of the 90 sailors in three boats that arrived at the Caribbean in three boats: La 
Niña, La Pinta, and La Santa María (Sued-Badillo, 2003). They argued that there 
could be more black-skinned men given that it was not necessary to record the sailors 
skin colour as black. (However, this is how historians were able to identify some.) To 
identify black-skinned figures in history is a contemporary preoccupation. In the 
records of the 15th and 16th centuries, the term “black skin” was usually found as a 
descriptor next to the name or in the identification details that might distinguish a 
subject in the same way the descriptors of ‘handless’, buen mozo (handsome), el bello 
(the beautiful one), judío converso (converted Jew), or de Segovia (from Segovia, a 
province in Spain) were used to describe people. The jobs of the black men identified 
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by Sued-Badillo (2008) and Alegría (1990) varied from mining to merchants, from 
sailors to conquistadores, and from soldiers to scribes. The records demonstrate that 
black-skinned slaves were only introduced towards the end of the 15th century in the 
Americas, but records also demonstrated that the slaves were not exclusively black. 
Some records included slaves from other skin colours such as pardos (a form of 
brown). However, there were no records of white-skinned slaves introduced into the 
Americas (Sued-Badillo, 2008).  
When the Colonial West arrived in the Americas, neither black skin nor a 
specific skin colour determined slavery. This is not to suggest that in the 15th and 16th 
centuries there was no inequality – it was a period distinguished by inequality – 
however, institutions39 such as the Church determined the inequality. For example, 
inequality was fiercely practiced on non-Christian peoples, recently converted 
Christians, Jews, Muslims, and Vikings, among other groups (Rolfe, 2010). In 1492, 
the Kingdom of Spain issued an edict that all Jews should be driven out of the 
kingdom and their territories (Rolfe, 2010); Christopher Columbus narrated that this 
happened “in the same month I was to undertake my expedition to the Indies” (July 
30, 1492). Similarly, in that same year, 1492, the fall of Granada ended the Muslim 
domination over the Iberian Peninsula (Alegría, 1990). These non-Christian 
categories, which constituted their relationships with the main institutions of Europe 
(such as the Vatican), determined social statuses, the recognition of kingdoms by the 
Vatican, and recognition by other important kingdoms. This also sometimes 
determined the plausibility of invasions and it facilitated allegiances between 
kingdoms. Imperialism was a “game of thrones” that resulted in a hierarchy of 																																																								
39 See Chapter III Monstrous Anthropology where The Inequality of Human Races is 
discussed as a book referring to the end of the period where inequality was 
determined by institutions and the beginning of the period where inequality was 
determined by race.  
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kingdoms confirmed by institutions such as the Catholic Church. If this hierarchy was 
not determined by skin colour during the period in which the first colonial experience 
occurred, then the formation of the conceptualisation of blackness was predicated by a 
set of previous historical processes interwoven with the discrete threads outside the 
modern racial categories and slavery justified by social Darwinism.  
Slavery in the 14th and 15th centuries in Europe was primarily domestic and 
white: slaves were mostly women and the recorded preferences for slaves were the 
ones describes as “not so rare” (no tan raras, in Sued-Badillo, 2008). Slavery in 
Europe was a luxury; therefore, there was no recorded time in the 14th and 15th 
centuries where slavery had significant numbers (Saco, 1879). Eastern Europe 
provided most of the slaves, but slavery was recorded across the periphery of the 
West (Sued-Badillo, 2008). For example, in the Kingdom of Italy (particularly in 
Rome), the preference was for Greek slaves even though the Vatican forbade it (Sued-
Badillo, 2008). Christopher Columbus’ voyage records40 illustrated that when trade 
with Africa began in the mid-15th century, more black-skinned slaves were 
introduced. Sued-Badillo (2008) and Alegría (1990) argued that these slaves were 
usually captured enemies, or the product of African Kingdoms’ internal conflicts and 
interests. Through slavery, these conflicts found a way to send people out of Africa, 
and some of those persons were key figures in African politics. Some records recount 
stories of captured African royalty with claims for important statutes including claims 
to African thrones (Alegría, 1990) that were sold as slaves for others to make those 
claims.  
In Europe, slaves were used to having a degree of “freedom” in the contexts in 
which they would work (Alegría, 1978). Domestic slaves were allowed to have their 																																																								
40 These records can be found in the Massachusetts Historical Society archives in the 
research notes of Alice Bache Gould (1868-1958).  
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own time after their working hours (Saco, 1879); other slaves would not see their 
owner for months at a time, and when they met it was just to divide the profits that the 
slave had made as a product of his or her work. These and other arrangements were 
characteristic of ladino (urban or city) slaves. The ladino slaves were the first slaves 
that arrived in the Americas (Alegría, 1990; Saco, 1879; Sued-Badillo, 2008). For 
these slaves, the changes in working conditions were very dramatic when they moved 
from Europe to the Americas. From living in houses or flats, they had to sleep in the 
un-Westernised lands of the Americas; lands that were often tropical jungles. From 
primarily working in domestic or artisanal industries, the ladinos had to work in the 
precarious industries of mining, which involved a lot of heavy lifting and transporting 
heavy precious metals from the mountain rivers (where gold was found in the first 
places in the Caribbean) to the improvised ports in the coastlines, and using very 
rustic tools to find the gold and other precious metals. These severe working 
situations provided the conditions for the first ladino-led slave rebellion in 1514 (the 
first black slave rebellion in colonial times) in the island of San Juan, today Puerto 
Rico (Alegría, 1990; Sued-Badillo, 2008).  
Juan Garrido, the Black Conquistador 
Juan Garrido de color negro vesino desta cibdad paresco ante Vuestra merced 
e digo que yo tengo nescesidad de hazer una provanca a perpetuad rey 
memoria de como e servydo a V.M. en la conquista e pasificaci6n desta Nueva 
España desde que pas6 a ella el Marqués del Valle yen su compañia me halle 
presentt! a todas las enfradas e conquista e pacificaciones que se an hecho 
syempre con el dicho Marques todo lo qual e hecho a mi costa syn me dar 
salaryo ny repartimiento de indios ni otra cosa s)lendo como soy casado e 
vecino desta cibdad que syempre e ressedido en ella y asi mismo fue e pase a 
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descobrir con el Marques del Valle las que estan desa parte de la mar del sur 
donde pase muchas hambres e nescEsidades y asi mismo fue a descobrir e 
pacificar a las Islas de San Juan de Buriquén de Puerto Rico y asi mismo fue 
en la pasyficadón y con· Quista de la Isla de Cuba con el adelantado Diego 
Velazques en todo lo qual a treynta años que yo e servydo e syrvo a S.M. por 
ende a vuestra merced pido que avyda ynforrnacion de lo susodicho e de como 
yo fui el primero que hizo la ysplriel1cia en esta Nueva España para sembrar 
[rigo e ver si se dava en ella lo qual hizo)l espirimente fado a mi cosra y as; 
hecha la dicha ynformacion vuestra merced me la mande dar synada…41 
(Probanza de Juan Garrido, 1538, see Appendix)42 
An example of a history of blackness that is in complete opposition to slavery 
in the context of colonial times in the 15th and 16th centuries in the Americas is the 
history of the black conquistador Juan Garrido. The Probanza of Juan Garrido of 
1538 is the first historical material of a black man in the Americas that includes 
interviews with witnesses answering questions about Juan Garrido. The story of Juan 
																																																								
41 I, Juan Garrido, black resident of this city, appear before Your Mercy and state that 
I am in need of making a probanza to the perpetuity of the king, a report on how I 
served Your Majesty in the conquest and pacification on this New Spain, from the 
time when the Marqués del Valle entered it; and in his company I was present at all 
the invasions and conquests and pacifications which were carried out, always with the 
said Marqués, all of which I did at my own expense without either salary or allotment 
of aboriginal people or anything else. As I am married and a resident of this city, 
where I have always lived; and also as I went with the Marqués del Valle to discover 
the islands which are in that part of the southern sea where there was much hunger 
and privation; and also as I went to discover and pacify the islands of San Juan de 
Buriquén de Puerto Rico; and also as I went on the pacification and conquest of the 
island of Cuba with the adelantado Diego Velazquez; in all these ways for thirty 
years have I served and continue to serve Your Majesty. For these reasons stated 
above do I petition Your Mercy. And also because I was the first to have the 
inspiration to sow wheat here in New Spain and to see if it took; I did this and 
experimented at my own expense.  (Juan Garrido, 1538, Folio I) 
42 This is the opening of Juan Garrido’s probanza, which is a document that was used 
to prove merit that would justify an allotment or a specific grant for money, lands 
or/and any other form of resources (Alegría, 1990; Gerhard, 1978). 
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Garrido is isolated from slavery and provides an individual historical account of 
blackness in the beginnings of the colonisation process that does not only demonstrate 
the arbitrary relationship between skin colour and inequality, but it also showcases the 
practice of colonisation in its individual form before the function of colour.  
Other examples of black men could be cited, for example the history of 
Miguel Enriquez who was a rich merchant of the Americas (Lopez-Cantos, 1998). 
Furthermore, at least nine other black conquistadores have been identified in the 16th 
century in Peru, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Panama43. However, Juan 
Garrido’s story is an illustrative example of blackness not being indistinguishably 
interchangeable with slavery in the 15th century and most of the 16th century; it is also 
an illustration of blackness on the other side of subjugation. This opposite of 
subjugation does not suggest a contradiction that nullifies the merits of any claim 
regarding the horrors of slavery or a distance from colonised peoples due to this 
apparent historical divergence. Quite the opposite, it illustrates a nonlinear 
relationship that positions the history of Juan Garrido all too close to the historical 
process of slavery, Western (conceptualisations of) blackness, and colonisation.44 
What is known of Juan Garrido is predominantly derived from the historical 
document called “Probanza de Juan Garrido del 27 de septiembre de 1538”45, which 
is found in the Archives of the Indies. One of the first publications of Juan Garrido’s 
story was the 1978 article by Peter Gerhard entitled A Black Conquistador in Mexico, 
																																																								
43 Restall (2001) lists most of the black conquistadores through accessing other 
sources in Latin America as well as in the Archive of the Indies in Seville. He names 
Sebastián Toral, Pedro Fulupo, Juan Bardales, Antonio Pérez, Juan Portuguéz, Juan 
García, Miguel Ruiz, Juan Valiente, and Juan Beltrán as black conquistadores.  
44 It must be mentioned that scholars are increasingly aware of black roles and their 
suspicious absence from the historical records, the current increase in the publication 
of colonisation accounts appears problematic, see for example Matthew Restal’s 
Maya Conquistador (2001).   
45 See Appendix.  
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and then in 1990 in a book by Ricardo Alegría entitled Juan Garrido: A black 
conquistador. Both publications used the probanza from 1538 as their primary 
historical source. In the probanza, Garrido outlines his contributions to the 
colonisation of the Americas from 1501 to the 1530s, notably the contributions of the 
colonisation of San Juan, Florida, and Mexico, and also his contribution of being the 
first person to introduce wheat to the Americas. The probanza tells the story through 
stating ten questions in interview format that are then answered by seven well-
respected witnesses. The first question asks if the witness knows Juan Garrido and the 
next nine questions are asked with the intention to confirm his contributions and to 
verify the living conditions of Juan Garrido at the time of the probanza. Each witness 
answers every question; if the witness has no knowledge of what is being asked, this 
is recorded. Each witness is presumably a distinguished person of the time; they 
include Alonso Escobar, El Bachiller Alonso Pérez, Rodrigo Salbatierra, Alonso 
Martin de Xerez, Juan Gonzalez de León, and Pedro de Vargas. In the content of the 
questions, Juan Garrido attempts to demonstrate that he was in the first colonisation 
process side-by-side with important colonisers including Juan Ponce de León, Diego 
Velázquez, and Hernan Cortés in the Great War against the Aztec Empire, which 
occurred inside and around the city of Tenochtitlan.  
Juan Garrido was originally from Africa; however, the specific place and 
kingdom to which he belonged is not clear (Alegría, 1990). It is known that Garrido 
was converted to Christianity in Lisbon sometime before 1494. The first record of 
Garrido residing somewhere was in 1494 in Seville (Gerhard, 1978). Sometime 
between the years 1499 and 1501, Garrido crossed the Atlantic and arrived in the 
island called La Española (today, Haiti and the Dominican Republic). La Española 
was the most important island for the colonisers at that time, as Spain’s colonised 
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territory was primarily concentrated in the main islands of the Caribbean; the 
mainland of the Americas would not be formerly occupied for another 30 years. Juan 
Garrido came into contact with Nicolás de Ovando, who was the representative of the 
Kingdom of Spain in the “Indies” at the time. From 1501 to 1508, there is very little 
record about what Garrido did in La Española. Historians speculate that, like most 
colonisers at that time, he organised expeditions to find and mine gold in the rivers 
located in the heart of most islands of the Caribbean (Sued-Badillo, 2008). In 1508, 
Juan Ponce de Leon was appointed to officially occupy the island of San Juan, and 
Juan Garrido was part of the expedition to officially colonise the island. There he 
helped to “pacify” the island and protect it from the attacks from Aboriginal peoples, 
many of which were recorded to be attacks from the Caribes. Garrido participated in 
the defence, construction, and re-construction of different settlements in Puerto Rico. 
There, Garrido extracted a considerable quantity of gold as well. This is known 
because it was mandatory to give 20% of the gold found as a tax contribution to the 
Kingdom of Spain, and his name was on the royal tax records, which suggests that he 
had a mining group, which was typically composed of some colonisers and some 
Aboriginal peoples of the island of Puerto Rico.  
In 1513, Juan Garrido went with Juan Ponce de Leon and a small expedition to 
find the “fountain of youth”. The Aboriginal peoples from the island of San Juan and 
the island of Cuba told a story to Juan Ponce de Leon that to the north of the 
Caribbean there was a place where the waters would make whoever bathed in them 
younger. It is unclear whether this story was told by the Aboriginal peoples as a way 
of interesting the colonisers in other lands so they would leave the Caribbean or 
whether it was another fictionalisation imagined by Ponce de Leon as a reason to 
expand the invasion to the north (Alegría, 1990). The small expedition sailed to the 
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north and did not find the fountain of youth or the land described by the Aboriginal 
peoples, but they found a vast land they later named La Florida (today, the US state 
of Florida). This was the first time that the Colonial West made contact with North 
America. Ponce de Leon, Garrido, and the rest of the expedition sailed back to San 
Juan. Ponce de Leon immediately asked the Kingdom of Spain to fund a large 
expedition to find this fountain of youth and to colonise the vast land of La Florida. 
The historical gossip stated that Ponce de Leon knew that the King of Spain recently 
married a much younger queen and that a fountain of youth would interest the King 
(Alegría, 1947). However, the story or rationale of the fountain of youth has been 
widely contested by many historians from very early on 46. In 1521, Ponce de Leon 
received the authorisation of the Kingdom of Spain and resources for a large 
expedition to find the fountain of youth. Garrido helped organise the expedition and 
went with Ponce de Leon as one of his principal soldiers.  
On the way, they stopped in the islands of Guadalupe and Martinique where 
the Caribes lived, or so the records stated47, and helped ‘pacify’ the islands in order to 
facilitate their settlement. These islands were very small, but it was where many ships 
would stop to replenish their water rations before heading to Europe and also when 
they arrived in the Americas from Europe. When the expedition arrived in La Florida, 
they were viciously attacked by the Aboriginal peoples, as if the Aboriginal peoples 
were expecting them. The expedition could not even leave their ships and go ashore. 
																																																								
46 From the cronista Gonzalo Fernando de Oviedo in 1557.  
47 Historians including Cancel (2000) and Sued-Badillo (2003) have persuasively 
argued that the Aboriginal peoples who where fighting against the Spanish colonisers 
sailed to these islands to temporarily stay and plan their attacks on the main islands. 
Cancel (2000) identified the reports of attacks on the main islands, analysed the attack 
practices of the Aboriginal peoples, and drew parallelisms with the aboriginal 
civilisations in the main lands. He also identified the Aboriginal peoples that the 
“Caribes” would ‘capture’, most of whom were Aboriginal peoples in slavery 
conditions.  
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In the battle, Ponce de Leon was badly injured and the expedition withdrew, failing to 
colonise the area at this time (Alegría, 1990). Ponce de Leon had sustained a deadly 
wound and Garrido took him to the island of Cuba, where Ponce de Leon wanted to 
die. Ponce de Leon died in July of that year and asked Garrido to sell his properties 
and give the money to his family.  
In Cuba, Garrido was informed that Hernan Cortes was about to conquer the 
great city of Tenochtitlan. Cortes grouped all the Spanish forces he could and also 
looked for support of Aboriginal groups in the surrounding areas of Tenochtitlan. 
These Aboriginal peoples had been enemies of the Aztecs for many years, but did not 
have sufficient strength to fight them (Iglesia, 1942). Cortes promised them that they 
would take the city and give them their part; however, history proved that this was a 
lie. Garrido found Cortes in Veracruz in 1521 and quickly became a very important 
soldier in his ranks. The great battle started in that same year in August and lasted for 
more than two months. The Spanish side had close to 200,000 soldiers and the Aztecs 
had 300,000 (Iglesia, 1942). Garrido fought side-by-side with Cortes in many battles; 
he even participated in the great battle at Montezuma Temple, which was the 
foundation of the empire of Tenochtitlan (Alegría, 1990). After the great battle at 
Montezuma Temple, Tenochtitlan fell and the Spanish took Mexico. They re-named it 
Nueva España (New Spain). In Garrido’s probanza, he asked all witnesses: 
4. Yten si saben etc que yo pase a esta nueva España en compañia del Marques 
del Valle don Hernando Cortes y estuve con el syempre hasta que se conquisto 
e pacifyco toda la tierra e me halle y estuve presente en la conquista de T 
ascala hasta tanto que se dieron de paz.  
5. Yten si saben que despuesde pacificada la provincia de Tascala el dicho 
marques se vino a esta cibdad de Mexico y estando en ella los naturales de la 
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tierra herharon della al dicho Marques y españoles que con el estavan y le 
mataron mucha gentes.48 
El Bachiller Alonso Perez answered: 
A la quarta pregunta dixo este testigo que estando sobre esta en ... [roto]... el 
marques del Valle en la calzada de Acachinango como el dicho Juan Garrido 
de color negro andava syrbiendo en lo que le mandava velando e yendo a los 
lugares... [roto]... mandavan como lo otros conquistadores lo hazian e que esto 
vida este testigo y siempre lo tubo por conquistador al dicho Juan …  Juan 
Garrido fue desta ciudad con el marques del Valle a las yslas que descubrio e 
bolvio perdido a esta cibdad e que esto sabe.49 
When the Colonial West colonised Mexico, it was expected that those who 
participated in this war were to be rewarded (Iglesia, 1942). However, new colonisers 
continued to arrive from Europe to participate in the invasion and the pilfering of the 
resources of the Americas. The first colonisers felt that they were entitled more 
recognition and lands than the new colonisers that arrived after the first wars against 
the Aboriginal peoples. Therefore, the Kingdom of Spain acknowledged the first 
colonisers through creating the title of conquistador that held a higher position in the 
																																																								
48 4. And do you know that I arrived to this Nueva España side-by-side with the 
Marques del Valle don Hernando Cortes and I was with him until it was conquered 
and until everywhere was pacified, and I was present in the conquest of Tascala 
(Tenochtitlan) until peace was pronounced?  
5. And do you know that after the province of Tascala was pacified, I came with the 
aforementioned Marques to the city of Mexico with all the other Spanish soldiers that 
were with him in that battle where many others died? (Garrido, 1538, Folio 3) 
49 To the fourth question, this witness said that being on the (broken)... the Marques 
del Valle (Hernan Cortes) in the top of Acachinango like Juan Garrido of black colour 
said was serving through being ordered to fight and go to places (broken)… and he 
was sent like all the other conquistadores and this witness always regarded the 
aforementioned Juan Garrido as a conquistador… Juan Garrido was always 
distinguished along side with the Marques del Valle and because all the islands he 
helped discovered which is known by us all. (Perez in Garrido, 1538, Folio 8) 
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lands of the Americas (Alegría, 1947)50. Alonso Perez speaks to this recognition and 
testifies how Juan Garrido was recognised in the Americas with the title of 
conquistador giving evidence of the lands that Garrido held in Mexico City next to 
Hernan Cortes’ lands.  
The last story that Garrido was known for in Mexico was that he was the first 
person to introduce wheat to the Americas. In the colonisation of the lands of the 
Americas, the Colonial West wanted to introduce the farming products that were the 
basis of the European diets, particularly products from Spain. Plants and animals were 
introduced in the Americas in order to test the fertility of the lands. The first grounds 
that were tested were those in the islands of the Caribbean; however, due to the 
tropical nature of these islands, the attempts to grow wheat were futile. Wheat was 
very important for the Colonial West given that it was the basis for products such as 
bread and flour, and it was used as a means of exchange. By the beginning of the 16th 
century, the colonisers had attempted to grow wheat numerous times, but they were 
unsuccessful. One day, Juan Garrido opened a bag of rice and he found three wheat 
seeds. He planted them in his lands in Coyoacan, Mexico City, and they grew 
successfully. It is recorded in the official history of Mexico that Juan Garrido was the 
first person to grow wheat in the Americas, and it is depicted in some historic 
representations including the murals of Diego Rivera in the Palacio Nacional in 
Mexico City.  
This is highlighted in the beginning of the probanza as a personal 
achievement. The intention of the probanza in 1538 was to demonstrate to the 
Kingdom of Spain through respected witnesses that Garrido was a well-respected 
																																																								
50 The title of conquistador included rights to lands of their choosing, as well as 
specific monetary and slave entitlements. This practice started after the great battle of 
Tenochtitlan and it was abolished in 1541 (Iglesia, 1947).  
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conquistador so he could request the entitlements that he deserved as a conquistador. 
Although he already had lands in Mexico City, he reported that he and his family 
“were in need” (padece necesidad). The text suggests that he was not given a pension 
or monetary entitlements that he deserved, and it is explicitly stated that he was not 
given Aboriginal peoples (indios), which meant that he was not given slaves. 
Slavery 
The first period of slavery was the enslavement of the Aboriginal peoples of 
the Americas. It was almost unthinkable in the 15th century and in the first years of the 
16th century to start a slave trade, as it was understood then, to the Americas (de 
Armas indicated that some proposed a slave trade from the Americas) primarily 
because slaves were so expensive. To enslave the Aboriginal peoples was as 
profitable as the gold that the Colonial West avidly wanted to extract not only because 
slavery provided the labour in this industry (and others), but also because slaves were 
as valuable as other highly regarded merchandise that were used as currency. Slavery 
had an intrinsic value in itself: due to the importance of labour, slaves were 
considered valuable assets. Furthermore, as mentioned above, slavery held the 
symbolic value of luxury. The great quantity of gold, silver, lands, potential slaves, 
and other goods valued by the Colonial West legitimised the representation of 
abundance of the Americas51. The Colonial West wanted Aboriginal slavery to 
continue; in this context, de Armas’ argument of the invention of the cannibal Caribes 
as a means to justify the enslavement of Aboriginal peoples appears even more 
plausible. The first prohibition from the Kingdom of Spain (in 1493) of the 
enslavement of Aboriginal peoples was an obstacle to further capitalising what the 
Colonial West regarded as valuable ‘resources’. For almost 100 years, the Colonial 																																																								
51 It should be noted that when the Colonial West arrived in the Americas, they 
thought they had arrived in the Indies.   
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West benefited from the luxury of the slave labour of Aboriginal peoples, yet the 
representation of wealth that slavery brought with colonisation was not something that 
would only be enjoyed by colonisers in the Americas; the formal African slave trade 
would capitalise on the pre-existing understanding of slavery and it would transform 
into one of the most profitable industries in the history of Western culture. 
In 1518-1523, Carlos V authorised the first license to sell a large amount of 
slaves from Africa to the Americas (Saco, 1879). The license was given to the Dutch 
Duke Lorenzo de Goredot (Sued-Badillo, 2003) for 4000 slaves. Then, this license 
was distributed to other traffickers in the Americas, mainly to the principal colonies in 
the Caribbean. For example, 1200 African slaves were sent to the island of San Juan 
(Alegría, 1990)52. Many of the main conquistadores protested the introduction of this 
new market of slaves because they were forced to buy these very expensive slaves. In 
practice, the Kingdom of Spain was regulating slavery in the Americas and 
institutionalising African slavery. Therefore, black slavery was forced upon the 
colonisers and they were expected to pay the full value of slaves, between 100 pesos 
and 500 pesos53 per slave (Inikori, 1976). This market regulation and 
institutionalisation would benefit the interests of the Colonial West in Europe given 
that it created a means to attain more profit than the gold and other goods that the 
colonisers were supposed to send back to Europe. Some resistances to the Colonial 
West in the Americas that are mentioned by historians such as Sued-Badillo (2003) 
include hiding the Aboriginal peoples and stating to the authorities that they had died 
of disease or that they had escaped to other islands or other unexplored places in the 																																																								
52 This is consistent with the later proportions that positioned the Caribbean second in 
the Atlantic slave trade (35%). The largest proportion went to Brazil with 40% (see 
National Center for History Report on Atlantic Slave Trade of 2000).   
53 One peso was usually made of gold or silver, and each peso was equivalent to 8 or 
9 reales. It is demonstrated later that it is very difficult to give a present day account 
of the value of a peso during that time.   
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Americas. Some have argued that to conclude that Aboriginal peoples, in many cases, 
died of introduced diseases is to not appreciate the complexity of this history (Alegría, 
1978).  
Table 1 Slave Trade from Africa by Region from Ianni (1976) in Capitalismo y Esclavitud 
(Capitalism and Slavery) 
 
The introduction of African slavery occurred slowly but steadily in the 
Americas. There is relative consensus in the historian community that close to 13 
million African slaves were enslaved in the Americas (Ianni, 1976; King, 1943; 
Mintz, 1981). As listed in Figure 6, from 1526 to 1575, more than 110,000 African 
slaves were trafficked and most were sent to the Americas (Ianni, 1976). It can also be 
seen that, in 1576, the African slave trade suddenly tripled in number compared with 
the figures in the previous years. From the end of the 16th century until almost the end 
of the 18th century, slave trade continued to consistently increase. Very few industries 
in Western capitalist history have registered an almost consistent incremental (at 
times exponential) growth for almost 300 years.  
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In 2002, Jean-Pierre Tardieu expanded on the idea proposed by Sidney Mintz 
(1981) that theorised that slavery became the model of profit and production that 
significantly influenced capitalism. Tardieu (2002) stated: “a black slave was worth 
because of his capacity to produce… early on slavery was constituted as a 
commodity” (p. 57). From the mid-16th century, the slaves in the Americas were used 
as collateral, were listed in the wills to be inherited, and could be used to buy most 
things (Tardieu, 2002). Monetary amounts in today’s currencies cannot determine the 
value of slaves in the 16th century because it is difficult to calculate and define one 
currency that has a universal value. That is, many forms of exchange currencies were 
valid: land, timber, spices, meats, jewellery, weapons, gold, silver in its natural form, 
and certain quantities of food like flour are some examples of objects that were used 
as means of exchange (Iani, 1976). The history of the symbolic use of the exchange 
value of certain currencies remains in flux. Although the material conditions of the 
Americas were regarded as abundant, it was a crude abundance where at times the 
Colonial West lacked the basic means of exchange, such as formal currencies (Mintz, 
1981). Therefore, any merchandise that was regarded as valuable could be used as 
means of exchange, including slaves.  
The value of one slave fluctuated according to their inherent physical and 
personal characteristics (what would be understood today as personality traits), where 
they were from (ladinos, directly from a specific Kingdom of Africa, or born in 
America), age, physical capacities, gender, and previous work experiences (Tardieu, 
2002). However, there is some agreement that the price fluctuated between 200 and 
500 pesos in the 16th century (after which the price increased further), which was a 
very high price. Sometimes, if the slave was a ladino with “good manners”, male, in a 
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productive age, and strong, the price could reach close to 700 pesos (Sempat-
Assadouruan, 1969). In Mintz (1981), some records of prices are stated as follows: 
March 7, 1597, in Cordoba de Tucuman (today Argentina) 6 Angolan slaves 
were sold for the total of 1125 and ½. 24 of July of 1598, Gasparde Quevedo 
bought in the name of the Attorney General of Santiago de Chile, 2 slaves 
with a golden chain which worth was estimated to be 450 pesos… (p. 111).  
The record goes on detailing the slave trade of that wealthy trafficker and illustrating 
the volatility of the prices of slavery and the different means of currency exchange. It 
appears that the symbolic use of currencies was mixed with the symbolic meanings of 
what is exchanged. In the process of selling the representation of the wealthy 
merchant, the gold, pesos, and other currencies, and the exchange of such amounts of 
money and blackness appeared to blend into a mix in which wealth and blackness 
could be regarded as interchangeable. In this context, blackness, which was 
represented by African slaves at the time, could mean wealth as much as gold, silver, 
pesos, and other goods would represent value.  
Currencies and the different means of exchange used in the 16th century were 
being redefined in every region in this “New World” that the Colonial West had 
named the Americas. The idea that the chaotic process of redefinition of use value, 
currencies, and means of exchange in the first colonial experience, and then it 
becoming an incubator of capitalism as we know it today, is not a new one (Mignolo, 
1996). At least Quijano (2000), Mignolo (1996), Dussel (1993), Grosfoguel (2012), 
and Castro-Gómez (1996), who are the significant coloniality-decoloniality theorists, 
have explicitly stated that capitalism and Western civilisation were historically 
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formed through the process of colonisation that began in the Americas54. However, 
this raises the question of which industry or industries in the colonial context enabled 
the mechanisms of capitalism to begin. Slavery and the African slave trade not only 
provided the productive force or labour to bestow the wealth for Europe to determine 
that its Western culture was the dominating culture, slavery and African slavery 
showcased one of the model industries for capitalism, as illustrated above with the 
figures of the African slave trade. The powerful presence of African slavery in the 
Americas had an impact on the way that the conceptualisation of blackness was 
formed. If the African slave trade was influential in the constitution of wealth, to the 
extent it represented wealth, it could therefore be argued that the symbolic value of 
wealth and its closeness with slavery, and thus its interchangeability with blackness, 
could have a function close to the core of the means of exchange and pure value. In 
the sense that gold arbitrarily has a pure value, as a result of a particular history that 
determined that it was a precious metal, blackness had a role in the constitution of the 
history of pure value closely related to the history of profit, the added value product 
of labour, and the representation of wealth, because African slaves were historically 
used as means of exchange. That is, the history of African slavery was constituted by 
the ‘golden blackness’ of the Colonial West through becoming a representation of 
more than use value (labour) to a representation of pure value.  
I must disclose that it is morally wrong to put a value on human beings, even 
if that value determined today is about the past. Furthermore, I must affirm that 
slavery in all its forms and in all periods in the history of humanity is genocide. The 
most horrible genocide in the history of humanity is the trafficking of slaves from the 
15th century to the 19th century. However, when navigating through the dark corners 																																																								
54 See Chapter I Archaeology of Colonisation for an elaborate account of what they 
proposed.  
	145	
of the history of the Colonial West, that is ultimately part of the history of humanity, 
it is necessary to continually re-present, visibilise, and illustrate all the dimensions of 
this barbarism55. 
Los mulatos de Esmeraldas: Processes that constitute the conceptualisation of 
blackness 
 
Figure 6 Los Mulatos de Esmeralda (1599)56 
At the end of the 16th century, in 1599, Adrián Sánchez Galque painted the 
first recorded painting in the Americas entitled Los Mulatos de Esmeralda in Quito 
(Saco, 1879). It is not a coincidence that this was the first formal representation of the 
Americas and that it can be understood as an illustration of the first tools of 
colonisation, Western aboriginality, and blackness. This painting will be used to 
illustrate the processes that constituted the conceptualisation of blackness, considering 
																																																								
55 I felt compelled to include this part in the text because I do not want my argument 
to be misunderstood: I am not arguing that peoples had or have determined prices. 
This chapter was particularly difficult for me to write given that I am also a 
descendant of African slaves. 
56 Source Race-work, Race-love 
(http://raceworkracelove.tumblr.com/post/94060324175/adriansanchezgalque-
ecuador-esmeraldas-zambos)  
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its overlap with the processes that constituted the conceptualisation of aboriginality. 
The Western conceptualisation of blackness has a historical overlap with the 
conceptualisation with aboriginality due to the link with slavery: Aboriginal peoples 
were subjected to slavery in the Americas and the African slave trade would replace 
this. Therefore, considering the processes that constituted the conceptualisation of 
aboriginality, i.e. tragedy-capture-anthropocentrism-conquest, the conceptualisation 
of blackness is built in conversation with these processes in order to assemble the set 
of processes of colouring, cultural practice, social status, and value. Los mulatos de 
Esmeralda (1599) showcases one of the main products of colonisation: the discursive 
tools or conceptualisation of colonisation for the subjects it spoke of.   
The conceptualisation of aboriginality, which is defined using monstrous 
anthropology, was assembled through a set of historical moments for which 
Aboriginal peoples were subjected to colonisation. That is, the conceptualisation of 
aboriginality in colonisation was built in the historical instances in which the 
colonisers spoke of aboriginality in order to dominate or colonise. As elaborated in 
the previous chapter, the processes that constitute this conceptualisation are tragedy or 
horror, which provided a narrative formation within the frame of the cannibal 
monstrosity form that took in the Americas; capture, which provided a subjugation 
narrative formation within the frame of forced labour and slavery towards Aboriginal 
peoples; anthropocentrism, which provided a stance formation within the narrative 
that Aboriginal peoples (cannibals and non-cannibals) would be understood from a 
Western framework only and not from a inferiority-superiority social Darwinist 
hierarchy; and conquest, in which rather than only extract all that was possible to 
make the Kingdom of Spain or Portugal more powerful, it enabled a narrative of 
occupation of the territories of the lands and the subjects that ignited the movement of 
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the colonisation. The discursive tool of the conceptualisation of blackness must be 
understood in the context of the assemblage of this tool of colonisation, and it must 
also be understood as a specific tool for the purposes of colonisation. Los mulatos de 
Esmeraldas uses the processes that constitute aboriginality, but it showcases more 
explicitly the processes that constitute blackness; therefore, it is used here to illustrate 
the processes that constitute the conceptualisation of blackness.   
This oil painting represents the three caciques or leaders of Esmeraldas (today, 
Ecuador) that are descendants from African and Aboriginal peoples in the Americas. 
They were called mulatos or Zambos. Their power in that area (and in other places in 
the Americas such as La Española) was such that these caciques claimed that they 
represented over 100,000 people in that region (Saco, 1879). They declared the area to 
be The Republic of Zambos. The painting was an offering to the Kingdom of Spain 
that was sent alongside a report of the “pacification” of the area (Descalzi, 1996). Los 
mulatos de Esmeralda is illustrative because it depicts, at least, four denotative 
elements that are very visible: colour, cultural practices, value, and social status.  
Firstly, the painting presents the advent of colour becoming more than just the 
descriptor to, at times (alongside the name), identify people, but it demonstrated to the 
Kingdom of Spain who dominated the area and it verified their alliance. Skin colour, 
in reference to blackness, until the end of the 16th century would hold a descriptive 
quality and would not determine social statutes. Juan Garrido is the perfect example 
of how skin colour operated on the opposite side of colonisation, having an active role 
in the first colonial experience. The historical documents that speak of Juan Garrido 
provide evidence of his role in the colonisation process and no other narrative is 
deployed. However, black skin in this painting is deployed to confirm that The 
Republic of Zambos ruled Ecuador in 1599. Cimarrones were Aboriginal and African 
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slaves that escaped their slavery, and the offspring of peoples subjected to slavery, i.e. 
mulatos, are in charge of a colonised land. The conceptualisation process through 
similarities within the process of anthropocentrism was no longer relevant, but the 
process of contrasting colour became the position of the framework of the narrative 
process. Colouring appears to begin the highlighting and contrasting57 processes. The 
process of contrasts defines the relevance of colour. When colouring, even if it is a 
piece of paper that is all one colour, it is visible only by its contrast. The piece of 
paper is regarded as though it was coloured due to the contrast of the former colour of 
the paper and the new colour. Furthermore, paintings are defined by the contrasting of 
colours, the limits of painted objects, and their colours; they can suggest texture, 
depth, and perspective. Colouring as a process of conceptualisation that implies a set 
of pre-existing colours that functions to refer to each other. Los mulatos de Esmeralda 
presents blackness to communicate whom rules over this territory; it would not have 
been necessary to send a painting to communicate that a coloniser rules a given 
territory in the Americas in the 16th century.  
Cultural practices are illustrated symbolically with golden adjournments, 
weapons, clothing, and gestures of grace, which indicate a representation of cultural 
difference from the Colonial West. By the end of the 16th century, more than 150,000 
African peoples were brought to the Americas, mainly from the Yoruba peoples 
(where Nigeria is today) (Sued-Badillo, 2008). As illustrated above, an exponential 
increase of the African slave trade was imposed on the Americas, primarily focusing 
on the Caribbean and Brazil. By 1599, a more elaborate conceptualisation of 
Aboriginal civilisations was achieved. Languages, rituals, weapons, appearances, and 
																																																								
57 Note that the word contrast is used and not differentiation. Differentiation is too 
open to describe this process given that there is a clear frame of reference that refers 
to a clear juxtaposition between one thing and the other.  
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other elements were identified as “Aboriginal” or as “African” (or as mulato). The 
representation of the three caciques demonstrates that the conceptualisation of 
Western blackness and Western aboriginality was closed in the process of 
colonisation. The painting presents the contrast of a canvas of a group of Aboriginal 
and African cimarron men coloured by the cultural practices of the Colonial West. It 
communicates that the three caciques are Aboriginal men, from the Western 
conceptualisation of aboriginality, through illustrating their adornments and their 
bodies but also through illustrating the difference of Western aboriginality by wearing 
gold, Spanish clothing, polished spears with metal heads, and gesturing using Western 
gestures of ‘grace’, which indicates a performance of leadership as conceptualised at 
the time, which was very closely related to nobility. The highlighted contrasts 
between Western aboriginality and the Colonial West became relevant and made 
irrelevant the previous Western anthropocentrism attributions. The colonised would 
no longer be understood in Eurocentric or anthropocentric terms, but in contrasting 
terms that were visibly differentiated through cultural practice.   
In this painting, value is presented most notably in the depiction of the type of 
clothing, in gold, and in other expensive objects such as the spears of each of the 
subjects. The colours of black, yellow (gold), white, and brown were used to indicate 
a spectrum of hierarchy that is illustrated in this painting; this hierarchy was defined 
through what is considered valuable in the Colonial West. The painting presents very 
bright and golden Aboriginal adornments that demonstrate wealth but also tradition 
that distinguished the Aboriginal peoples in the area of Ecuador. This colouring of 
value, with the very visible gold signifier, branded the conceptualisation of Western 
aboriginality and Western blackness as valuable. Adornments, indicating tradition, 
and the facial skin of the three men denote a positive relationship between pure value 
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and Western blackness and aboriginality. In the conceptualisation of aboriginality, 
slavery was signified as a luxury, and later in the imposition of the African slave 
trade, it became a means of exchange due to its value. If yellow (gold) represented 
pure value, it could be argued that at one point, black represented more than the use-
value of labour of slavery: blackness also signified pure value. Colour and cultural 
practice in this painting – and the painting itself – operate in a process hinged in 
difference, but that is signified as a valuable resource and as a commodity.  
Lastly, the titles of Don were given to the caciques and this highlighted their 
social status as non-slaves (Saco, 1879), and this needed to be illustrated in order to 
distinguish them from the African slaves. The visibility of blackness in the painting 
communicates that they were leaders with noble titles through communicating that it 
needed to demonstrate that they were not slaves. The title of Don was a feudal title 
given in the context of Spain that differentiated the Dons from the rest of the 
population, as all titles did in medieval times. This illustration of nobility denotatively 
communicates the granting of these titles, and it also shows the colouring process 
using these cultural devices and how it was processed through proposing a Colonial 
West social status device. This social status device was closer to a hierarchal system 
and moved away from a system of differentiation using titles. The social status device 
here was used to propose merit and acknowledgement of the power that they held in 
the area, and suggested a possible ‘promotion’, even to the mulatos from Aboriginal 
and African backgrounds. This colouring referred to the hierarchies that one group of 
peoples, with the primary colours of Western aboriginality and Western blackness. 
The way that the painting ‘presents’ the three mulato men, one depicted from one 
side, the other depicted the opposite side, and the man in the centre suggests an 
invitation to the viewer to inspect the subjects to confirm their social status. To colour 
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them using the colours of social status creates a spectrum of hierarchy in which its 
highest position is depicted before the eye of the Colonial West.  
Juan Garrido received the title of conquistador as a result of his protagonist 
role in the first years of colonisation. The precondition for this title was to be a 
Christian, for which he was converted many years prior. That is, Garrido would be 
judged because he was not Christian born. Therefore, inequality was predicated 
through simply being converted to a religion. This is a similar discursive formation or 
process as capture, where it allowed for a dichotomous system for which the subject it 
spoke of would be Christian or not, and, if not, they could be enslaved. The 
conceptualisation of aboriginality had a capturing process for which it operated 
through framing a subject in a specific way in order that it could be captured, 
dominated, and (at times) enslaved. The social status process allows for a more 
complex form of capturing for which a given spectrum of inequality was assembled, 
in which the historical foundation includes slavery. Here, the interchangeability of 
Western blackness and slavery embedded in the foundation of the social status 
spectrum and linked with colour and cultural practice as difference and value as a 
process that highlights the historical involvement with wealth. In Los mulatos de 
Esmeralda, the social status granted to the caciques was referred to the reference to 
slavery, which indicates the end possible point of the social status spectrum.  
After 100 years of exposure, of writing (diaries and books of “General 
Histories”), and of knowledge-making that aimed to capture Aboriginal cultures in the 
Americas in an understandable frame of analysis, and of over 150,000 African slaves 
sent to mostly to the Caribbean and South America by the end of the 16th century 
(Ianni, 1976), the Colonial West elaborated a language to aid the identification of the 
subject it spoke of: the language of cultural practice constituted by a necessary set of 
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symbols to identify aboriginality and blackness. The symbols of cultural practice are 
only relevant to non-Colonial Western peoples, as colonisers did not need to identify 
themselves as such. Lastly, these cultural practices, symbols, and colour, within the 
spectrum of social status that begins with an underlying position of slavery, are 
mediated by a process of value that includes not only use-value but also pure value. 
The conceptualisation of Western blackness moves further away from the 
anthropocentric stance of the conceptualisation of aboriginality, and this allows 
difference from the Colonial Western peoples and positions the ‘other’ in the space of 
commodities or resources. Slavery, before the African slave trade, represented wealth; 
therefore, this wealth denotation was transferred to blackness. The success of the 
industry of the African slave trade exacerbated the representation of wealth, primarily 
as a result of the high cost of slaves. At the same time, African slaves were used as 
commodities to be exchanged, inherited, and appraised. In the painting, the ‘coloured’ 
mulatos were well represented in Western blackness, but also represented as peoples 
of social status, as Dons. Here, Western blackness was being conceptualised as 
resources or assets of the Kingdom of Spain because an agreement was reached with 
them, and they accepted the titles and recognition of Spain to become a republic 
(Descalzi, 1996) in the Colonial West’s terms.  
In the end, Oviedo was correct in writing in 1533 that “all this is better seen 
than written” (Fol. 91), when witnessing and representing the colonisation of the 
Americas in Los Mulatos de Esmeralda (1599). This painting illustrates the first 
blueprint of the tools of colonisation, fully drawn, coloured, and assembled. The 
Western conceptualisations of aboriginality and blackness are the tools found in the 
painting, which also functions as a historical map of the processes that constituted 
these conceptualisations; the conceptualisations here are solidified and are ready to be 
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used for the purposes of colonisation. Notably, Los Mulatos de Esmeralda less 
implicitly depicts the processes that constitute the conceptualisation of Western 
blackness: colouring-cultural practice-social status-value. From a history of Western 
blackness, which is at times in opposition to slavery, as demonstrated with the 
example of Juan Garrido, colour began to become a relevant process to determine 
specific social positions. The subjects painted here served the function of 
demonstrating to the Kingdom of Spain that the freed mulatos slaves ruled what is 
today known as Ecuador. This is one of the first times that skin colour became 
relevant to social position, given that blackness and slavery were rapidly becoming 
interchangeable.  
The conceptualisation of Western blackness carries the debt of the conceptualisation 
of aboriginality, linked through slavery and through the historicity of the first colonial 
experience in the 15th and 16th centuries. Rather than only mapping these 
conceptualisations using the clues from writings in diaries, chronicles, or history 
books, the conceptualisation of aboriginality and blackness can be revealed through 
drawings and paintings. The conceptualisation of Western blackness finds its initial 
discursive solidification in the first painting of the Americas in 1599, Los mulatos de 
Esmeralda, displaying the links with the conceptualisation of aboriginality. These two 
discursive tools are the first instruments forged in the history of colonisation to be 
used to speak of peoples that were not from the Colonial West, well before social 
Darwinism predicated by a hierarchy of races in the dichotomous categorisation 
inferiority-superiority. This simplistic view of a hierarchy of races does not consider 
the founding experience of colonisation in the 15th and 16th centuries, where a 
hierarchy of races does not make sense, and it must have had a significant influence in 
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the forthcoming colonial experiences because its history created the tools used for 
domination.  
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Part 3: Command (1881-1939) 
In Part 2: Origins (1492-1538), this archaeology unearthed the global origins 
of the conceptualisations of aboriginality and blackness, which are the tools used for 
the local administrative functionality of the command of colonisation in Queensland, 
Australia. First, the formation of the conceptualisation of aboriginality was 
constructed within a frame of aesthetics and not in a social Darwinist hierarchy; 
specifically, aboriginality was formed in a frame of monstrous aesthetics. This implies 
that its constituting rules of formation or processes are framed addressing an 
anthropocentric monstrosity and they were not formed originally addressing the social 
Darwinist perspective of an inequality of races. Second, the formation of the 
conceptualisation of blackness was not initially tied to slavery alone, as blackness and 
slavery were not initially interchangeable, but blackness was historically formed using 
aboriginality as a referent and tied historically through inheriting slavery from the 
Aboriginal peoples of the Americas. 
The following part presents an illustration of how colonisation operated and 
functioned in the context of Queensland. Through excavating the device used for the 
colonisation of Australian Aboriginal peoples in Queensland, i.e. the Aboriginals 
Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act 1897 (1897 Act), this part 
describes the specific mechanism through which colonisation subjectified the subject 
it spoke of, utilising the previously assembled conceptualisation of blackness and 
aboriginality. Similar to Foucault’s non-discursive functional description of the 
Panopticon, the 1897 Act assumed the non-discursive function of a “blanket”: in 
colonisation, the 1897 Act functioned in a Blanket Approach form. The significant 
presence or positivity of the blanket flagged the form of content that the mechanism 
of colonisation used. The non-discursive form of the blanket provided the design of 
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the mechanism or the pure function of the 1897 Act; the history of the mechanism of 
the Act, as opposed to an interpretation of what it said, is presented as a complex 
machine to colonise. In order to answer the overarching question of how colonisation 
was operationalised, or how it was put to use, both the origins of the two main 
components of colonisation and the way the machine of colonisation functioned 
should be described.  
It is important to consider that, in this part, “blanket” is not used simply as a 
metaphor or a symbolic transference to explain the operation of colonisation in the 
context of Queensland, but as a form of content that captures the mechanism of 
colonisation in Queensland through the 1897 Act. In a similar way, Foucault (1976) 
defined “panopticism” as a form of content constituted by its pure function, as 
opposed to a form of expression or discursive practice; the ‘Blanket Approach’ is 
defined as a form of content or an abstract machine that, referring to a given 
conceptualisation or discursive device, imposes a given identity practice on a given 
subjectivity. When explaining the link between Foucauldian archaeology and 
panopticism, Deleuze states: 
When Foucault defines Panoptiscism, either he specifically see it as an optical 
or luminous arrangement that characterizes prison, or he views it abstractly as 
a machine that not only affects visible matter in general (a workshop, barracks, 
school or hospital as much as a prison) but also in general passes through 
every articulable function. So the abstract formula of Panopticism is not only 
‘to see without being seen’ but also to impose a particular conduct on a 
particular human multiplicity. (Deleuze, 1985, pp. 33-34, emphasis in 
original)  
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Penal law feeds into the confirmation of the assemblage of the prison and the 
prison feeds into the forms of expression of the penal law. The discursive and non-
discursive practices continually feed from each other, refer to each other, and are, at 
times, in explicit contact. Is this arrangement or relationship, in which part three of 
this research understands the blanket in the Blanket Approach as a non-discursive 
form of content that is defined by an abstract operation or machine that is fed by the 
discursive conceptualisations of aboriginality and blackness, present in the 1897 Act? 
That is, the 1897 Act, constituted by the specific history it has with blankets, assumes 
the configuration of a Blanket Approach that includes in its contents a specific 
function or set of functions, which is similar to the pure function of panopticism “to 
see without being seen” and “to impose a particular conduct on a particular human 
multiplicity”. Therefore, the blanket is not used as a metaphor because, like the 
Panopticon, it is not only a device to represent a similar function of another object, 
but the Blanket Approach is also the form of content or the configuration of functions 
assembled as an abstract formula defined solely through the pure functions or non-
discursively constituted functions. 
If the description of the command of colonisation can be explained as a 
Blanket Approach, then how was this non-discursive practice configured historically 
in the context of Queensland, Australia, and how did it operate? This broad question 
categorises this part of the thesis. Through excavating the 1897 Act as a functional 
device, considering its precedents, the forms of expressions as practices, its 
relationship with blankets, and the specific formula of its functions, a functional 
analysis of the 1897 Act is performed and a specific machine for the colonisation of 
Aboriginal peoples in the 19th and 20th centuries in Queensland is described.   
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In the following chapter, the Blanket Approach is described through 
navigating the historicity of the 1897 Act from the previous policies that addressed the 
subject it spoke of, including the 1881 Pearl-Shell and Beche-De-Mer Fishery Act 
and The Native Labourers Protection Act of 1884. Then, an analysis of the emergence 
of the 1897 Act is conducted that addresses its rationale and the strategies it used to 
function within the Queensland government of the time, such as the formulation of 
the 1897 Act within a nation-state as an imposition of a state on a group of nations 
without a social contract with them, or an imposition of a state without a nation. At 
the end of the Blanket Approach chapter, the triple function of the command of 
colonisation illustrated through the 1897 Act is described. The triple function of this 
non-discursive mechanism is totalisation, multiplicity, and the creation of desire. 
	160
Chapter V  
The Blanket Approach 
This chapter historically and functionally analyses the historicity of the 
Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act 1897 (1897 Act) in 
the way that it created the conditions of possibilities in which Australian Aboriginal 
peoples in Queensland could be spoken of. It is argued that the 1897 Act used a 
Blanket Approach mechanism that aimed to colonise Australian Aboriginal peoples. 
This chapter does not engage in an interpretative historical inquiry, such as the work 
of Rosalind Kidd in, for instance, The Way We Civilise (1997); nor does it engage in a 
critique of the legal effectiveness of the 1897 Act. This chapter analyses the local 
command of colonisation through the 1897 Act, i.e. the techno-political administrative 
function of the 1897 Act, through a mapping of its historicity. Though the pure 
administrative function of the 1897 Act is incommensurable, or any non-discursive 
practice such as panopticism (Deleuze, 1985; Foucault, 1976), its analysis can be 
described in a form of content that can communicate its operation.  
In this research, the Blanket Approach is defined as a form of content for the 
functionality of the relief item, which is the “blanket” that on one hand refers to the 
phrase that alludes to a policy that provides a discrete and total solution to very 
complex problems. On the other hand, it means that it covered every subject like the 
blankets that were distributed in the 19th century and in the beginning of the 20th 
century. This mechanism operated using the triple function of totalisation, 
multiplicity, and the creation of desire. First, the process that determines everything, 
that which was listed in the Act and therefore it does not determine anything, that was 
first determined by the protectorates in the institution and constitution of the 1897 Act 
is called totalisation. Second, the process that delivers this totalisation to each 
individual person is called multiplicity. Third, the process of creating needs, 
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necessities, and desires, and through that imposing the enclosure and perpetual 
process of the process of colonisation, is called the creation of desire. These threads 
of processes were and are continually assembled in reference to the history of 
Western aboriginality and Western blackness discussed in the previous chapters. 
The Act 
Secretary of Agriculture: This Bill is intended to enable the colony to do 
something towards carrying out its duty to the Aboriginal nations of this 
country. The imperfect provisions made in that direction up to the present time 
have scarcely been successful and it is not to the credit of the white inhabitants 
of these countries that so little success has attended the efforts made to save 
the unfortunate Aboriginals. We protect infants, and their rights, we protect 
men from other countries… and it is time we took some steps towards treating 
the aboriginals of this country as they ought to be treated. (Queensland 
Parliamentary Debates, 1898, p. 1225) 
 The Queensland Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium 
Act 1897 (1897 Act) was the first comprehensive law of the Government of the colony 
of Queensland that aimed to control every aspect of Aboriginal affairs. However, the 
control of or ‘protection’ by the 1897 Act was regarded to be unsuccessful in “treating 
Aboriginals as they ought to be treated” from the very early stages. This opening 
statement by the Secretary of Agriculture to the Parliament in 1898 argued that the 
1897 Act needed to be changed, and this was the tone that the Parliamentary Debates 
had to what would become the 1899 Amendment to the Act58. Many Members of 
Parliament stated that the Aboriginal “problem” was far from being resolved. The 
1897 Act needed to undertake some changes in 1898, which were the first of many. 
																																																								
58 See the Parliamentary Debates of Queensland 1899, pp. 1220-1401.  
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The Act provided for three broad topics: it addressed opium and alcohol; it created 
institutions for Australian Aboriginal peoples be subjected to (reserves or 
“protectorates”, and missions); and it restricted and subjected Australian Aboriginal 
life to the Colonial West definition of labour, marriage, education, health, “civility”, 
government, and the use and exclusion of objects (for example, possum blankets were 
banned and cotton/woollen blankets were imposed). Opium and alcohol were quickly 
controlled by the 1897 Act. This did not mean that these were not allowed to be used, 
for example the use of alcohol was allowed, but that the protectors of the reserves 
defined their acceptable use. The missions and protectorates aimed to visibilise and 
accurately account for the population of Australian Aboriginal peoples. In her guide 
to the government records and archives, Frankland states: 
Regional administrative control of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
population of the State was achieved by dividing the State into Protectorates. 
Each Protectorate was administered by a local Protector of Aboriginals who 
was a police officer in all cases except for Thursday Island. The appointment 
of local Protectors began in 1898. Local Protectors had many responsibilities 
including the administration of Aboriginal employment, wages, and savings 
bank accounts. Local Protectors also played a significant role in the removal 
of Aboriginal people to reserves. By 1932 there were 95 Protectorates and 
widespread corruption had emerged within the administrative practices of the 
local Protectors. (Frankland, 1994, p. 4)59 
These protectors regulated and controlled marriages, removals, labour, 
employment and wages, education, and Aboriginal industries; they reported deaths, 
																																																								
59 This research performs a historical-functional analysis of the 1897 Act; for a more 
detailed history of the administrative aspects of Aboriginal Affairs, see Frankland 
(1994) and Kidd (1997), which are included in the references of this thesis.  
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specific diseases, crimes, etc., and defined what would constitute an Aboriginal 
person whom would be under the rule of the 1897 Act, not including people who 
would apply to be exempted from the Act. Very few cases would be granted 
exemptions60 (Frankland, 1994). The protectors were police officers that would be 
paid additional income to be the enforcers of the 1897 Act; therefore, they were 
responsible for the protectorates in any given region of Queensland. They reported at 
first to the Northern Chief Protector and the Southern Chief Protector, and then 
shortly after to only one Chief Protector who was responsible for all protectorates. 
One of their responsibilities was to directly report to the Home Secretary who then 
reported to Queensland Parliament.  
It is important to clearly state that the 1897 Act did not control all aspects of 
Australian Aboriginal life, but that it aimed to cover Australian Aboriginal peoples 
with a defined set of elements that were important to the Colonial West. This means 
that every aspect, not just any aspect, of life was defined by the Colonial West and 
was not defined by Aboriginal Australia (note that the distinction I make between 
every-thing and any-thing is discussed below). Rather than being an inquiry regarding 
Australian Aboriginal peoples in Queensland in the 19th and 20th centuries, this 
chapter engages in a Foucauldian theoretical-historical archaeological inquiry of the 
																																																								
60 Frankland states: “Section 33 of the 1897 Act made provision for the Minister ‘to 
issue any half-caste, who, in his opinion, ought not to be subject to the provisions of 
this Act, a certificate... that such a half-caste is exempt from the provisions of this 
Act...'. Certificates of exemption were sought by hundreds of Aboriginal people who 
wished to escape the oppressive conditions enforced upon them by the Act. In many 
cases, the Aboriginal person wishing to become exempt would write or request the 
local Protector or anyone else to write on his or her behalf to the Chief Protector 
requesting to be exempt. The request would often be accompanied by letters of 
reference which confirmed that the Aboriginal person seeking exemption was of good 
character and did not associate with other Aborigines.” (1994, p. 7) 
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1897 Act as a non-discursive device utilised to colonise Australian Aboriginal peoples 
in Queensland.  
In this chapter, the functional analysis of how the 1897 Act commanded the 
colonisation of Aboriginal peoples in Queensland is demonstrated through navigating 
the historicity of the 1897 Act from its precedents through functionally analysing 
other laws that speak of the same subject. Then, the way in which the blanket 
functionally became the form of content for the machine of the Blanket Approach to 
function and how it functioned are analysed. However, before proceeding with the 
historicity of the Blanket Approach, two notions must be clarified: the distinction 
between every-thing and any-thing, and its relationship with totality, and also the role 
of opium in the mechanism of the 1897 Act.  
Every-thing and Any-thing 
In order to address the means through which the 1897 Act dominated the 
subject it spoke of, a brief review of what is usually the assertion made to describe the 
Act should be presented. The typical description of the 1897 Act reads more or less 
like the statement: the 1897 Act controlled every aspect of the Australian Aboriginal 
lives. There is much truth in this statement, and this research does not intend to 
contest it. However, it must be more closely analysed. In particular, a distinction is 
made between the words “every-thing” and “any-thing”. Levinas (1969) examined 
this distinction in his book Totality and Infinity. To state “every-thing” means a 
defined set or a total set of “things”, whereas “any-thing” means an infinite account of 
things. Thus, when it is stated that the 1897 Act controlled “every” aspect, or “every-
thing”, it is very different to using the word “any-thing”. This is not to suggest that, 
potentially, in practice, the 1897 Act did not control matters that were not explicitly 
stated by the Act. In practice, the 1897 Act, particularly through Section 31, provided 
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for the powers to control more than what had been explicitly stated. In Section 31 
Regulation 17, what appears to be open-ended power is given to the State to regulate 
“all other matters and things that may be necessary to give effect to this Act”. 
However, this speaks to a defined set of total matters existing. This total set is not 
prospective, but it is defined by the presence of what constitutes the Act; what is 
prospective is the ways in which the Act might need to give powers “to give effect to 
this Act”.  
Levinas (1969) dedicates his book to distinguishing these two notions of 
totality and infinity, ethically favouring the latter. About totality and totalizers, he 
states: 
It is this outwardly directed but self-centred totalistic thinking that organises 
men and things into power systems, and gives us control over nature and other 
people. Hence it has dominated the course of human history. From this point 
of view, on the neutral and impersonal. Being, for example is important. What 
is it? Is the most basic question that requires an answer in terms of a context, a 
system. The real is something that can be brought before the senses and the 
mind as an object. The acts of sensing, thinking, existing, as they are lived 
through, are discounted as subjective. A priority is, therefore, placed on 
objective thinking, and the objective. The group is more powerful, more 
inclusive, and, therefore, more important than the individual. To be free is to 
sacrifice the arbitrary inner self and to fit into a rationally grounded system. 
(Levinas, 1969, p. 17) 
In this elaboration, the word “every-thing” suggests a set of given things, which 
represent a total: everything is a totality enabled through a system. In contrast, “any-
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thing” is an infinite amount of possibilities or infinity: infinity enables freedom. Its 
uncertainty does not allow the systematisation to capture it. Levinas states: 
To the infinitizers on the other hand, this seems like a partial and biased 
doctrine. Systematic thinking, no doubt, has its place. It is required for the 
establishment of those power structures, which satisfy men. But when 
absolutised in this way and applied to free men, it constitutes violence, which 
is not merely found in temporary and accidental displays of armed force, but 
in the permanent tyranny of the neutral and impersonal over the active and 
personal. (Levinas, 1969, p. 18) 
Infinity is freedom and to affirm wording that enables this infinity is to 
promote this active stance against the unnecessary violence of the systems enacted 
through the totalizers. To state everything is to point to a totality. The 1897 Act was a 
law that isolated, captured, and restricted the subject that it spoke of, while referring 
to its specific totalistic system of law. A totality is composed by a given set of 
elements, but the addition (or summation) of these elements is not the totality in itself. 
It can be said that these elements are subordinated by their totality.  
Opium? 
The Queensland Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium 
Act 1897 (1897 Act) was developed to control the distribution of opium and 
Australian Aboriginal people’s labour, but it also became a mechanism for social 
engineering through regulating every aspect of their lives (Kidd, 1997). Every (and 
not any) aspect of Australian Aboriginal lives was defined by the Australian Colonial 
West. Australian Aboriginal labour had a protagonist role in building Queensland, and 
this labour was paid with tobacco, alcohol, and opium charcoal, as well as food, 
liquor, clothes, and blankets, among other exchange items (Gillett, 2011). Opium in 
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the 1897 Act was used as a rhetorical device to institute a point of entry to regulate 
Australian Aboriginal populations. Opium was also used as a scapegoat to constitute 
an illustrative example of colonial domination in Australia (Gillett, 2011). 
The use of opium in Australia was documented well before the institution of 
the 1897 Act, and it was usually associated with Chinese people, trade, and cultural 
practice. Before the 1897 Act, opium was legal and Australians consumed it in large 
quantities. The Government of the Colonies of Australia enjoyed very healthy 
revenue from the taxes that opium paid. Opium contributed an estimated $2.5 million 
annually to the government in today’s value (Berridge & Griffith, 1999). In the late 
19th century, opium began to become more regulated and its use was registered by 
race; for example, the Annual Reports present tables of opium offences reporting the 
offenders name and their races such as ‘Chinese’, ‘Malay’, ‘White European’, etc.; 
however, it remained associated with questionable pay for labour and sex (Evans, 
2007). The first formal attempt by the Queensland government to regulate it occurred 
in the context of the global movement against opium (Berridge & Griffith, 1999). In 
the 1890s, the global war on opium had replaced the abolitionist (abolition against 
slavery) movement because it was considered that slavery had been abolished. 
However, in the 1890s, the opium “problem” was disappearing in Australia (Gillett, 
2011). According to both unofficial reports and official government reports, opium 
remained present but the latter reported a significant decrease (Evans, 2007). Gillett 
(2011) argued that for the younger generations of Chinese people in Australia, opium 
was considered passé or something that only older people would do, even though 
opium use in China was rising. The use of opium by Australian Aboriginal peoples 
was reported to be limited to opium charcoal, which is the opium residue after it was 
smoked (Kidd, 1997). The opium charcoal was consumed through diluting it in a 
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large quantity of water and then this water was consumed. The drinking of the opium 
charcoal was reported to be a distinctive social activity (Gillett, 2011). However, as 
early as 1902, the protectors under the 1897 Act were reporting the following: 
"In the neighbourhood of towns where there are police stations the supply of 
opium, although not entirely stopped, is considerably checked.” - Protector 
Martin, Mackay, 1902 
"The blacks in these districts are not much addicted to opium smoking, as it is 
confined mostly to the elder people, and the younger ones evidently perceive 
that opium has been killing their race, and avoid using it." - Protector 
MacNamara, Charter Towers, 1902 
"I am glad to again report that the aboriginals here do not use opium or 
liquor." - Protector O'Connor, Boulia (Annual Reports, 1902) 
These individual reports and others (Annual Reports 1901-1906) stated that the 
problem of opium use had disappeared or significantly decreased. Opium-related 
criminal convictions, primarily perpetrated by people of Chinese descent, were what 
were mostly reported in the Annual Reports under the 1897 Act. Thus, either opium 
was an already a decreasing problem, or the 1897 Act had an immediate effect in 
eliminating this problem, or perhaps it was never a problem at all. 
In many of her works, Rosalind Kidd (2012; 2010; 2007; 1997) suggests that 
labour, as a topic of Parliamentary discussion and employment practices, was a key 
factor in the domination of Aboriginal Australia in the Queensland experience. 
Interestingly, this pressure came from a top down approach: 
Nineteenth-Century governments in Queensland were forced to respond to 
local and international campaigns demanding official interventions to bring 
Aboriginal/European relations under orderly control. The variety of 
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recommendations, remedial programs and administrative responses suggests 
that the Aboriginal plight was a target for social change. Vigorous debate and 
practical adjustments in the legal domain and the field of “coloured” 
employment, and indeed the articulation of the Aboriginal dilemma through 
the prism of European reformatory rhetoric, run counter to the historical 
convention of a systemic racial exclusion. (Kidd, 1997, p. 35) 
However, Kidd demonstrated that Australian Aboriginal labour was critical to the 
development of Queensland from the very early stages of the colony. From the 
beginnings of the settlement of Queensland, Australian Aboriginal peoples worked as 
guides, helped in the construction of huts, houses, and other structures, cleared 
densely vegetated areas for the construction of pathways and living spaces, supplied 
food such as fish and other animals, worked in domestic duties, and worked in various 
pastoral duties (Keen, 2004; Kidd, 2010). Kidd (2010) stated that in the early 1880s, 
more than 1000 Australian Aboriginal people had permanent employment in rural 
Queensland. 
 The usual payment for Australian Aboriginal labour was tobacco, opium 
charcoal, food, liquor, clothes, and blankets (Kidd, 2010). Very few Europeans agreed 
to work for such ‘payments’ in the characteristically harsh conditions of Queensland 
in the late 19th century. European labour expected to receive monetary wages for the 
same labour that Australian Aboriginal peoples would do for mercantile and 
consumable goods. These conditions increased the demand for Australian Aboriginal 
labour; one reason was that no one could afford the wages that the Europeans were 
demanding (Kidd, 2010). It is reported that in some cases Australian Aboriginal 
peoples preferred to work with Chinese employers because they offered better 
working conditions overall (Evans, Kay & Kathryn, 1993). European Australians 
	170
reportedly resented this preference, and it further nourished racism against the 
Chinese communities. One of the effects of the 1897 Act was that the protectors held 
a monopoly over Australian Aboriginal labour, largely because they were given the 
authority to determine whether or not an Australian Aboriginal person could work 
with an employer. Protectors, who were police officers, favoured the European 
employers and the records reveal an increase of Chinese convictions, predominantly 
with opium-related offences. The Parliamentary Debates of the late 19th century and 
early 20th century on matters such as the 1897 Act, as well as the Annual Reports, 
demonstrated clear disapproval of the Chinese communities. The Chinese were 
blamed for the general problem of opium addiction and in particular to the 
“degeneration” of Australian Aboriginal communities (Gillett, 2011). The 1897 Act 
was approved in the context of this generalised resentment against the Chinese 
communities (Gillett, 2011). After the approval of the 1897 Act in the context of 
Chinese resentment and the global war on opium, opium was banned in 1906 with an 
exception for medicinal use (Gillett, 2011), but the 1897 Act continued to be enacted 
for decades longer.  
 In the 1897 Act, opium was a rhetorical device that built the complex 
machinery of colonial domination not simply as an empty signifier but as a scapegoat 
that was specified in order to change the focus from the real function of the Act. Some 
historians (Evans, 2007; Gillett, 2011) have suggested that opium was merely an 
excuse to introduce the 1897 Act as a “Trojan horse”. However, even this history 
positions opium as central to the machinery of the 1897 Act. From this perspective, 
even if opium was the Trojan horse of the 1897 Act, it had to operate around the legal 
provisions of the substance in order to control Australian Aboriginal peoples. 
Furthermore, even if this account of history denies the “reality” of the problem of 
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opium addiction and simply argues that it was a lie, or at least a very selective 
interpretation of events that occurred in the whole of Queensland society, the focus 
remains on denying or confirming this historical account; that is, opium remains a 
positive (present) part of the machinery of the 1897 Act. Notably, all accounts of 
history have persuading and empirically sound arguments that place opium as the 
pretext for the institution of the 1897 Act. However, if opium was nothing more than a 
scapegoat, as some of these historians suggest, then it must be accepted that it had 
very little to do with the function of the mechanism of the 1897 Act. The historical 
conditions that made the mechanism of the 1897 Act in Queensland, and undeniably 
in the Western world, followed a different pattern. 
Precedents of the 1897 Act 
 One of the first attempts that the Queensland government made to address the 
“Aboriginal problem” occurred in 1874, when the government appointed an 
Aboriginal Commission to “inquire what can be done to ameliorate the condition of 
aborigines and to make them useful” (Ross, 1992 cited in Kidd, 1997, p. 25). The 
commission concluded that “the aggressive conquest of aborigines in the Northern 
frontier districts be replaced by a policy of ‘conciliation’ through the distribution of 
rations and blankets” (Kidd, 1997, p. 26). The Aboriginal Commission was dissolved 
shortly after that year, but the distribution of rations and blankets was adopted as a 
Queensland government policy. Rations, tomahawks, tobacco, and blankets were 
distributed in different locations throughout Queensland. Blankets were used to 
provide early estimates of the population of Australian Aboriginal peoples in 
Queensland (Diamond, 1997). However, blankets also had an aggressive history in 
other parts of the world and other parts of Australia. Campbell (2002) discussed this 
history in his book Invisible Invaders, where he demonstrates how in the second half 
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of the 18th century, blankets were used to spread smallpox among the Native 
Americans in the United States. The use of blankets to spread diseases also occurred 
in Australia. Campbell states that: 
Like Curr, Butlin claimed that smallpox in Aboriginals followed an 
introduction at Sydney, and attributed the outbreak to the surgeon’s supply of 
bottles of virus material. The one possibility that Butlin did not consider was 
that the bottles were never opened. His opinion differed from Curr’s in that he 
proposed a second introduction in 1829 that occurred through blankets being 
sent ashore from a ship at Sydney. (Campbell, 2002, p. 219) 
The history of the arrival of diseases like smallpox is an object of historical debate. 
However, there is very little doubt that one of the first ways to manage the Aboriginal 
“problem” was through violent conquest, and that for some these ways included the 
purposeful spreading of diseases (Campbell, 2002).  
 The next time that the Queensland Parliament actively discussed Australian 
Aboriginal peoples was in relation to the 1881 Pearl-Shell and Beche-De-Mer Fishery 
Act (1881 Act). This Act aimed to regulate the very profitable practice of pearl 
shelling and beche-de-mer that existed for decades before the Act. This business was 
primarily located in North Queensland and the Torres Strait Islands. The Government 
was concerned about the treatment of the labourers in that industry and decided to 
create a law to regulate it, primarily through taxes and specific fines to the boat owner 
offenders. In the 1881 Act, a “native labourer” was defined as “any Aboriginal native 
of Australia or New Guinea, or of the islands adjacent there to” (Pearl-Shell and 
Beche-De-Mer Fishery Act, 1881). Although the Parliamentary Debates record many 
cases in which native labourers were treated cruelly, there is no single section of the 
1881 Act that specifically addresses this concern. In Section 12, the Act states, “the 
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master is liable for expenses incurred in the maintenance of Polynesians and native 
labourers” (Pearl-Shell and Beche-De-Mer Fishery Act, 1881). Then, in Section 13, 
the Act commanded that any death or desertion must be reported, and this section 
started with addressing the master: “any master or employer of such Polynesian or 
native labourer who fails to make any such report shall be liable to a penalty not 
exceeding ten pounds” (Pearl-Shell and Beche-De-Mer Fishery Act, 1881, p. 121). 
The arguments for the approval of the 1881 Act revolved around wanting to promote 
better working conditions and some Members of Parliament in Queensland quoted 
specific “horror” stories of masters of vessels, usually Malays or non-white peoples, 
leaving labourers far away from their ports (even stories of leaving labourers as far as 
Victoria) and other stories of simply not being appropriately paid after months of 
unpaid work. Interestingly, almost all Parliamentary Debates focused on the “native 
labourer” although the Act only mentioned them in Sections 13, 14, and 17 out of a 
total of 19 sections. It appears that this was the first time that the “native labourer” 
topic of the 1881 Act functioned as a vehicle to implement formal control in a specific 
area, which was in this case the pearl shelling and beche-de-mer industries. It was a 
very effective vehicle given that the entire conversation only focused on this topic, the 
native labourer or the Australian Aboriginal peoples, and not on the nature of the 
industry.  
 Three years after the 1881 Act, The Native Labourers Protection Act of 1884 
(1884 Act) was passed. This law specifically intended to regulate the “improper 
employment” of Australian Aboriginal peoples defined by the same legal definition of 
native labourer used in the 1881 Act. Again, this topic primed a very intense debate 
framed with expressed feelings such as from the Member of the Queensland 
Parliament, Mr. Archer: “I see no reason why we don’t protect the aborigines as we 
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protect the Polynesians” (Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 1881, p. 129). From 
this point on, Queensland Parliament engaged in a discussion revolving around race 
relations: 
Mr. Archer: I am perfectly in favour of what the Hon. Premier is trying to 
effect by this Bill: I wish that every native labourer on board ship, or any other 
place, should be properly treated – have fair play and the same protection as 
white man… the bill has my complete sympathy. I do not think I ever ill-used 
a man on account of the colour of his skin, and I do not want to see him ill-
used…  (Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 1881, p. 184) 
This seemingly progressive account in 1884 of this Member of Parliament evoked a 
proportionately opposite effect in other Members, as seen in this statement: 
Mr. Morehead: I think the sentimentalism in the way of protection of the black 
Aboriginal race of this colony is running rampant… I am perfectly certain the 
hon. The Minister for Lands could point out how he and others assisted in 
sweeping the blacks out of the western portion of the colony, and very 
properly, too no doubt. Where the white man appears the black disappears, as 
was said by a very great authority, John Arthur Roebuck, in speaking with 
reference to the New Zealand war. There is no doubt it should be so, and it is 
so. We may mitigate the severity of the process, but that is all, this is merely a 
measure of mitigation. I am sure the junior member for North Brisbane thinks 
the sooner the black races are swept the better. I am sure he detests them, and I 
think he would support a measure that would hurry their departure to another 
and possibly better sphere that they now occupy…” (Queensland 
Parliamentary Debates, 1881, p. 185) 
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Mr. Morehead and Mr. Archibald Meston were part of the group who would 
be responsible for pushing and designing the 1897 Act (Kidd, 1997; Queensland 
Parliamentary Debates, 1898). In 1881, it was one of the first times that Australian 
Aboriginal lives were formally discussed in Queensland Parliament. However, there 
was no discussion, or very little, about the approval or disapproval of the bill itself. 
The debate focused on the “nature” of Australian Aboriginal peoples. The debate 
revolved around the efforts needed to be undertaken to “save” this “dying” race, or if 
any effort from the Government to “save them” was an exercise in futility. For this 
debate around “saving a dying race” to happen, an entire imagery of the nature of 
Australian Aboriginal peoples was drawn from the current understandings based on 
pre-existing colonial imagery of aboriginality and blackness, at times explicitly citing 
the experiences of the United States, New Zealand, and other colonised countries. The 
context in which this imagery was drawn was in the main topic of the bill, which was 
labour.  
 The 1884 Act intended to regulate and protect the employment conditions of 
native labourers through instituting a bill that exclusively addressed them. The 1884 
Act was officially repealed in 1939 when the 1897 Act assumed the functions of the 
1884 Act de jure (or officially), because the 1897 Act had been regulating Australian 
Aboriginal labour since its de facto implementation (or in practice). Labour appeared 
to be the first vehicle for the representations of Australian Aboriginal peoples in 
Queensland Parliament. For example, one of the Members of Parliament painted a 
picture of Australian Aboriginal peoples in relation to labour in this way:  
Mr. Black: “The Aboriginal native of Queensland, or of Africa, or of the 
South Sea Islands, did not work in his own country: he hunted; it was the 
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women who had to do the arduous work.” (Queensland Parliamentary 
Debates, 1884, p. 188) 
In relation to the nature of aboriginality, this quote summarises well the position of 
many Members of Parliament: 
Mr. Sim: “Of course we know that we are dealing with a race that occupies a 
very low position in the scale of humanity, but at the same time we must not 
forget that at one period in our own history our ancestors lived under very 
similar conditions, and in some respects very much worse conditions, than 
those under which the blacks of this country live, and that our race is a product 
of a process of civilisation which has extended over a period of very nearly 
2000 years.” (Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 1884, p. 192) 
These conceptualisations were a product of a social Darwinist perspective 
guided by the modern anthropological discourse discussed in the previous chapters. 
However, the content appeared to be entangled with the historicity of the 
conceptualisations of blackness and aboriginality. Other Members of Parliament 
expressed enigmatic arguments such as that expressed in the following quote: 
Mr. Jordan: “If those people could be civilised and taught the value of labour 
then the law could not operate.” (Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 1884, p. 
197) 
This comment that the Member made speaks to the use of law. The bill addresses a 
problem, but its positivity (presence) creates the space that the problem of labour lies 
on and therefore constitutes. The irony of the expression gestures to the contradictory 
function of this law, which aims to regulate labour, but its very existence depends on 
the verbalisation of this problem. Following this line, another Member expressed the 
following: 
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Mr. Norton: “…good thing that blacks are employed. This Bill, however, not 
only restricts their employment, but almost prohibits it, because, in order to 
engage them at all, they must be engaged in some seaport town.” (Queensland 
Parliamentary Debates, 1884, p. 189) 
The Members of Parliament knew the power that a law would have to institute the 
positivity of, in this case, labour.  
This positivity of labour, within the conditions of the possibilities of the 
conceptualisations of aboriginality and blackness, was not a bad thing or a good thing, 
but it announced an initial “capture” via these conceptualisations in Australia and the 
advent of other areas of capture that such laws implied to impose, such as education, 
wages control, regulation of criminality, etc. That is, this initial positivity set the 
grounds for the subsequent spaces of control and “protection”. From the regulation of 
labour of specific peoples, with specific conceptualising content, the grounds of 
protection would be able to expand in all directions that arise after this capturing. 
However, this capture or protection must always refer to the nature of aboriginality 
and blackness that has its roots in the Western conceptualisations of aboriginality and 
blackness.  
 Kidd (2012, 2010, 1997) is right to emphasise the role that labour had in the 
history of how the Australian Colonial West managed Australian Aboriginal affairs. 
When the Australian Colonial West started discussions about labour and Australian 
Aboriginal affairs, they found very fertile grounds to grow the complex machinery of 
colonial domination. The seeds of the conceptualisations of aboriginality and 
blackness were nurtured in the aforementioned modern grounds of colonisation. In 
particular, the history of the conceptualisation of blackness echoed the labour 
elements in slavery. The naming of the word slavery was wilfully silent in the 1881 
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Act, the 1884 Act, and the 1897 Act even though many labour practices were 
effectively slave practices (Kidd, 2007; Lake, 1993; Reynolds, 1990). The 
Parliamentary Debates around these Acts and the reports of the implementation of the 
1897 Act addressed slavery through avoiding and manoeuvring its wording in order to 
avoid the direct enunciation of slavery. However, this intentional tactic only caused 
the Act to refer to slavery at all times, which made it ever present when talking about 
labour and other affairs. However, sometimes the word slave or slavery erupted in the 
form of expressions like these: 
“…she apparently had no blankets, and certainly no wages-the poor thing had 
proved a hard-working willing slave.” (Annual Reports, 1899, p. 18) 
In other moments, the word was mentioned along the lines of “not appearing 
to promote slavery”. Historians like Kidd (2010) and Lake (1993) suggest that there 
were existing slave conditions in Australia towards Australian Aboriginal peoples. 
However, this research is interested in what constituted the grounds of labour and the 
conceptualisations of aboriginality and blackness for these conceptualisations to be a 
foundation for the machinery of colonisation in modern times, yet having roots in a 
colonial history constituted by slavery, both Aboriginal and African slavery. That is, 
all sides and aspects of this debate contributed to the formation of the 1897 Act that 
included the entangled foundational element of a history that was slavery inside the 
conceptualisations of aboriginality and blackness.  
Slavery is constantly but silently addressed when discussing the 1884 Act 
because it explicitly discusses labour. The abolition of slavery in other parts of the 
world occurred decades prior to this point, and it was politically correct to condemn 
and avoid such actions. The topic of the “nature” of Australian Aboriginal peoples 
was widely discussed (the Parliamentary Debates had hundreds of pages), even 
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though the 1884 Act had only 14 sections and was a relatively uncontroversial law. 
This was the first time that the Parliament of Queensland formerly discussed 
Australian Aboriginal people in the light of an Act loosely designed exclusively for 
them. However, strictly speaking, the 1884 Act was not about Australian Aboriginal 
affairs: it was primarily directed to restrict the employment of ‘native labourers’ in 
ships in Queensland. It is illustrative that the 1884 Act sparked a broad debate about 
Australian Aboriginal “nature” and labour. The Australian Aboriginal topic found a 
comfortable space in the regulation of labour to exacerbate further conversations to 
manage the “Aboriginal problem”. These previous laws also found a comfortable 
space for the implementation of the 1897 Act because it continued the conversations 
of the Parliamentary Debates and the language of the previous laws. 
Language of the 1897 Act 
The 1880s and 1890s represented a threshold moment in which the Australian 
Colonial West gathered a language through which Australian Aboriginal affairs were 
officially and richly spoken of, discussed, and legislated. However, the language was 
not only the language of labour: labour was the grounds for these enunciations to 
occur. The language of Western aboriginality and blackness fed these enunciations. 
This language conversed with the language of the West and created the instituted 
intersections that weaved the fabric of the technology that functioned to reproduce the 
supremacy of the Colonial West in Queensland, Australia. Words like “protection”, 
“removals”, and “exceptions” pointed to the new processes that colonisation would 
institute. At this point, the 1881 Act and the 1884 Act were only vague attempts to 
manage the Australian Aboriginal “problem”.  
Home Secretary: The Bill proposes to deal with the subjects I have 
enumerated in three ways. It first repeals one section of an act now in 
	180
existence in regards to the supply of liquor to blacks, and places it in this Bill 
so that it can be found under the heading of “aboriginals”. It says clearly and 
definitely that it is the duty of everyone in the community to see that the law 
in this respect shall be carried out… Then the laws regarding the supply of 
opium are amended so as to overcome what has been the great difficulty in the 
past- to catch the offender… We must make of 10,000 pounds a year… 
Having dealt with these three matters, we have to make a provision for 
protecting these blacks and securing them in some suitable employment. The 
Bill makes provision, in conclusion, for regulations dealing with the thousand 
and one matters which must arise, but which I could not prophesy or narrate. 
The Bill is open; there is not one clause which, if argument and experience are 
brought before me, I shall not be prepared to modify on receiving substantial 
proof that the views advanced are better. (Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 
1897, pp. 1540-1541) 
With this statement, the Home Secretary concluded his opening statement to 
introduce the Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act of 
Queensland (1897 Act). Even with 33 sections, the 1897 Act did not detail the broad 
intention of the law. That is, the 1897 Act was everything but specific or concise. For 
example, the definition of an Aboriginal was circular. In Section 4, it addressed who 
was deemed as an Aboriginal as “an Aboriginal inhabitant of Queensland” or “a half-
caste who, at the commencement of this Act, is living with an Aboriginal as wife, 
husband, or child” or “a half-caste who, otherwise than as wife, husband, or child, 
habitually lives or associates with Aboriginals, shall be deemed to be an Aboriginal 
within the meaning of this Act” (Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of 
Opium Act, 1897). However, the words “aboriginal” and “half-caste” were not clearly 
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defined. This sparked discussions in the Parliamentary Debates and justified future 
amendments. Section 9 introduced the way in which “Aboriginals” should be 
recruited into the designated reservations or protectorates, and removed from their 
current locations, without the “Aboriginals” being properly defined. The first eight 
sections of the 1897 Act described the powers of the Government in the control and 
administration of Australian Aboriginal peoples under the 1897 Act. In Section 12, it 
details at first that “any Aboriginal employed by any trustworthy person to continue to 
be employed by such person, in like manner, may permit any Aboriginal or half-caste 
not previously employed to be employed by a like person”, which made the power of 
employment of the 1897 Act open for interpretation to those responsible for enforcing 
this law.  
Labour was addressed in Sections 12 to 16; Section 27 addressed liquor; 
Sections 19 to 25 addressed opium; and the punitive aspect of the 1897 Act was 
addressed from Section 26 to Section 30. This initial architecture of the 1897 Act 
appeared to address the main types of law in many given nation states, such as penal 
law, civil law, contractual law, and labour law; these types of laws were all addressed 
in the 1897 Act as though the Queensland government was imposing another 
government or autonomous state for a specific group of peoples. The part that would 
function as the constitution of the 1897 Act, which gives the order and the powers of 
the State from the people, was Section 31. Clearly, this “constitution” did not begin 
with the statement “We the people”, because there was no consultation with the 
Australian Aboriginal nations at the time. However, Section 31 gave the power to the 
Governor Council and to the 1897 Act to regulate the following: 
(1) Prescribing the mode of removing aboriginals to a reserve, and from one 
reserve to another;  
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(2) Defining the duties of Protectors and Superintendents, and any other 
persons employed to carry the provisions of this Act into effect;  
(3) Authorising entry upon a reserve by specified persons or classes of persons 
for specified objects, and defining those objects, and the conditions under 
which such, persons may visit or remain upon a reserve, and fixing the 
duration of their stay thereupon, and providing for the revocation of such 
authority in any case;  
(4) Prescribing the mode of distribution and expenditure of moneys granted by 
Parliament for the benefit of aboriginals;  
(5) Apportioning amongst, or for the benefit of, aboriginals or half-castes, 
living on a reserve, the net produce of the labour of such aboriginals or half-
castes;  
(6) Providing for the care, custody, and education of the children of 
aboriginals;  
(7) Providing for the transfer of any half-caste child, being an orphan, or 
deserted by its parents, to an orphanage;  
(8) Prescribing the conditions on which any Aboriginal or half-caste children 
may be apprenticed to, or placed in service with, suitable persons;  
(9) Providing for the mode of supplying to any half-castes, who may be 
declared to be entitled thereto, any rations, blankets, or other necessaries, or 
any medical or other relief or assistance;  
(10) Prescribing the conditions on which the Minister may authorise any half-
caste to reside upon any reserve, and limiting the period of such residence, and 
the mode of dismissing or removing any such half-caste from such reserve;  
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(11) Providing for the control of all aboriginals and half-castes residing upon a 
reserve, and for the inspection of all aboriginals and half-castes, employed 
under the provisions of this Act or the Regulations;  
(12) Maintaining discipline and good order, upon a reserve; 
(13) Imposing the punishment of imprisonment, for any term not exceeding 
three months, upon any Aboriginal or half-caste who is guilty of a breach of 
the Regulations relating to the maintenance of discipline and good order upon 
a reserve;  
(14) Imposing, and authorising a Protector to inflict summary punishment by 
way of imprisonment, not exceeding fourteen days, upon aboriginals or half- 
castes, living upon a reserve or within the District under his charge, who, in 
the judgment of the Protector, are guilty of any crime, serious misconduct, 
neglect of duty, gross insubordination, or wilful breach of the Regulations;  
(15) Prohibiting any Aboriginal rites or customs that, in the opinion of the 
Minister, are injurious to the welfare of aboriginals living upon a reserve;  
(16) Providing for the due carrying out of the provisions of this Act;  
(17) Providing for all other matters and things that may be necessary to give 
effect to this Act. (Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium 
Act, 1897, sec. 31) 
These regulations covered all groups in the aforementioned sections of the 
1897 Act, excluding those sections that focused on opium. One Member of Parliament 
in Queensland interpreted Section 31 as one that could potentially make the other 
sections of the Act inoperable because it gave too much power to the Governor 
Council (Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 1899). Theoretically, all sections of the 
1897 Act could be nullified due to the powers that had been conferred to the Governor 
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Council. Section 31 was the section that the Home Secretary was alluding to when he 
discussed the “1001 matters that must arise” in relation to governing Australian 
Aboriginal lives (Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 1898). In practice, Section 31 
gave a “blank cheque” to the agents responsible for enforcing the 1897 Act, mainly to 
the protectors. Section 31 also provided the outline for the Annual Protectorate 
Reports to the Home Secretary and to Queensland Parliament. It also provided the 
recorded narratives for Aboriginal affairs that would be expressed in later debates, 
discussions, reports, and other manifestations of the implementation of the 1897 Act. 
Section 31 was the core of the 1897 Act because it functioned as the generator of the 
reproductive power of the Act to capture the subject that it spoke of. That is, Section 
31 functioned as the source of the power of the law for all other sections of the 1897 
Act, in the same way that the social contract of a constitution functions as the source 
of the power and command of all laws created in a state.  
 On the other hand, Section 18 did not have consistency with the remainder of 
the sections of the 1897 Act. Section 18 makes the possession of a government-issued 
blanket by a non-Aboriginal illegal. This detailed section mentions: 
Every blanket issued by an officer of the Government to any Aboriginal or 
half-caste shall be and remain the property of Her Majesty, and any person, 
other than an Aboriginal or half-caste, who has in his possession or custody 
any such blanket or portion thereof which shall reasonably appear to the 
justices, from the marks thereupon or otherwise, to have been so issued for the 
use of an Aboriginal or half-caste, shall be guilty of an offence against this 
Act, and shall be liable, on conviction, to a penalty not exceeding ten pounds. 
(Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act, 1897, sec. 
18) 
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Furthermore, blankets are stated in Regulation 9 of Section 31. The Annual 
Reports list the persons convicted to have possession of blankets for Aboriginal 
people. It also reports the distribution of blankets with considerable detail. In the 
Parliamentary Debates, questions were raised about the unjustified portion of the 
budget for the 1897 Act dedicated for blankets and their distribution. The Queensland 
government would spend most of the funding on these blankets, between £2000 and 
almost £9000; this constituted more than half of the funding that accompanied the 
1897 Act, which was approximately £10,000 per year (Annual Report, 1901; 
Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 1899). This total is the equivalent of 
approximately $1 million in current times (Ryden, 2001).  
Given the context of the poor design of the 1897 Act as a policy, it can be 
imagined that the importance given to blankets was just another of the many 
shortcomings of the 1897 Act. Another approach would question who benefited from 
the large quantities of blankets purchased for the “relief of Aboriginals”. Certainly 
there was profit to be made in supplying blankets to the Queensland Government. 
Even if all assumptions were true, the importance of blankets was not proportional to 
these speculative reasons. If the importance of the presence or positivity of blankets 
had no formal logical justification, then it had a non-formal relationship with the 1897 
Act. These blankets are the manifestations of the “hidden foundation” (Foucault, 
1974, p. 134) of the pure function of the mechanism of power in colonisation in 
Queensland, in the same way that the structure of the Panopticon was the 
manifestation of the pure function of power in many prisons. How does a non-linear 
logical relationship between the blankets and the 1897 Act look? A tangible object is 
not related to the intangible 1897 Act; thus, how is the intangibility of the blanket, i.e. 
its function, related to the intangible function of the 1897 Act as a comprehensive law 
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that functioned under the Western formulation of a nation-state without consultation 
with the peoples it governed?  
The 1897 Act as a State without a Nation 
The power of the State lies in the implementation of the law. The law, most of 
the time, is used to force a “peaceful” state on opposing forces (Dworkin, 1998). That 
is, this law is defined by stopping, voluntarily or involuntarily, the opposing force and 
by this opposing force being called “illegal”. For example, legislating the social 
practice of drug use brings the non-use or illegality of drugs into the plane of 
socialisation; through that, it also results in the social practice of drug use becoming 
visible (positive) and administered by the regulations of the state. Previously, drug 
use was not an institutional concern, but now it has become the responsibility of the 
government. Therefore, what is illegal becomes as much part of the law as 
compliance with the law itself because it is the state’s responsibility to manage it. 
Deleuze takes a more emphatic stance on the role of illegalities in law, as follows:  
Law is the management of that which is illegal, some laws that allows, makes 
it possible or creates a privilege for the dominating class, other laws are 
compensations to the dominated class that are tolerated by the dominating 
class, and lastly other laws that restrict, isolates and captures the object it 
speaks of as a mean for domination. (1985, pp. 55-56) 
This research is interested in the latter type of law: the law that “restricts, isolates and 
captures the object it speaks of” (Deleuze, 1985, p. 56). The 1897 Act spoke of the 
conceptualisation of blackness and aboriginality “objects”, and these discursive tools 
captured the subjects that these conceptualisations spoke of. The 1897 Act functioned 
in this way as a means for domination. If this is true, then the question revolves 
around: what are the specific means through which this domination operated? How 
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did this operation function to restrict, isolate, and capture the object it spoke of, and 
the subject that this object speaks of?  
Totalisation 
The first component of the way that the 1897 Act operated is described in the 
elements of the specific matters that the Act regulated and therefore instituted; the 
sum of the areas that the Act controlled such as labour and crime, and later on health 
and education, and a more precise account of the Australian Aboriginal population 
provided the totalisation or configuration of its machinery. In this case, the Blanket 
Approach refers to the phrase used in policy analysis to name a policy that uses a 
simple and discrete approach to solve complex problems. However, if this phrase is 
used to describe the 1897 Act, it would not make sense to analyse the Act given that 
the policy would be regarded as a one-dimensional policy, or even as an error. If this 
is true, it can be thought almost immediately that the logical solution for this mistake 
would be to design a more tailored and complete policy. Then, the new and, by 
definition, evolved policy is deployed to oppose and move away from the former 
policy in order to address the problems that were not resolved. Then, the new policy 
has learned from its own mistakes. If the policy has moved away from the inferior 
version of the Blanket Approach policy, then it can be inferred that it has little to no 
direct relationship with the original policy. However, it would still hold some 
relationship with the instituting policy. The 1897 Act evolved and was amended in 
1899, 1901, 1928, 1934, 1939, 1946, and 1965. The 1897 Act started with nine pages, 
and only one page was dedicated to regulations (Section 31); in the end, it had more 
than 100 pages for the Act itself and more than 200 pages for the regulations. 
Therefore, even if it is accepted that the 1897 Act was a simplistic policy, the 
instituting Act 
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Act. The totality of this Blanket Approach is the first operation in the pure function of 
the 1897 Act: the reference back to the structure of the constituting elements 
expressed in the Act.   
The 1897 Act functioned as a blanket or a totality in four distinct ways. First, 
the 1897 Act aimed to cover or control the location of Australian Aboriginal peoples 
through removals and the institution of reservations controlled by either the 
Queensland government or managed by missions (Reynolds, 1990). The Western 
notion of location meant a capacity to move according to the will of institutions. The 
institutions dictated (and still dictate) ownership, town planning, definitions of 
communities, and where peoples were meant to be throughout the day. However, 
other worldview perspectives do not necessarily share this notion of location (Melia, 
1998; Moreton-Robinson, 2003).  
The first element in the 1897 Act was location and it functioned as an axis 
through which to institutionalise Australian Aboriginal presence or visibility, which 
was defined by specific numbers in specific places, and to make invisible those 
outside the accountability of the Act. Before the Act, the accountability of the 
Australian Aboriginal population depended on estimates informed by the number of 
distributed blankets, employees that were accountable for the records, and those few 
who lived on the periphery of the towns (Kidd, 1997). By 1910, the population 
control depended on the presence of Australian Aboriginal peoples that were under 
the authority of the agents of the 1897 Act, which were primarily the Protectors. In 
Queensland, by the beginning of the 20th century, just a few years after the 
implementation of the 1897 Act, the total number of Australian Aboriginal peoples in 
27 locations (protectorates) was in total 12,724 “natives controlled by each Protector” 
(Annual Reports, 1910). The location and population were closely related to 
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controlling the Australian Aboriginal peoples. The “dying race” rhetoric was fuelled 
by the more accurate figures of the Australian Aboriginal population in the 
protectorates. This rhetoric was not something unseen in past experiences of 
colonisation; for example, in the 16th century, it began to be used as a reason for the 
sudden decline of Aboriginal peoples in parts of the Americas. However, historians 
such as Sued-Badillo (2003) argued that Aboriginal peoples might have been hidden 
so that they could be used as slaves when African slavery was imposed. Other 
Indigenous groups in the Americas (such as the Aztec and other nations around what 
is today Mexico) were institutionally forced to marry Europeans and their Aboriginal 
lineage was “erased”. This is not to say that disease was not widely reported, records 
demonstrate that it was, but it does raise the question of how many of those peoples in 
the history of colonialism escaped or were hidden. This question is not meant to be 
answered in this research; therefore, further research is needed to help illuminate this 
potentially obscured area of history.  
The second element of the totalisation of the 1897 Act was the creation of the 
agents and institutions that would ensure that the Act was enforced. The protagonist 
agent in the Act was the figure of the Protector, who was a police officer with the 
exception of higher management Protectors such as the Northern Protector and then 
the Chief Protector. For example, Walter Roth was a well-published anthropologist 
and he served as the Northern Protector and Chief Protector in the first years of the 
Act (Ellinhaus, 2003). Other agents were also missionaries, teachers, nurses, medical 
doctors, and other relevant government and missionary employees. The Western 
government institutions that were quickly included in the protectorates were the 
police, labour management or human resources, schools, reformatories, and other 
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Western institutional activities such as agriculture, building, domestic chores, and 
more.  
The setting in which the 1897 Act made Australian Aboriginal peoples visible 
had various institutional dimensions. The first dimension of the institutions of the 
protectorates was the penal institutions. This institution was formalised first because 
the Protectors were police officers. The penal institution deployed its power through 
the criminalisation of certain aspects of Australian Aboriginal practices and through 
the restriction of what non-Aboriginal peoples could do, for example, socialising with 
Australian Aboriginal peoples, opium and liquor use, and the possession of blankets 
by non-Aboriginal peoples were regarded as punishable offenses under the 1897 Act. 
All punishable offenses committed by Australian Aboriginal people in the 
protectorates and non-Aboriginal people were reported and classified as such. For 
example, it was recorded if the offenders were non-Aboriginal and usually the race if 
the person was not European or white Australian. It is important to highlight that the 
rest of the penal laws in the colony of Queensland did not apply to Australian 
Aboriginal peoples under the 1897 Act, primarily because they were not considered 
citizens under Australian law.  
The second dimension of the element of institutionalisation was the restriction 
of employment and labour inside and outside the protectorates. A Protector was 
required to approve any employer who wanted to hire any Australian Aboriginal 
person under the 1897 Act. Permits for employment were approved and administered 
by the Protectors under the Act, and the Protectors had the power to agree to the terms 
of employment. In addition, the Australian Aboriginals’ labour wages were not paid 
to the worker, but rather they were sent to the protectorate. The last dimension was 
education, which was formalised later in the 1900s. This dimension came late, but it 
	191
became one of the most influential aspects of the protectorates. The education 
dimension was justified in 1906 by Acting Chief Protector Richard Howard when he 
advised the Parliament that by associating Australian Aboriginal peoples with only 
the “right kind of whites”, they would become more “quickly civilised” (Kidd, 1997).    
These dimensions within the location of institutions operated as control towers 
to impose a specific Western worldview perspective. These institutions were 
prescribed by the Australian Colonial West nation-state, which was enacting a state 
without nation. That is, these institutions formed dimensions that were characteristic 
of the Western notion of state, but this state did not emerge from the nation it 
governed because the Australian nation-state imposed it. In hindsight, this totalisation 
can appear to be pure totalitarianism or imperialism, but to state this is to overlook the 
process that allowed this to occur. Colonisation in the 19th and 20th centuries is 
distinguished in order to prescribe a state that is (often) a product of a democratic 
nation-state. This operation usually involves an explicit imposition or sometimes a 
replacement of all important institutions, and their agents, of a given nation or nations 
(Mann, 2006).   
The third element of the totalisation component of the 1897 Act, following 
location and institutions and its agents, is the restriction and creation of the production 
modes that allowed for the capitalisation of labour. Due to committed historians like 
Kidd (2006), we know that the 1897 Act provided the conditions through which the 
controlled wages of Australian Aboriginal peoples were stolen; wages had to be paid 
to the protectorate and they were kept in trusts and not paid in full to Australian 
Aboriginal peoples under the Act. The 1897 Act restricted the employment of 
Australian Aboriginal peoples, as mentioned earlier, through granting or denying 
permission to work. The 1897 Act also commanded that the protectors would control 
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the wages. These wages were directed to a trust fund. Some of the money was 
available to give Australian Aboriginal peoples “pocket money” from their wages. 
Another portion of the money was used for the operation of the protectorates. The 
regulation and control of the labour and wages in any given mode of production adds 
an important characterisation to the 1897 Act, some of which scholars have suggested 
as a form of slavery, in practice (Kidd, 2007; Lake, 1993; Reynolds, 1990). 
Given the scope of this research, this capitalisation of Australian Aboriginal 
labour has common ground with the capitalisation of slavery in the 16th century and it 
has a close relationship with the conceptualisations of aboriginality and blackness. 
That is, the control of wages and labour, and the explicit intention of the 1897 Act to 
make protectorates sustainable and even profitable (Kidd, 2006) (e.g. Thursday Island 
see Annual Reports 1905) is the enslavement of labour. Aboriginal peoples were no 
longer owned, but the ownership was directed to the pure modes of production61, i.e. 
the productive forces and relations of production were considered property of the 
Queensland government. Instead of blackness representing a direct value and labour 
being the use-value of slavery, the enslavement of Australian Aboriginal labour was 
the capture of the modes of production and the re-signifying of them as pure value. 
This relocation of value and slavery, which was hidden in the processes of control and 
explicit monopolisation of Australian Aboriginal labour, could be possible given the 
previous location of value and use-value in the instauration of slavery in the 
conceptualisation of blackness, and more implicitly in the conceptualisation of 
aboriginality.  
																																																								
61 The modes of production in the Marxist sense are defined by the unity of producing 
necessary aspects of life, which is a step prior to the implementation of an added 
value system (Marx, 2002). 
	193
The fourth and last element of the totalisation component of the 1897 Act is 
the objects surrounding the Act, particularly the objects given as “relief” and then 
listed as part of the “welfare” of Australian Aboriginal peoples. At first, well before 
the 1897 Act, certain items were provided that were interpreted by Australian 
Aboriginal peoples as goods, such as tobacco, tomahawks, blankets, flour, fishhooks, 
liquor, rations, and other “necessary items to obtain food” (Annual Reports, 1900) 
according to the Queensland government. Objects are influential to evolving social 
practices in any given society, and Australian Aboriginal peoples are not an 
exception. This is not to say that objects determined the cultural practices, but that 
social practices occur around objects and they tend become part of everyday life. The 
key example that records register are the blankets because they became so important 
to Australian Aboriginal peoples that when the distribution stopped in 1905, the 
reports recorded that the Australian Aboriginal peoples preferred blankets over any 
other relief items (Annual Reports, 1906). Therefore, objects that link one group of 
peoples with another, and then form a specific relationship between them, are 
influential in the way that the relationship is formed. In the 1897 Act, which alluded to 
a set of objects that were primarily relief items, the objects informed the type of 
relationship between the Queensland government and Australian Aboriginal peoples; 
in this case, it was a relationship in which only Western objects for Western ways of 
living were privileged over others, and this indicates a relationship of domination. In 
general, Australian Aboriginal objects were not mentioned in the materials analysed, 
except for the anthropological reports.  
The initial interpretations of Western objects by Australian Aboriginal peoples 
cannot be fully understood because even the anthropological materials do not aim to 
understand their interpretations. However, the research trend is to focus on objects 
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that have a specific use and effect, e.g. liquor. It is not difficult to see how this liquid 
can be integrated into everyday life, primarily due to its effect. Archaeology uses 
‘objects’ to think about what might have occurred in a certain time through 
unravelling their functions. It is not difficult to imagine how rock paintings inform us 
of the culture of certain civilisations, or how distinct ceramic styles of different 
civilisations across time provides us with different information about that time. In an 
archaeology of colonisation, certain objects might inform us further about how their 
mechanisms functioned and, of particular interest here, how the 1897 Act functioned. 
The object that this research focuses on is the blanket, which was a relief item 
provided prior to the 1897 Act to Australian Aboriginal peoples and then, in the Act, it 
was included explicitly in its language. This object serves as a form of content of how 
the 1897 Act functioned primarily in the space of labour, relief, and welfare. Blankets 
continue to be more consistently referred to in the Annual Reports, and even in the 
Parliamentary Reports, than seemingly more important topics such as crime, opium, 
and tobacco and alcohol consumption. The blankets were provided as an item of relief 
under the 1897 Act, but they had an independent section in the official documents 
such as the Annual Reports and in the law. The importance of blankets could be 
representative of the adverse conditions in Queensland because Australian Aboriginal 
peoples were removed from their lands and relocated to unfamiliar lands. 
Furthermore, the government used the blankets to survey Australian Aboriginal 
peoples, as mentioned previously; thus, they functioned in the accountability of the 
Australian Aboriginal population. It is the argument of this research that these reasons 
(among others) were not proportionate to the importance that the 1897 Act gave to the 
blankets, which were sometimes regarded as useless items. Even in the year after the 
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blankets were replaced by other relief items, the Annual Report (1906) reported the 
following: 
Last year, on the recommendation of Dr. Roth, a change in the distribution 
was made so far as the Northern division of the State was concerned, in that 
tomahawks, knives, pipes, tobacco, print dresses, fishing lines, and fishing 
hooks were substituted to some extent for blankets, as it was thought then that 
these articles would be more acceptable than blankets to the recipients. This 
year, however, the substituted articles were not supplied to the same extent as 
last year, as the distributors reported that, in most cases, the aboriginals 
preferred the blankets. (Annual Reports, 1906, p. 9) 
The reason why Australian Aboriginal peoples preferred the blankets to other items is 
not the objective of this research: what is relevant in this research is the importance of 
this item (the blankets) and what it could be communicating about the 1897 Act. Why 
is this object found to be of such importance when unearthing the 1897 Act machinery 
of colonisation?  
Until this point, it has been discussed that the Blanket Approach of policy 
analysis implies a simplistic policy that attempts to address a complex phenomena or 
problem, which is a form of totalising the problem. However, the way in which a 
given totalisation is delivered through understanding the blankets as a form of 
content, which is described as a Blanket Approach, is very different. The state is no 
longer a kingdom that commands the subject by royal decree in the imperial sense of 
the form of government. Governments serve the delegated will of the “people” 
creating the nation (people)-state (government) formula. The nation-state form of 
governance constitutes the operation of every given state that is derived from that 
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logic or formula. That is, the explicit62 form of governance of the nation-state implies 
a conversation between the nation (people) and its representative, which is the state. 
The state obeys the initial command of the nation expressed in a social contract; this 
is the explicit and current Western formula of government. The 1897 Act functioned 
as a state designed by the nation-state of the colony of Queensland, and by extension 
the Colonial West, that commanded a nation (or a group of nations), but in a similar 
form of a normal state. A standard, or a totality, is designed and encrypted in law, 
enforced by agents and institutions, and delivered individually, just like the blankets. 
The totalisation operation of the Blanket Approach instituted a state without a nation 
with a specific set of areas of law that created legalities and illegalities (Deleuze, 
1985; Dworkin, 1998) that it not only operated as an imperialistic imposition of a 
government (like a kingdom), which is a form of government that has been 
historically proven to be ineffective (Castro-Gómez, 2007), but also in the nation-state 
formula of production of the subject, which is a colonised subject in this case. 
Therefore, as a state, the 1897 Act covers simultaneously a set of nations and each 
individual that is under the Act: thus, how is the operation of totalisation delivered to 
the subjects that the Blanket Approach covers?  
Multiplicity 
By 1899, the registered employment permits for Australian Aboriginal peoples 
under the 1897 Act in Queensland accounted for 303 persons in Normanton, 80 in 
Townsville, 289 in Cooktown, 291 in Thursday Island, 54 in Charter Towers, 75 in 
Mackay, 151 in Coen and Cape Tribulation, and 92 in Cairns (Annual Reports, 1900). 
In 1916, the state of Queensland was divided into 64 protectorates, and the number of 
																																																								
62 It is explicit because scholars including Foucault argue that this is not the modern 
formula of government, but the implicit function of government is best described by 
biopower and biopolitics (Castro-Gómez, 2007; Foucault, 2005).  
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registered employment permits increased to 3853 males and 823 females (Annual 
Reports, 1917). In 1937, 5480 Aboriginal people were in regular employment (3701 
full bloods and 1779 half-castes, as was documented). The year of 1899 reported a 
total of 6126 blankets issued in the three police districts of Townsville, Cairns, and 
Normanton. The blankets were only distributed to “the blacks that were not in regular 
employment” (Annual Reports, 1900). The employment figures and blanket 
distribution assisted the state with the Australian Aboriginal population estimates. The 
population estimates of the Queensland government in 1903 reported Queensland as 
having the second largest Australian Aboriginal population with 25,000 people. New 
South Wales reported the largest population with 30,000 people and Victoria reported 
the smallest figure with 382 people (Annual Reports, 1904). For more than one 
hundred years before the 1897 Act, the population estimates had been being reported 
as problematic by Members of Parliament, commission reports, and other 
documentation of the Queensland government. The main problem was that the 
numbers were “only estimates” (Evans, 2007). From a Western perspective, it makes 
sense that in order to “solve a problem”, in this case the problem of Aboriginal affairs, 
the real number of those who the problem speaks of must be produced. For the first 40 
years, the 1897 Act attempted to construct a complete picture of the Australian 
Aboriginal “problem” through, mainly, using accurate population numbers.  
Multiplicity, which was coined by Riemann (Derbyshire, 2004) and then used 
more broadly by Husserl (2009) and Deleuze (1985), refers to the operation in 
between the total and the one, or its unit. Multiplicity uses numbers as a tool to 
consolidate the operation in which subjectivity is managed in between the spaces of 
totalisation and that of the subject, i.e. how the blanket of colonisation is distributed. 
That is, a given multiplicity is the pathway to providing a given narrative of a subject. 
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It is not the intention of this research to suggest that the numbers and figures pose a 
problem or are oppressive in themselves because they served an important descriptive 
function for what the numbers referred to. What is of interest in this research is the 
capacity of the numbers to simultaneously speak of each unit and of the total, because 
the numbers in themselves mean very little as numbers are aided by a given story or a 
total of stories. The totalisation of the Colonial West draws a picture of what it speaks 
of, the colonised subject, through elucidating a set of figures that tell a set of stories. 
However, these totalising stories have the capacity to reach each unit that the total 
speaks of. At the same time that it can speak of a total of 600 workers in a factory, 
this total speaks of each person through expressing that figure. The underlying story 
or narrative of the workers in the factory is constituted through the identification of 
the total number (600) and, through this, the narrative is distributed to each of the 
workers individually. Furthermore, it is indifferent to the problems of generalisations 
and individualisations given that it does not claim accuracy in deduction or in 
induction forms of reasoning. Therefore, it escapes the empire of the structure and of 
anthropocentrism. Discourses (are a) function to produce subjectivity. Following this 
line, Deleuze states:  
The subject is dialectical, it has the characteristic capacity of ‘being’ in the 
first person experience, from which discourses start, but enunciative 
multiplicity is an anonymous primitive function that only allow the subject to 
live and be in the third person experience and its derived functions. (1985, p. 
41) 
Thus, multiplicity is not only the point in which discourses and subjects meet, but it 
also operates as the modulator of the intentional and non-intentional experiences 
(Deleuze, 1985). In this dynamic state, the subjectivity and the person that meet are 
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referred by and through the number. That is, multiplicity is the point in which the 
totality enters. In the function of the administration of the colonised subject, a given 
story is totalised, yet a second operation is required in order to reach to the subject 
and that is the function of multiplicity: the operation in which a given blanket of 
totalisation is distributed or “handed down”. 
As the 1897 Act continued to operate, it reported more and more figures using 
the set of narratives from the Act; it reported figures of crime, school attendance, 
items of relief, labour and employment, and other topics informed by the 
anthropological discourse or knowledge of the nature of Australian Aboriginal 
peoples. The set group of stories or enunciations provided a productive capacity to 
create more stories that are self-referential to the first stories. These meta-stories 
(stories of stories) create their form from the first stories that were given in the 
provided picture. Multiplicity is a better method of telling the story of a number 
because it refers to the entry and exit points of the subject. The multiplicity of the 
figures of school attendance in the Protector Reports in Queensland in the early 1900s 
tells a different story to the multiplicity of the figures of school performance or the 
figures of the number of schools per population ratio. The multiplicity of the figures 
of removals and relocations tell a different story to that of the figures of property 
owners or available housing in remote and urban areas. This is not to posit that 
multiplicity is limited to a politics of numbers and figures; that is, multiplicity is not 
only the use of numerical data to support an argument. The illustrations of 
multiplicity tell a story that speaks to the nature of the operation of the multiplicities 
as a derived function of the total body of a command expressed, in this case, by a law. 
The productive and effective capacity of multiplicity lies in how the total picture of 
the story is delivered to each of the units of the whole. 
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One year prior to the significant amendment of the 1897 Act in 1939, opium 
was finally removed from the name of the Act, and the Annual Reports detailed the 
following numbers for each protectorate: the hospitalisations and diseases admitted 
for, school attendance, figures of diseases, mortality and fertility rates, marriages 
(including interracial marriages), specific figures of mostly Australian Aboriginal 
crime, vocational training figures, recreation and types of recreation, and the 
population of Australian Aboriginal peoples divided into full bloods and half-castes 
(Kidd, 1997). These figures and their accompanying narratives accounted for the 
18,024 Australian Aboriginal peoples in the state of Queensland located in 
government settlements, church missions, the Torres Strait Islands, and country 
districts; the 1897 Act spoke of this total and therefore of each unit that comprised the 
aforementioned number. Therefore, the 1938 report illustrates the full deployment of 
the narrative of the 1897 Act as told through the language of numbers (Annual 
Reports, 1939)63.  
The operation of multiplicity is not only concerned with explicit numbers, but 
also with the figure of the number, which illustrates the operation of multiplicity 
when it delivered the 1897 Act totalisation. The operation of the delivery of the 
totalisation of the 1897 Act was in-function of the derived function of the dispersion 
of subjectivity. This dispersion slowly but steadily fed back to the framework that the 
1897 Act designed, which created a more complex picture and additional elements for 
its operation. The function or equation always presents more variables and 
considerations, but it is determined by the root function of a multiplicity of the 1897 
Act. The 1897 Act multiplicity function of diseases operates individually through 
producing the question and the narrative within diseases in subjectivity to Australian 																																																								
63 See examples of the 1939 Annual Report, specifically the various tables with 
different topics in the 23-page report and pages 3, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 14, and 16-20.  
	201
Aboriginal peoples and not from them. Concretely, every person could be potentially 
subjected by the operation of this multiplicity regardless whether the answer of the 
question of disease is positive or negative. The multiplicity of a report on venereal 
diseases imposes a specific narrative or totalisation on the reports of the numbers of 
people suffering from them and those who are not. The function of the operation has 
been already or a priori deployed before the numbers were provided. Multiplicity can 
be seen being distributed in the same way as blankets were distributed individually. 
However, the distribution of such individual blankets of multiplicity is not sufficient 
to have a real effect at the micro-level of people. In order to appreciate the way that 
the command of the 1897 Act affected people, the question of power must be asked. 
How did the Blanket Approach that totalised and distributed blankets of multiplicity 
in the 1897 Act operate individually? What energised this operation to continue 
enabling the 1897 Act machine to function?  
Creation of desire 
In 1900, the second year of the operation of the 1897 Act, Dr Walter E. Roth, 
then the Northern Protector of Aboriginals in Queensland, stated in the Annual Report 
of that year: 
Personally, I might be allowed to take the opportunity of expressing the 
opinion that this annual gift of blankets to aboriginals is in many cases a 
misplaced charity, that its promiscuous grant should not be looked upon as a 
matter of right, but regarded rather in the light of a medical adjunct and 
comfort for the aged, the young, and the sick. I am accordingly impressing 
upon local protectors of the more outlying districts the expediency of 
discouraging able-bodied aboriginals not yet accustomed to them from 
applying “to the Government” these articles. Of course, at the present time 
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blankets are distributed only to such blacks as are not in regular employment; 
and I certainly would not recommend any stoppage of the supply to those who 
have thus become regularly used to them. I recognise, furthermore that the 
promiscuous gift of blankets in past years has tended to the utter desuetude of 
the native-made opossum-skin and bark-cloth rugs…up in the Coen and Cape, 
districts of the Peninsula, it is of interest to note the concurrence of view of 
Sub-Inspector Garraway, the local protector, with that of Sergeant 
Whiteford… “The blacks up here would be nearly as well off without a 
blanket as with one; in fact, in most cases now, the blacks who do receive 
blankets either throw them away or get rid of them before they have had them 
a month.” (Annual Reports, 1901, p. 18) 
This was the first reported argument against the distribution of blankets by the 
Northern Protector, Dr Roth. His recommendation was implemented in 1905 (the year 
that he was removed from the role) and as stated in an earlier quote: “the distributors 
reported that, in most cases, the aboriginals preferred the blankets” (Annual Reports, 
1906, p. 9).  
In order to understand the form of content of the Blanket Approach, the 
functioning of the object it refers to must be described in the context of the historicity 
of the 1897 Act. Blankets were part of the relief items of the 1897 Act, yet for decades 
before that Queensland and other colonies in Australia distributed blankets to 
Australian Aboriginal peoples (Evans, 2007). Under the 1897 Act, blankets were the 
most important relief item reported. A large part of the budget of this Act was 
allocated to the purchase of blankets that fluctuated between 6,000 and 10,000 
blankets per year. A whole section of the Annual Reports was dedicated to the 
distribution of blankets and the report of unlawful possession of this relief item. To 
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think about blankets is to understand them as objects that cover the individual bodies 
of people and protect them from multiple effects. Blankets protect, cover, hide, 
enclose, and touch people. If a person does not have a blanket, they have to bear the 
cold; when a person has a blanket, they are protected. However, once a person is 
protected, their tolerance to the outside is reduced. This can be understood by the 
maxim of “the more you use it, the more you want it”. In the context of the 1897 Act, 
blankets were objects that were present everywhere and eventually became desired, as 
reported and mentioned previously, by Australian Aboriginal peoples.  
The creation of desire for the blanket object illustrates the final mechanism of 
the operation of the 1897 Act. Walter Roth was right to not see any practical reason to 
continue to invest a large part of the budget (between £2,000 and £9,000 per year) on 
the distribution of blankets. Although the weather conditions in Queensland could 
have required Australian Aboriginal peoples at times to consider the use of blankets, 
this reasoning can be easily defeated when considering the long history of Australian 
Aboriginal civilisation. At times, the Chief Protector and the Members of Parliament 
reported that funding was required for reaching certain areas to implement the 1897 
Act and the cost effectiveness of the distribution of blankets was questioned (see 
Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 1899). Other than budget and policy ineptitude 
reasons from the Queensland government, other factors must have had a role in the 
importance of blankets. A modern capitalist strategy to make a product attractive is to 
create a need for it, assuming that there was no apparent use for it. Sometimes, the 
sole presence of the item eventually naturalises it into everyday life; once that occurs, 
its absence will be noted. The noticing of the absence is not only activated as a result 
of its everyday use or due to its pure function, but it is also activated as a result of the 
added value of the imagined sense of need. The imagined sense of need is desire. 
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Leaving the psychoanalytical debate aside, desire is something that is not fully located 
in the realm of the real: desire can be regarded as the driving force to and for the real 
produced in the imaginary realm and signified by the realm of the symbolic (Lacan, 
1977). That is, objects can produce an added sense of value that is not ruled by its 
pure function but rather it is influenced by a sense of desire. The blanket distribution 
stopped being reported after 1917, but the instituted function illustrated by this relief 
item was a manifestation of the final function of the operation of the 1897 Act, i.e. the 
creation of desire.  
The Blanket Approach operation of the 1897 Act had the final function of 
creating the desire for the blankets of a totalising Westernisation, delivered via 
multiplicity and developing a relationship with these blankets. The notion of desire in 
this research is conceptualised closer to the Foucauldian notion of power (Deleuze, 
1985) because the psychoanalytical perspective of desire drives an individualistic 
focus, and this research attempts to resist the anthropological discourse dimension of 
colonisation. If Foucault stated that “power produced reality” (2007), then in the same 
gesture, Deleuze would state, “desire produces reality” (1985). In that sense, Deleuze 
(1995) equated Foucault’s notion of power with his notion of desire. In an interview, 
Deleuze narrates a conversation with Foucault: 
The last time we saw each other he respectfully said that he couldn’t stand the 
word ‘desire’… He said something along the lines of, ‘I can’t avoid it thinking 
it means repression or something that has been repressed, perhaps that what I 
call desire you would call pleasure’. (Deleuze, 1995, p. 23) 
However, for Deleuze, desire would mean not only the product of absence or 
lack of something, but the relationship between people and a given subjectivity or a 
given multiplicity. This understanding of desire highlights the tension, which 
	205
transcends simple violence (Deleuze, 1985), between the institution of totalisation, the 
multiplicity, and the person. Its contact point is not in the positivity of power, but on 
the specificity of the imagined subject (or what Deleuze (1995) refers to as a body 
without organs). This process operates subjectively on each person, but in a more or 
less copied function of a given multiplicity that refers back to an instituted 
totalisation. This operation can almost be represented as a mathematical expression or 
an algorithm. Totalisation can be regarded as the mathematical laws or their 
assumptions, the multiplicity the operation that performs the function of a given unit, 
and lastly the creation of desire is the reproductive capacity of creating a given result 
in a serial way, given a set of specific variables and/or values. The creation of the 
desire operation speaks to the reproductive capacity of the 1897 Act in the micro-level 
arena of peoples to produce a serialisation of identifications or identities. 
MacCorquodale (1987) analysed 700 pieces of legislation across Australia in 
which he identified “no less than 67 identifiable classifications, descriptions, or 
definitions” (p. 9) of Australian Aboriginal peoples. In his research, he found no clear 
consistency with the assumption that these definitions were based on the biological 
notion of race. He states, “Australian legislation was predicated on the basis of white 
superiority, and white fear. Both ‘blood’ and economic factors predicated a statutory 
relegation of non-Caucasoids” (MacCorquodale, 1987, p. 24). Taking aside the 
biological racial debate, which is not the focus of this referred article either, these 
definitions predicate the possible combinations of the understanding of Australian 
Aboriginal peoples and it even suggests that it determines the content of the broad 
meaning of “race”. One of the pieces of legislation analysed by MacCorquodale is the 
1897 Act, and particularly the definition provided in that law, which was described in 
Section 4. This definition was the focus of discussion in the Parliamentary Debates in 
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all years when the 1897 Act underwent changes (see for instance Queensland 
Parliamentary Debates from 1899, 1903, and 1909). As MacCorquodale found, the 
debates focus revolved around whiteness, economics, morals, inferiority, and 
sometimes Members of Parliament cited international experiences such as that with 
Maoris in New Zealand, Native Americans in the United States, and the colonial 
experience in India.  
The imposed Western definitions of Australian Aboriginal peoples do not 
determine the identity of every single person. Rather, they are the product of the 
reproductive capacity of the Colonial West conceptualisation of aboriginality and 
blackness. That is, the conceptualisation of aboriginality and blackness co-created the 
means through which the Colonial West drew the picture of the machine of the 1897 
Act, because it was the colonial space of this discursive formation. The function of the 
creation of desire constituted the reproductive capacity of the Act. That is, the creation 
of desire is the function that serialises the content of the 1897 Act. It combines the 
serialising root of the function of a monstrous anthropology, blackness, slavery, the 
hierarchy of social Darwinism, and other specific historicity elements to the subject in 
question. The function is the command, the machine of colonisation, which is 
embodied in this context as the 1897 Act. This imposed relationship, which is 
instituted by a given totalisation and delivered in a given multiplicity, creates the by-
product of a given imagined subject. In turn, this creates the desire that will be the 
void and drive of colonisation at large, which manifested in the subjugation of the 
colonised. As in the case of the blankets, there was no rational argument to justify the 
preference for them. However, eventually, the imposed object became desired 
because the creation of desire was instituted when the given relationship was 
established. The same as the Foucauldian notion of power relationships, desire is 
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relational and its violence is only a manifestation of the power relationship. The 
manifestation of the power or the process of the creation of desire it is not only 
expressed in brute force, but also in the case of the 1897 Act it is manifested in the 
disproportionate presence of the individual “blankets” of colonisation, forcing the 
subject to establish a relationship with it. The function of the creation of desire is the 
forced relationship with a subjectivity that is manifested in a created definition of 
identity that modulates, either positively or negatively, the subject it speaks of.  
When Foucault argued that panopticism was the way that that power functions 
in the operation of “seeing without being seen”, his illustration of Bentham’s 
Panopticon could not be more precise (Foucault, 1976). Furthermore, this 
architectural design was (and remains) frequently present in the institutions through 
which power was evidently deployed in a panoptical operation. This research is far 
from claiming such ingenuity and preciseness as it cannot claim the readily 
availability of the physical structures in the aforementioned institutions of power like 
panopticism in schools, prisons, factories, etc. The non-discursive way in which the 
1897 Act functioned cannot claim that it will physically have blankets in some of its 
institutions of power; therefore, the Blanket Approach operation today must be 
thought within a referent that does not refer to the physical but on, sometimes, the 
expression of a Blanket Approach. Non-discursive power, such as the Panopticon, is 
defined by its pure functions: panoptical power can exist without the physical 
structure. For example, a panoptical managerial power can exist through the 
management having the capacity to monitor every staff member’s computer in an 
office. In this research, to state that the 1897 Act operated as a Blanket Approach does 
not refer to the policy analysis phrase that expresses the simplicity of a law, nor does 
it refer to the physical blankets distributed by the Queensland government for close to 
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100 years. Instead, it refers to a wordplay that highlights the triple function of the 
1897 Act of totalisation, of multiplicity, and of the creation of desire. That is, it refers 
to the pure function of a blanket as a total, as its potential productive capacity of being 
distributed individually and its potential reproductive capacity of being imposed. In 
this sense, a Blanket Approach finds its functional manifestation, at times, in the 
functional analysis of policy as being a totalising law that addresses a complex 
situation in the same way as the architectural manifestation of the Panopticon is found 
in the buildings of institutions that harbour and use Panoptical power, such as schools, 
factories, and prisons. 
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Part 4: Towards a Conclusion  
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Chapter VI  
Blue-and-White Spode China: A Conceptualist Movement 
 
Figure 7 Danie Mellor's Bayi Minyjirral (2013)64 
In the last three chapters, the artefacts of colonisation have been unearthed 
from their global origins and their local command. Though this inquiry has been 
limited to the global formation of the conceptualising tools of aboriginality and 
blackness, and the administrative function of the Aboriginals Protection and 
Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act of 1897 in Queensland (1897 Act), this 
archaeology of colonisation has critically investigated this form of government to see 
it and talk about it in different ways. First, the formation of the conceptualisation of 
aboriginality occurred within a frame of aesthetics and not as part of a social 																																																								
64 Images from Danie Mellor’s art were retrieved from his website: 
http://daniemellor.com/.  
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Darwinist hierarchy; specifically, aboriginality was formed in a frame of monstrous 
aesthetics. This implies that its constituting rules of formation or processes are framed 
addressing an anthropocentric monstrosity and they were not formed originally 
addressing the social Darwinist perspective of an inequality of races. Second, the 
formation of the conceptualisation of blackness was not initially tied to slavery alone, 
because blackness and slavery were not initially interchangeable, and blackness was 
historically formed using aboriginality as a referent because it was tied historically 
through inheriting slavery from the Aboriginal peoples of the Americas. Third, both 
of these conceptualisations were used interchangeably in the command of 
colonisation in Queensland, Australia, through the 1897 Act; yet the administrative 
function of this Act used the form of content described here as the Blanket Approach. 
In sum the operationalisation of the governmental artefact of colonisation is 
constituted, at least, by the description of the global conceptualisations of blackness 
and aboriginality, and the local administrative function of the 1897 Act described in 
the form of content of the Blanket Approach.   
This chapter aims to propose how the integration of the global with the local 
can be considered in future research on colonisation. The proposed integration of the 
conceptualisations that provide colonisation with the content to depict the colonised 
and the manner in which the colonised will be drawn in a given administrative 
movement is framed in a technology of power (Foucault, 1990) or the form of power 
of the conceptualist movement. The specific form of power described here is framed 
initially via aesthetics and unearthed through an archaeology of colonisation. The 
theorisation of this form of power as a conceptualist movement falls outside the scope 
of the archaeological method, and I have drawn on another aesthetic response to 
colonisation: the blue-and-white Spode china technique that Aboriginal artist Danie 
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Mellor uses to paint the colonial transformations of the landscapes of histories in 
Australia. In this theorisation, as in Mellor’s art, colonial transformations of people 
and landscapes are explained in the context of the form of government of 
colonisation. The aesthetic framework, within which the formation of the subjectivity 
of the colonised has been modulated, highlights the way in which a form of power, 
like the conceptualist movement, can operate through using conceptual content and 
movement simultaneously to govern the colonised.  
The conceptualist movement refers here to a type of technology (in the 
Foucauldian sense of technologies of power) or form of power that uses aesthetically 
constructed conceptualisations, such as blackness and aboriginality with their attached 
sets of processes – to help administer the colonised. A “movement” is similar to the 
administrative function or the pure function described as the Blanket Approach. 
Agamben’s (2005) notion of movement is related to the administrative capacity of a 
government to shape the subject it governs. Agamben distinguishes between the two 
notions of movement previously described in Schmitt (1933). The first notion is the 
well-known concept of political movement: “the decisive political concept when the 
democratic concept of the people, as a political body, is in demise. Democracy ends 
when movements emerge. Substantially there are no democratic movements” 
(Agamben, 2005, para. 9). The second notion relates to the “unpolitical sphere of the 
administration” (Agamben, 2005, para. 9), where the unpolitical or non-political 
character of people becomes described as a population and its biopolitical character 
becomes the configuration of such movement. “The people is now turned from 
constitutive political body into population: a demographical biological entity, and as 
such unpolitical. An entity to protect, to nurture.” (Agamben, 2005, para. 7) Then, in 
order to justify the rethinking of the concept of movement, Agamben (2005) adds “if 
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we think about the intrinsic politicisation of the biopolitical, which is already 
thoroughly political and needs not be politicised through the movement, then we have 
to rethink the notion of the movement too” (para. 7). The conceptualist movement 
draws from the non-political administrative dimension of movement to identify the 
object of the pure governance function of the of the state, and this administrative 
function is simultaneously framed in the aesthetic construction of conceptualised 
populations of people. With colonisation in mind, conceptualist here refers to the 
aesthetic construction of imageries that interact with and come to represent the 
subjectivity of the colonised in the minds and gaze of colonial agents. Furthermore, as 
Groys (2011) noted: 
Every act of aestheticization has its author. We always can and should ask the 
questions: who aestheticizes- and to what purpose? The aesthetic field is not a 
space of peaceful contemplation- but a battlefield on which gazes clash and 
fight… this suggests the subjugation of life under a certain form.  (para. 16)  
The colonial conceptualist battlefield is constituted by the techno-political operation 
of colonisation, that is, the administrative movement to subjugate the colonised. 
Together, and simultaneously, the conceptualist movement becomes a form of power 
that aids the form of government of colonisation. 
This chapter does not aim to explain the operation of the form of power of the 
conceptualist movement, as Foucauldian archaeology only maps the historicity of the 
origin and the command; it is not equipped to draw conclusions that would follow a 
formal logic or a linear cause and effect rationale. Furthermore, Foucault reached an 
explanation of the technology of the self within pastoral power (similar to what is 
theorised here as the conceptualist movement), after 25 years of research, and through 
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using the methodological tool of genealogy65. A technology or form of power like the 
conceptualist movement could be best investigated using Foucauldian genealogy. 
However, when unearthing and analysing the colonisation artefact, the mechanism 
that operates closest to the colonised cannot be ignored; therefore, this chapter begins 
to describe the technology of colonisation utilising a frame of analysis informed by 
the discourse of aesthetics and its administrative function, without claiming this initial 
description as a fully formed analysis.  
Blue-and-White Spode China 
In this part, it is argued that the blue-and-white Spode china (blue-china) 
technique illustrates a conceptualist movement and how the integration of the first 
part of the conceptualisation of colonisation in the 15th and 16th centuries using the 
19th and 20th centuries Blanket Approach mechanism can appear. Similar to 
Foucault’s analytical pathway in his archaeological inquiry into Western knowledge, 
where he demonstrates through Diego Velázquez’s Las Meninas how knowledge 
operated in the classical episteme through pure representation and an inability to gaze 
back into a knowing subject, the blue-china technique in Danie Mellor’s works 
demonstrates the twofold operation of colonisation and its incommensurable 
relationship with the “real”; in other words, Mellor’s blue-china technique is an 
aesthetic manifestation that exemplifies this form of power.  
The blue-china technique illustrates the conceptualist movement that uses the 
global colonial history of the materials used to create blue pigments to paint the 
																																																								
65 In Technologies of the Self (1990), Foucault states: 
My objective for more than twenty-five years has been to sketch out a history 
of the different ways in our culture that humans develop knowledge about 
themselves: economics, biology, psychiatry, medicine, and penology. The 
main point is not to accept this knowledge at face value but to analyse these 
so-called sciences as vert specific “truth games” related to specific techniques 
that human beings use to understand themselves. (p. 46) 
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history of the specific colonised territories in question in a given specific movement. 
Danie Mellor’s work paints landscapes of the places and events (imagined or real) in 
Australian history using the blue-china technique; see for example Figure 7 above. 
The complicit colonial history of blue was manufactured in a similar manner to that of 
how Western aboriginality and blackness was manufactured as a conceptualisation to 
transform the landscapes of history in a totalising and individualising process. In this 
sense, the transformation of the landscapes of the blue-china technique is similar to 
the Blanket Approach in delivering notions of colonisation. It can be said that, 
similarly, the conceptualist movement of colonisation drew and continues to draw the 
landscapes and subjectivities of the colonised.  
In order to describe how Mellor’s blue-china technique is similar to the 
conceptualist movement operation, this part describes the content used for 
conceptualising colonisation, which is the colour blue, and the movement for the 
administration of colonisation, which is depicted in the transformation of the 
landscapes. Blue represents a marker in colonial history that had the function to depict 
frames of exotic images in porcelain objects such as dinnerware. Furthermore, blue 
paint was a rare colour until the 18th century when it was first accidentally 
manufactured synthetically66. The second element of the blue-china technique, i.e. the 
transformation the landscapes, indicates a topological understanding of the 
conceptualisation of colonisation as a cartography of the shared history of the 
Colonial West and the original inhabitants of Australia. Mellor’s blue-china technique 
beautifully mimics the dinnerware porcelain that transformed the British Empire’s 
colonial endeavours into fine dining or collectable objects to be purchased or 
“consumed”. However, rather than capturing Oriental portraits and landscapes, 																																																								
66 Through his research, Mellor (UQ Art Museum, 2014) found that there was no 
word that meant the colour blue in Aboriginal languages prior to colonisation. 
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Mellor’s blue-china technique captures the Colonial West’s mind to be observed by 
the viewer. The blue-china technique maps the Colonial West transformation of the 
landscapes, but it also maps the Colonial West’s perspective or worldview. In that 
sense, the object to be gazed upon or to be the focus of the study is not Australian 
Aboriginal peoples, but the mindset of the Colonial West.  
The “real” aspects in Mellor’s work are painted in their distinctive colours to 
demonstrate that the blue-china cannot “talk about them”. Mellor states that the “real” 
existed tens of thousands of years before the arrival of the Colonial West and that it 
has a different and, perhaps, almost unreachable history and worldview. Although 
Mellor explicitly acknowledges that he is an artist and not an activist, he does state 
that his work is profoundly political (UQ Art Museum, 2014). The relationship 
between the blue-china technique and the “real” representations of the original 
inhabitants of Australia is shared, but with an inherent dissonance. This difference 
indicates the asymmetry of worldviews: one populates the surroundings of the 
paintings and the other exists surrounded by the blue-china but unattainable by it. In 
Memento mori (Figure 8), one of Mellor’s more explicitly theoretical paintings, the 
dead body of an Australian Aboriginal person is under a blanket painted using the 
blue-china, while the “real” is observed in the periphery of the painting that depicts 
the classic Western way to lecture and demonstrate medical and anatomical research. 
This painting, which has been carefully crafted and represented, illustrates that the 
ideas conceptualised by the Colonial West were distinctively from and for the 
Colonial West and cannot encompass the “real”. Furthermore, it suggests that the 
rituals and the history of the knowledge, cultural customs, techniques, paradigms, and 
mental schemas of the Colonial West have not been conceptualised as the subjects of 
colonisation have been conceptualised. The blue-china technique is an attempt to map 
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the conceptualisation of the Colonial West in order to have it become the subject of 
which it speaks. Because blue has particular significance in the Colonial West, the 
history of this colour must be briefly discussed. 
 
Figure 8 Danie Mellor's Memento mori (2009) 
The blue-china technique is predicated by the colonial conceptualisation of 
blue as a colour that is difficult to find, and that is historically synthetised by Colonial 
West knowledges. Blue takes a protagonist role in Western culture, whereas in other 
histories that was not the case. Mellor (UQ Art Museum, 2014) states: 
I haven’t been able to find an Aboriginal language word for the colour blue. 
It’s almost like blue was not conceptualised, it was recognised through words 
for sky, for instance, or water. So it’s almost like the transformed landscape 
talks about that which was brought with Western culture – in a way talking 
about the symbolically manufactured, or the ‘change forever’. (p. 8) 
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Chinese blue porcelain is regarded as a classic representation of Chinese 
culture that began in the 10th century with the Yang dynasty (Zhu & Shao, 2009). In 
contrast, blue in Western culture has always been manufactured. For blue porcelain, 
this colour was obtained from cobalt blue. However, there are few naturally occurring 
materials that can provide blue pigments. The first source of blue in Western culture 
was lapis lazuli, which was only found in the north-eastern region of Afghanistan, in 
Badakhsan (Kiser, 2014). It has been used since the 4th millennia in Mesopotamian 
cultures (Kiser, 2014); however, the first time that it was used in its ultramarine 
colour (a vivid and intense shade of blue, which is the preferred shade of blue) in 
Western culture was in paintings from the 12th century. In order to produce the 
ultramarine colour, lapis lazuli could not simply be crushed but had to be extracted 
using specific chemical ingredients. Given that there was only one source of lapis 
lazuli, it was very difficult to find and only a few paintings could use it. The most 
common material for creating this shade of blue was ultramarine ash, but it had a 
lower quality of lapis lazuli (Kiser, 2014). The first time that blue was synthetised in 
an alchemy laboratory was in 1709 when Diesbash accidentally created a blue 
pigment (Kiser, 2014); the chemical compound was a mixture of potassium and iron 
sulphides. This synthetised blue pigment, which became known as Prussian blue, was 
the first time a blue pigment had been manufactured in large quantities. Prior to this, 
lapis lazuli had been very difficult to find and therefore blue was an exclusive colour 
that symbolised wealth and beauty.  
The history of blue in Western culture is very long and interesting, but other 
civilisations also conceptualised blue, such as the Chinese civilisation in their 
porcelain. Given that the Chinese culture had blue and white porcelain that Western 
culture considered beautiful, particularly in the British Colonial West Empire, it was 
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targeted and acquired as a valuable exotic object. Later, blue and white porcelain was 
manufactured in other places, including Britain, and was used in teacups, decorative 
plates, and dinnerware sets. The images portrayed in the blue and white transfers 
communicated a “global language” of colonial conquest (UQ Art Museum, 2014). 
Portraits of exotic images from the Orient were embedded in the dinnerware from 
which meals were eaten: it can be said that the Oriental culture was “literally eaten” 
(UQ Art Museum, 2014). This was an analogous way of experiencing exotic cultures, 
albeit from afar. Mellor states, “blue and white talks about the idea of the exotic 
space” (UQ Art Museum, 2014, p. 9); in this case, blue represents the Colonial West’s 
synthetic manufacturing of the colonised cultures.  
A second element of the blue-china technique is the way it transforms 
landscapes. This refers to the use of blue to draw a map of history, in opposition to 
portraying factual historical events; it refers to a totality of the vignette as opposed to 
the “real”. This can be seen in Mellor’s paintings using the blue-china technique, 
which Martin-Chew (10 August 2014) described as follows: 
As an artist he brings together an unusual, innovative hybridization - not 
unlike the way Australia has been formed. Yet unlike many artists who draw 
on their Aboriginality as subject, his images also echo colonial histories and 
European antecedents. (para. 1) 
The transformation of landscapes via the blue-china technique aims to map the 
worldview of the Colonial West history for the “real” and other spectators’ enjoyment 
as it is captured by our gaze upon it, as the Colonial West “looked” at the colonised 
since the beginning of the global colonial experience. The blue-china technique that 
encapsulated colonial imagery for the enjoyment of the Colonial West is similar to the 
way that the Colonial West encapsulated the image of the colonised through modern 
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sciences and interpretative history. The Colonial West captured the idea of 
aboriginality, of blackness, and of history, as well as many other ideas, and 
transformed them into familiar landscapes. The landscapes that Mellor paints speak to 
a cultural interaction between the Colonial West and Aboriginal culture in Australia. 
This interaction is not a balanced coexistence: it favours the blue-china that surrounds 
the real. 
However, agency survives in two ways: first, the real is ever present and not 
captured by the blue-china or the frame at times and, second, the gaze of the real and 
of the spectator is being directed to look at the intricate landscape of colonisation. 
This mapping of colonisation seduces the spectator to closely examine the intricate 
web and to be confronted by the convolution of the history of coloniality (Grosfoguel, 
2008b; Mignolo, 1996; Quijano, 1992) given that the transformation that this map 
describes appears to be imposed. The subject of Mellor’s paintings is the blue-china 
technique itself and, by extension, the subject of the paintings is the Colonial West. 
That is, the transformation of the landscapes is a cartography of the Colonial West 
worldview to be engaged with, to be understood, to be known, and, through that, to be 
captured, and perhaps conquered.  
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Figure 9 Danie Mellor's A man in high degree (2011) 
The blue-china technique demonstrates how the content of the synthetisation 
of blue, representing colonial conceptualisations, is used to transform, map, and 
capture the landscape of the history of the mind of the Colonial West in Australia. In a 
similar movement to the blue pigment, the conceptualisation (or manufacture) of 
Western aboriginality and blackness provides the content for the delivery of 
colonisation. Similar to the blue-china technique, the Blanket Approach provides a 
defined mind and historical landscape delivered simultaneously at a macro level and 
at a micro level. In this sense, space is re-understood as individual (in the mind) and 
simultaneously collective (historical), like a single drop of water that reflects and 
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contains an image of the skies. With the blue-china technique in mind, the two-fold 
process of colonisation is constituted by a non-linear relationship between the 
Western conceptualisation of aboriginality and of blackness, and the pure function of 
colonisation described by the Blanket Approach. That is, the twofold process of the 
colonisation machine finds its form in the correlation between the conceptualisation 
and the function, and this is integrated into the operation as a whole of a conceptualist 
movement.  
A Conceptualist Movement 
Mellor’s blue-china technique aesthetically reflects the discursive or 
conceptualist element of colonisation alongside its non-discursive or functional 
movement; in its operation, it carries the global historicity of colonisation and the 
local historicity that determines the manner in which it moves to create the conditions 
of possibility for the subjectivity of the colonised. Together, in a conceptualist 
movement, colonisation is aided not only through operating within the social 
Darwinism functional hierarchy or through only certain global conceptualisations of 
blackness and aboriginality predicated by the single machinery of colonisation (for 
example, the World/System or the International Division of Labour), but it is also 
operated through both simultaneously.  
The administrative movement of Western culture shaped not only the subjects 
it wanted to “make live”, but also the subjects it wanted to “let die” (Foucault in 
Castro Gómez, 2007); the biopolitical movement not only governed colonisers but it 
also governed and dominated the colonised. That is, the conceptualist movement can 
be thought as the operation in which a colonised subject was conceptualised and 
administered in the biopolitical sense of government. Its local dimension in the 
context of Queensland, Australia, took the form of the Blanket Approach, and its 
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global dimension was entangled with, at least, the conceptualisations of aboriginality 
and blackness, forged in the origins of colonisation. The blue-china technique allows 
us to “see” the conceptualist movement from a gaze that positions the viewer below 
the blanket of Westernisation; the conceptual colonial content, represented by blue, is 
historically threaded in colonising “patterns”.   
Biopolitics is the notion that Foucault elaborated in order to explicate the 
governmental turn that the State took, sometime after the 16th century, from “letting 
live the desired subjects of the Kingdom and killing the undesired subjects to making 
live the desired subjects that serve the State and letting die the undesired subjects” 
(Castro-Gómez, 2007, p. 158, emphasis added). The conceptualist movement is 
located in the space of a biopolitical government where there is an administrative 
function of letting the undesired subjects die. Colonisation is often regarded solely as 
a form of domination and control; however, it is less often conceptualised as a form of 
government. Similarly, the biopolitical form of government is often theorised 
focussing on the ways that the State “makes live” its desired subjects, for example 
through regulating population health, births, deaths, mental health, and all other 
institutional governmental practices that subject individuals to a productive lifestyle 
according to the State (Foucault, 2005). The form of government that “lets die” the 
undesired subjects is often less theorised; however, colonisation through the 
conceptualist movement is a method that aids the operation of governing the 
undesired subjects, i.e. the colonised, that does not make these subjects live but rather 
has detrimental effects in their lives using similar indicators that biopolitics uses to 
make subjects live, i.e. health, births, deaths, education, employment, etc. Foucault 
did not theorise about colonisation because it was not the focus of his works (Castro-
Gómez, 2007), yet the operationalisation of colonisation constituted by the racial 
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discursive devices, i.e. conceptualisations of aboriginality and of blackness, and the 
administrative movement applied to the colonised have a close relationship to the 
biopolitical nature of Western forms of government.  
Colonisation is located in the biopolitical space of Western government that 
lets the colonised die using the twofold operation of the conceptualising movement: 
the colonised are not only subjected to the technology of the self or pastoral power 
(Foucault, 1990) but also to the form of power described as the conceptualist 
movement. Differing to the modulation of subjectivity deployed from a technology of 
the self, which is essentially inflicted through discourses making the subject talk 
through verbalisations67 (Deleuze 1985; Foucault, 1990), the conceptualist movement 
discursively projects a set of narratives, which are heavily reliant on appearances that 
are constituted by its colonial historicity. The conceptualisations of aboriginality and 
of blackness are imageries that locate the processes of the narratives of the subject it 
speaks of; these imageries become the colonisation set of “colours” in which its 
subjectivity is framed. The administrative movement predicates the direction and the 
pattern that the conceptualisation uses to “paint” subjectivity. The pure function of the 
way the colonised subjectivity is administered, and using any given conceptualisation, 
is determined through the interests of the State. Hierarchal rationales, such as social 
Darwinism and the discourse of anthropology at large, operate to configure the 
operation of the State’s government and not the other way in which, for example, 
racism is regarded to arise from people’s judgement. That is, the administrative 
movement of the discourse of anthropology pre-exists, i.e. it is a priori, embedded in 
																																																								
67 Foucault (1990) states when describing the technology of the self of pastoral power: 
“Throughout Christianity there is a correlation between disclosure of the self, 
dramatic or verbalised, and the renunciation of the self. My hypothesis from looking 
at these two techniques is that it’s the second one, verbalization, which becomes 
important.” (p. 49) 
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the social institutional functions that create the conditions in which certain job 
positions, e.g. academic job positions, are for one part of the population and not 
others.  
Moreover, the conceptualist part of the conceptualist movement is not 
constituted by a simple definition but rather a set of processes that coalesce a 
determined set of definitions of, in this case, aboriginality and/or blackness. Rather 
than provide specific content, informed by aesthetics, these processes modulate the 
constitution of the object and subject in question, yet the local historicity of a given 
place ascertains its final constitution. For example, the process of a narrative of 
tragedy, of terror, and of horror modulates the way a person may conceptualise, and 
therefore define, their lives; yet their definitions will be made from the specific 
historical conditions of the place and group in question – Queensland, San Juan, 
Bogotá, Buenos Aires, New York, African Americans, Indigenous, Mexican 
Americans, etc. This does not mean that, if subjected to the conceptualisation of 
aboriginality, the person will be determined to live in a narrative of tragedy, but it 
does mean that this narrative will have a significant weight in their life in conjunction 
with their local historical conditions. That is, their particular life will be in 
conversation with any given conceptualisation process, and it can be in opposition to 
a given conceptualisation. A classic example is the stories of overcoming adversity 
that can only be conceptualised as “inspirational stories” in conversation with a given 
narrative that creates the genre of the story. If a person is of Aboriginal background 
and becomes a professor, it can be an “inspirational story” only due to the underlying 
conceptualising movement that creates the place where the story departs. The 
conceptualist movement’s power relies on its capacity to assemble a colonising fold 
on the subjectivity of the colonised that is created by the conditions of the possibilities 
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of the local institutions and its conceptualising global reverberations. The space of 
biopolitical government lets the colonised die, but it is an active form of government 
that achieves the administration of the colonised through imposing the additional 
technology of power, which seems to be a type of conceptualist movement.  
The conceptualist movement is a product of the global history of colonisation, 
which is what authors including Quijano (1992), Dussel (1993), Mignolo (1996), and 
Grosfoguel (2008b), among others, understand as the global machinery of coloniality, 
and the local operation or administration of colonisation determined by its specific 
history, such as the case of the history of colonisation of Queensland, Australia. 
However, this simultaneous operation has a historicity informed by the framework of 
aesthetics. Similar to transferring exotic landscapes from China or from India into fine 
porcelain painted using the blue-china technique, the conceptualist movement 
operates through conceptualising the colonised using the pre-existing colours 
manufactured in colonial history to transfer the conceptualisation to a specific 
locality, tailored to the place in question, e.g. Queensland, Auckland, Puerto Rico, etc. 
Then, the twofold conceptualist movement is constituted through local histories and 
global histories that enact colonisation to the colonised subjects. The expression of the 
conceptualising movement in the historicity of colonisation through art further 
illustrates the importance of aesthetics as an analytical framework to understand the 
machinery of colonisation. Aesthetics can link global and local political practices that 
would be difficult for other analytical frameworks, such as the framework of 
anthropological discourse because this discourse is reliant on linear narratives 
expressed through speech or writing acts. Therefore, the conceptualist movement 
arises from the discourse of aesthetics that forms specific discursive devices that are 
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then used simultaneously with its local administrative function that modulates 
subjectivity. 	
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Chapter VII  
Conclusion 
 
Figure 10 BabaKiueria68 
 
BabaKiueria (1986)69 5:01 
 
Duranga Manika:  Is it fair of us to expect white people to 
improve? Do they want to change? 
Minister for White Affairs  
Wagwan70:  Yes! And here in my department we’re doing 
everything we can to help them. We’ve created 																																																								
68 Source: 
(http://www.puntodevistafestival.com/resize.asp?x=290&y=200&imagen=Argazkiak/
Pelis/20110105145340.jpg)  
69 According to the Australian Screen Organisation (ASO), the synopsis of this 
‘mockumentary’ is described as follows:  
…a drama pretending to be an ethnographic documentary examining the 
customs of the white natives of ‘Babakiueria’, from the perspective of the 
country’s black colonisers. Babakiueria is named as a result of first contact 
between the colonisers and the natives. Arriving at a barbecue area, the settlers 
ask the locals, ‘What’s this place called?’. Presenter Duranga Manika 
(Michelle Torres) looks back at this moment and at white people’s place in 
contemporary Babakiuerian society. She also spends time with a ‘typical’ 
white family. 
Furthermore, Matthews (n.d.) notes: “Babakiueria uses role reversal to satirise and 
critique Australia’s treatment of its Indigenous peoples… The ruling Babakiuerians 
demonstrate a paternalistic, patronising attitude towards the 'natives’…” 
70 The character of the Minister for White Affairs was based on Sir Joh Bjelke-
Petersen, who was Premier of Queensland from 1968 to 1987. His government had 
several problems with Aboriginal nations across Queensland, one of which was 
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32 new jobs in the last year; we’ve built 7 new 
houses… 
Duranga Manika:    But what if they are happy the way they are?  
Minister for White Affairs  
Wagwan:  It would be morally wrong for us to leave them 
like that. We’ve got to do everything we can to 
help these people take their place in society. 
And I think most white people are happy with 
what we are doing for them.  
Duranga Manika:  But has the government tried to find out what 
white people want?  
Minister for White Affairs  
Wagwan:  Why? I mean we’re the government. It’s our job 
to make decisions of what these people want. 
And give it to them.  
 
This archaeology of colonisation has demonstrated that the operationalisation 
of colonisation in Queensland, Australia, was constituted locally by the pure 
administrative function of the non-discursive operation of the Blanket Approach and 
that it was constituted globally from the first colonial experience in the Caribbean 
through the conceptualisations of aboriginality and of blackness. This two-fold 
process was aided by a conceptualist movement, which is the technology of power 
within the discourse of aesthetics. The conceptualisation (discursive device) of 
aboriginality was formed aesthetically starting in 1492 in the Caribbean as a 
monstrous anthropology. The processes (rules of formation) of the conceptualisation 
of aboriginality were constituted historically through the founding narratives of 
tragedy-capture-anthropocentrism-conquest. The conceptualisation of blackness 
followed a parallel yet opposing direction of history from aboriginality; moreover, at 
one point in history and as manifested in the imposition of African slavery, it linked 
with the historical direction of the conceptualisation of aboriginality as it adopted the 
slave labour conditions that Aboriginal peoples in the Americas suffered. The 
																																																																																																																																																														
expressed in court in the case Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen in which the courts found 
that the Premier had discriminated against Aboriginal people (Lunn, 1987). 
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processes of the conceptualisation of blackness were constituted historically over the 
foundations of aboriginality and through the narratives of colouring-cultural practice-
social status-value. The conceptualisations of blackness and aboriginality were the 
objects that the Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act 1897 
(1897 Act) spoke of when implementing the operation of colonisation in Queensland, 
Australia. The way through which the administrative movement of the 1897 Act 
operated was in the form of the pure function of the Blanket Approach, which is 
constituted in three operations: totalisation, multiplicity, and the creation of desire. 
The operation constituted by any given conceptualisation, such as aboriginality and 
blackness, and the operation constituted by an administrative movement such as the 
Blanket Approach form the two-fold operation of colonisation that is manifested in 
the technology or form of power described as the conceptualist movement. The 
conceptualist movement is the mode of power assembled through the colonisation 
form of government within the frame of an aesthetic discourse that modulates the 
subjectivity of the colonised. This transversal critique of colonisation does not focus 
on only the local operation of colonisation or on only the global operation of 
colonisation: rather, it demonstrates the operationalisation of colonisation in its 
micropolitical space and simultaneously in its macropolitical space.  
In this part of the research, the concluding remarks are presented in small 
summaries of the previous parts of this work. These summaries are attempts to 
present the main claims of this research; however, they do not fully explicate these 
claims because this has been undertaken in the previous chapters. 
Literature on Colonisation 
The literature that theorises the praxis of colonisation discusses its complex 
operation as a machine operating in the macro space, primarily in the disciplines of 
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postcolonial studies and coloniality/decoloniality studies (Castro-Gómez, 2007; 
Dussel, 1993; Grosfoguel, 2008a; Mignolo, 1996; Quijano, 2000), while also 
discussing colonisation in the space of the micro or the local with notions such as 
race, identity, indigenous methodology, etc. where privilege is placed on the lived 
experiences, primarily including critical race theory, whiteness studies, decolonisation 
studies, and indigenous studies (Nakata, 2007; Nakata, Nakata, Keech & Bolt, 2012; 
Moreton-Robinson, 2003; Smith, 2000). Post-colonial and coloniality/decoloniality 
(Castro-Gómez, 2007) research focuses on the macropolitics of colonisation where a 
top-down operation is conceptualised as coloniality (Quijano, 1992) or the 
international division of labour (Spivak, 1988), among other global notions, and it 
ignores the micropolitics of colonisation arguing that it operates as an ideology 
(Spivak, 1988). This was expressed famously in Spivak’s article Can the Subaltern 
Speak (1988), where she states that poststructuralists like Foucault “ignore[s] the 
international division of labor… it is incapable of dealing with global capitalism: the 
subject-production of worker and unemployed within nation-state ideologies in its 
Center” (Spivak, 1988, p. 67). Research in critical race theory, whiteness studies, 
indigenous studies, and others focuses primarily on issues that revolve around notions 
of identity, corporality, lived experiences, and decolonisation, among other 
micropolitical notions that often take the macropolitical processes operating in 
colonisation for granted; therefore, the geo-political element of colonisation is often 
ignored. Post-colonial thinkers including Said (1978) and coloniality/decoloniality 
thinkers including Mignolo (1995), Grosfoguel (2012), and Castro Gómez (2007) 
accept their theoretical debt to Foucauldian notions such as biopower (Foucault, 
2005) and similarly decolonial and decolonisation theorists from Australia including 
Moreton-Robinson (2003) and Nakata (2007) also explicitly use the Foucauldian 
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analytical tools to critique Western discourses. Although Foucault’s work can be 
regarded as being influential to both research streams in colonisation, he is often 
criticised for, from the macropolitical side of colonisation, focussing on the 
microphysics of power as it operates as an ideology and it shifts the focus to the real 
“problem”, which is the global machinery of colonisation. However, in the 
micropolitical stream of colonisation, Foucault was unable to articulate anything 
regarding identity, lived experiences, or any microphysical analytical tool because he 
theorised from Western and French worldview perspectives, and research in the 
micropolitical stream is often classified and validated using racial categories such as 
indigenous, black, Latin-American, African-American, etc. In this research, 
Foucauldian archaeology was used not as a starting point but as a methodological tool 
to unearth the fundamentally Western machinery and operationalisation of 
colonisation. This work began with the Caribbean and Latin American political-
theoretical context in conversation with an Australian Aboriginal political-theoretical 
context in this way assuming a transversal approach, because a transversal 
understanding of the operation of colonisation considers the micropolitics and 
macropolitics that modulate the subjectivity of the colonised.  
Origins: Conceptualisation of Aboriginality 
The identified conceptualisations of colonisation are devised in this work as 
monstrous anthropology and Western blackness. These are the points of pressure that 
colonisation exerted that were specifically located in the Western conceptualisations 
of aboriginality and of blackness. That is, they were the objects of what colonisation 
spoke of. The four processes that constitute the monstrous anthropological 
conceptualisation are (1) terror, horror, and tragedy, (2) capturing and enslavement, 
(3) similarity and anthropocentrism, and (4) conquest. The narrative of tragedy was 
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framed in the first Western conceptualisation of aboriginality through an 
interpretation that was closely aligned with medieval monstrosity. This narrative of 
monstrosity is illustrated and located in an aesthetic of ugliness described in the 
beginning of Chapter III Monstrous Anthropology.  
The first colonial encounter was predetermined by an expectation of the 
relatively known civilisation or culture of the Indies. When Christopher Columbus 
and the fleet of three boats realised that these cultures were completely unknown, they 
painted them in their minds with what they already knew. It had to be a story “worth 
telling” and previous conceptualisations of the Indies informed an underlying 
narrative along the lines of a different civilisation of creatures. The conceptualisation 
of un-Christian creatures determined the “side” and the narrative in which these 
creatures were framed. They were a civilisation of dark and irreligious creatures. The 
Spanish described the Aboriginal peoples as very generous at first, but the dangerous 
ones, i.e. the ones that were not welcoming from the perspective of the Colonial West, 
were described with more detail. They were described with monstrous features and 
characteristics to commit the most horrid nightmares of any being in the Colonial 
West: they ate human flesh (which was something commonly recorded in long 
voyages such as the those from Spain to the Americas). The narrative process of 
tragedy allowed for some Aboriginal peoples to be portrayed as “noble creatures” 
(because savagery was not yet a descriptor) and others as the cannibals. This process 
planted a seed that grew in many narratives of Aboriginal martyrs that only fought to 
continue to live “peacefully”, and it simultaneously grew narratives of senseless 
warrior ‘tribes’ that inexplicably cooked and sacrificed outsiders.  
This seed of the narrative process at its core provided the method through 
which the Western conceptualisation of aboriginality would always be sensed as the 
	234
“other” belonging in a “dark” realm. The realm of the Colonial West is where 
“proper” life could be lived and, by extension, every other realm must have another 
narrative. People can “overcome” this narrative, but the very word “overcome” relates 
back – in opposition – to a pre-existing narrative of tragedy, of hardship, and mainly 
of “otherness”. This was not bad or negative for the Colonial West, at least, because 
in medieval times there was an appreciation of extreme situations because they 
assisted in creating seductive stories of the first conquistadores and colonisers being 
brave people who experienced fantastic adventures. What the process indicated was 
the location of the generator of these narratives of tragedy that the Colonial West 
wanted to engage with: this first narrative inaugurated the monstrous anthropological 
conceptualisation of aboriginality. 
The second process, i.e. capture and enslavement, relies on the first peoples to 
be enslaved by the Colonial West being the Aboriginal peoples of the Americas. 
Slavery was the crudest form of capture; the process of capture meant bringing these 
peoples into the gaze, and therefore into the course of conceptualisation, of the 
Colonial West. The initial motivator of colonisation was extracting all possible 
“goods” from the Americas: Christopher Columbus took all that he could carry in the 
first voyages and Aboriginal peoples were not an exception. The Colonial West 
captured anything of value, and then they captured the lands, which was not the 
original intention. Anything that opposed the Colonial West was captured with 
incredible force through enslavement, or worse. However, this process did not only 
use the means of enslavement, but it also used luring techniques such as titles, 
mandatory mixing of races, and promises of safety (which were often broken by the 
Colonial West). Slowly, but surely, the capturing also meant the pacification and 
settlement-occupation of the Americas; it also meant the transformation of the way in 
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which the Americas were “seen”. The process of capture does not only refer to 
explicit enslavement, but it also refers to the control of worldview perspectives. 
Christianisation, pacification, and later “civilisation” were a few ways through which 
to achieve this. For example, the capturing process reframed the ancestral 
understanding of gold into the Colonial West worldview; it reframed human sacrifice 
into the Colonial West worldview of morals; and it allowed for one understanding of 
individuality and made indiscernible different appropriations of what the Colonial 
West referred to as individuality (Dussel, 1993; Grosfoguel, 2003). Colonisation and 
enslavement are intrinsically complicit because the latter historically constituted the 
former, from the capture of peoples to the arrest of worldview perspectives.  
The process of anthropocentrism (anthropos referring to the Colonial West 
man or human) set the conditions for the capturing process to occur; thus, the process 
of capturing and anthropocentrism are intertwined. The anthropocentric process is 
defined by the Colonial West gaze located at the centre of the interpretation and 
everything else is understood via similarities. Different, and even monstrous, 
civilisations were conceptualised using the same instruments for cooking, similar 
political organisation, and similar cultural practices, among other practices that are 
distinctive of the Colonial West but had to be captured through this anthropocentric 
gaze. This anthropocentric perspective process had not yet been linked to a hierarchal 
inequality that would make see other civilisations in the binary of inferiority-
superiority such as social Darwinism. This happened later when anthropocentrism 
became constituted as logos in philosophical anthropological discourse by Immanuel 
Kant (Foucault, 2009). The anthropocentric gaze “sees” that which is familiar to the 
Colonial West, interprets that which is unfamiliar to the Colonial West and it becomes 
reconfigured as familiar, and that which is uncaptured remains invisible to the eyes of 
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anthropocentrism. Thus, anthropocentrism is a location in which the visibilities are 
constantly captured from a position that is not subjective but is very clearly grounded 
as the centre of the gravitational space, as conceptualised by the Colonial West. The 
Colonial West is the centre of the world and then everything is interpreted in 
reference to what Western culture “knows” and anything outside of the “known” 
becomes invisible.  
The last process is conquest and it is at the core of the chain of processes of 
the conceptualisation of aboriginality. The first colonial experience began as a 
mistake: Christopher Columbus and the Kingdom of Spain intended to find a new 
route to the Indies. The first year (1492) in the Americas was characterised by a desire 
to extract everything possible, which was inspired by the Imperial imperative to 
strengthen the Kingdom against possible invaders (Foucault, 2005). However, 
Imperialism turned into colonisation as a result of this will to conquer or to 
completely own (culturally, physically, epistemologically, etc.) the places it 
conquered. The Spanish, Portuguese, and French conquistadores and colonisers 
searched for everything that was of value according to the Colonial West. The 
“pacification” of the Aztec Empire marked a transition between the extraction of 
goods for the Spanish and other Kingdoms, and the expansion of the Colonial West 
into a never-ending movement of complete conquest for the sake of conquest. The 
horrific first war against the Aztec Empire explicitly unfolded the monstrous 
anthropology chain through illustrating tragedy, capture, and enslavement, which 
were the gravitational centre of the “winning” Colonial West and pure conquest. The 
will of colonisation was energised through the process of conquest in the context of 
the conceptualisation of aboriginality.  
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Origins: Conceptualisation of Blackness 
The four processes that constituted the Western conceptualisation of blackness 
are (1) colouring, (2) cultural practice, (3) social status or class, and (4) value. 
Blackness was not interchangeable with slavery until the end of the 16th century; prior 
to this, skin colour only functioned, sometimes, as a descriptor for the identification 
of certain peoples. Institutions in power, such as the Catholic Church and the 
Kingdoms, determined inequality, for which slavery was the crudest example. The 
most extreme example that this research could find was Juan Garrido: he was the first 
documented black conquistador. The significance of his story is founded in the 
complete contrasting concept of a black-skinned man who actively participated in the 
colonisation of the Americas, including the enslavement of Aboriginal peoples. After 
the introduction of African slavery in the late 16th century, which was resisted by the 
colonisers in America, skin colour became more relevant to determine the inequality 
base of colonisation. Slavery was no longer only Aboriginal because African peoples 
were captured by this new Western conceptualisation of blackness. Therefore, 
colouring became the process through which inequality was transformed, though it 
did not yet determine inequality by itself. Colouring can be defined as the contrasting 
process from a set of base colours for comparison. Concretely, black cannot be 
understood without another base colour through which black can make sense, such as 
black and white, or black and brown, etc. The process of colouring draws the symbols 
that might indicate slavery, or it might indicate nobility, such as the first painting of 
the Americas, Los mulatos de Esmeralda (1599). The process of colouring in Western 
blackness served as a symbolic descriptor that began to draw a picture of subjectivity.  
The second process is cultural practice that goes one step further from the 
process of anthropocentrism as it removes people from similarities of the Colonial 
West to the location of the “other”. The location remains situated in an 
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anthropocentric gravitational force, but now the “other” has a set of cultural content. 
Therefore, the “other” is no longer fully invisible, but it has become visible in the 
Colonial West recognised content of visibilities. The “other” became akin to planets 
that were illuminated by the “sun” of the Colonial West. After over 100 years of 
accumulating information about Aboriginal peoples, and also of African slaves71, the 
cultural practices process aided the colouring process through identifying distinct 
“cultural” artefacts, kinship practices, facial modifications, and so on. This process 
allowed a symbolic distinction of that which is seen as “cultural” and located in the 
“planet of the other”. No longer could an African man dress distinctly as a 
conquistador, or as a catholic bishop in the Vatican, or purely as a Don; the cultural 
practice process allowed for the introduction of recognised symbolisms that located 
the person as a “cultural other”. Cultural practices were to be “worn” as family crests 
in order to demonstrate where the peoples came from, whereas the Colonial West did 
not need to “demonstrate” anything because they were the eyes that gazed and were 
therefore not subjected to the gaze of otherness.  
The third process in the conceptualisation of blackness is social status. The 
Colonial West thought that Aboriginal peoples had Kingdoms, nobility, and even 
Empires similar to theirs. For example, the first overarching ruler that the Spanish 
encountered, and assassinated, was the ruler (cacica) Anacaona (Sued-Badillo, 1975). 
For the Spanish, it was not surprising that one of the most important rulers of the 
Tainos was a woman, given that the Spanish were also ruled by a woman, Queen 
Isabela La Católica. After some time, Aboriginal peoples, mulatos, and other nations 
were given specific Colonial West titles. Furthermore, slavery was an already widely 																																																								
71 It should be remembered that the first black slaves to arrive in the beginning of the 
16th century were ladino slaves who spoke Spanish and were more or less acculturated 
in the Colonial West given that they lived in Spain, Portugal, France, and other 
Kingdoms.  
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visible practice towards Aboriginal peoples at first and then towards African peoples. 
Slavery was the lowest social status position, but it was also the way that the social 
status process was introduced. That is, slavery was the hook that pulled non-Colonial 
Western peoples into the social status process of the Colonial West. No longer could a 
parallel or similar system of interpretation of social status be possible: the social 
status process absorbed the possible non-Western social categorisations. In this way, a 
hierarchy was set for an alienated group of peoples that could never be at the “top” 
end of the social ladder because, by definition, the “other” could never be fully 
Western. The social status processes are defined by the social category ordered in a 
hierarchy determined by and from the history of the Colonial West. Therefore, the 
social status process absorbed the “other”, but as a second-class citizen in the social 
status hierarchal space.  
The last process of the conceptualisation of blackness is value. Given that 
slavery had great importance in the first 300 years of colonisation, labour and the 
intrinsic value of slaves were critical in the historical constitution of colonisation and 
therefore in the assemblage of the conceptualisation of blackness. A critical process 
that remained at the heart of colonisation, and particularly in Western blackness, was 
value and, most prominently, pure value. As argued previously, slavery was 
distinctively associated with wealth because slavery was expensive: it was a marker 
of affluence and abundance, and it was even regarded as a currency to be exchanged 
for other item(s) or left as assets in wills (Tardieu, 2002). African slavery is often 
understood along the lines of use-value, which is defined by its capacity to produce 
other goods. For less than 100 years, it was used to extract gold and silver; moreover, 
when African slavery was forced upon the Americas, its use-value was associated 
with sugar, wood, cotton, and tobacco. However, slavery was also defined by its pure 
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value given that it was a marker of wealth and the slave trade was a wealthy industry. 
African slave trade was one of the few industries (if not the only industry) to 
consistently increase its profit for 300 years, in which some years had exponential 
increases. Therefore, it is not an exaggeration to state that the slave trade was a 
hallmark industry or a best scenario example from capitalist logic. The value process 
of Western blackness binds the processes of colouring, cultural practices, and social 
status into a conceptualisation that is defined through the association of importance 
for capitalism. From this historical context, Western blackness finds a comfortable 
zone in labour through which it is capitalised, given the “inherent” nature of the 
process of value in this conceptualisation.  
Command: Blanket Approach 
The Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act 1897 
(1897 Act), of the colony of Queensland, is a local model of the modern form of 
government of colonisation. It functioned as an engineered Western government 
formulation of a nation-state, but without a nation. The pure colonising function of the 
1897 Act was to implement a state that came from a nation-state formulation. The 
1897 Act followed the same structure as the constitution of the government of a state 
determined by its laws of crime, family, labour, welfare, etc. Therefore, the 1897 Act 
illustrates the local modern operation of the machinery of colonisation, i.e. a nation-
state that produced a state-state formulation. This state-state formulation was not a 
frivolous repetition, but rather it was a method of illustrating how the 
conceptualisation of a state was determined by the Colonial West conceptualisation 
of, at least, aboriginality and blackness, and how it had no relationship between the 
Australian Aboriginal civilisation in Queensland and the 1897 Act. In this sense, the 
1897 Act is a pure function of government because it is pure government for the 
	241
colonised without conversation with the Australian Aboriginal civilisation in 
Queensland. The 1897 Act can simply be described as a “colonisation Act”; however, 
the complexity of the processes operating within the force of colonisation must be 
named in order to describe the real effects of the government of the colonised. In 
order to conceptualise the approach operating in the 1897 Act from its origins in the 
conceptualisation of tragedy-capture-anthropocentrism-conquest and colouring-
cultural practice-social status-value is to turn the gaze back onto the Colonial West 
strategies of government and its mindset.  
The Blanket Approach is a wordplay that describes the pure function of the 
state-state of the 1897 Act. This wordplay refers to the totalisation of the function of 
the 1897 Act, as well as to the multiplicity that distributed this totalisation 
individually and, more or less, tailored subjectively. The Blanket Approach is not a 
conceptualisation, but the pure function of the local exemplification of the modern 
machinery of colonisation. Through the state-state formulation, from the nation-state 
formulation, the Blanket Approach mechanism totalised a specific, finite, and policy 
inspired system that applied to every-thing (not any-thing) defined by the Colonial 
West. It spoke primarily of the objects of the conceptualisations of aboriginality and 
of blackness. Through the distribution of this imposed conceptualisation, the 
mechanism of multiplicity functioned to serialise individual people. This colonised-
imposed subjectivity was not similar to the non-colonised subjectivity that was 
determined by the nation-state formulation that is problematic due to the specific 
history of Western civilisation that, for example, through biopolitics (Agamben, 2005; 
Foucault, 2005) the State “makes live” the desired subject. The subjectivity in 
colonisation is determined by the double negative of the presence of peoples given 
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that the state-state formulation does not provide easy access to the structures of the 
Colonial West state because they are undesired subjects.  
The third mechanism of the function of the Blanket Approach is the creation 
of desire. This mechanism is the most organic part of the function that has close 
conceptual links with, for example, the notion of fetiche, the added experience in the 
consumption process understood in Marxism, the pleasure principle understood in 
psychoanalysis, which is a driving force in each individual, and power relations 
understood by Foucault, which is one of the constituting links of human relationships. 
However, the function of the creation of desire is closer to the power relations in 
Foucault (1976) and Deleuze (1995) that refer specifically to the relationship with the 
“blanket” of Westernisation or the subjectivity object. The force of the Blanket 
Approach of the 1897 Act is constituted through the significant presence of the 
blanket of Westernisation, and this imposition eventually forms a particular 
relationship determined by each person, but it is predicated by the root function of the 
Blanket Approach. In the creation of desire, a person can love or hate the subjectivity 
object or the blanket of Westernisation; they can show it or hide it; they can use it or 
not; regardless, it will be significantly present given the reproductive capacity of its 
implementation. The creation of desire can be seen in the notion of identity and it can 
create either a positive desire or a negative desire. The creation of desire is an open 
process that operates in the lucid space of identity formation. Its power relies on the 
presence of a readily available subjectivity object and also the difficulty of critique 
and re-evaluation of what appears to be ever present and therefore experienced as our 
“nature”.  
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Conceptualist Movement 
The proposed constitution of the two-fold operation of colonisation is 
simultaneously enacted by the conceptualist movement, yet this notion is an attempt 
to theorise a different way to understand a technology of power in the form of 
government of colonisation. If “every politics is simultaneously a macropolitics and a 
micropolitics” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 213), then the conceptualist movement is 
the synthetisation of the device that aids colonisation, and that simultaneously 
considers both the geopolitics (Western colonial history of the world) and local 
politics (biopolitics) in Queensland, Australia. Within the local biopolitical 
formulation of the Western state, colonisation is the form of government that 
administers the subjects that the State “lets die” (Foucault, 2005) in an administrative 
movement that serves the aforementioned purpose using conceptualist tools to 
conceptualise the colonised. The conceptualist movement operates utilising the 
globally forged colonial conceptualising tools of, at least, aboriginality and blackness 
with the administrative movement of the Blanket Approach to form the technology of 
power that modulates the subjectivity of the colonised. Different to the technology of 
the self or pastoral power (Foucault, 1990), the conceptualist movement operates from 
the discourse of aesthetics because it relies heavily on appearances that find meanings 
in conceptualist tools. While the pastoral power’s technology of the self relies on 
anthropological discourse, the conceptualising movement relies on aesthetic 
discourse, as explained in Chapter III Monstrous Anthropology. Following this line of 
thought, the subjectivity of the colonised is then affected discursively and non-
discursively through the form of government of colonisation, discursively through the 
given conceptual tools, such as the conceptualisations of aboriginality and blackness, 
and non-discursively through the administrative movement of a given state that 
governs using colonisation as its form of government, i.e. the Blanket Approach. 
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Similar to Mellor’s artistic technique of the blue-and-white Spode china, the 
conceptualist movement transforms the landscapes of the real surrounding it with a 
the colonially synthesised blue, drawing and painting a Westernised surrounding that 
appears to be everywhere. In this sense, the conceptualist movement utilises the 
colonially synthesised conceptualisations to transform the landscapes of the colonised 
in the administrative movement dictated by a given state.  
Limitations 
The limitations of this research first revolve around the theoretical and 
historical implications; however, more importantly, because the analysis is limited by 
the problem of colonisation, the solutions and agency can appear elusive. Moreover, 
the theoretical and methodological boundaries of this archaeology of colonisation 
avoid the trap of anthropological discourse and redirect the research into the 
conditions of possibilities for subjectivity to be produced (Foucault, 1974). 
Furthermore, I, as a Puerto Rican male, US born, produced by a specific set of 
historical narratives, and a colonised subject, do not feel that I am able to make any 
suggestion of solutions. Therefore, a “decolonisation of being” (Castro-Gómez, 2007, 
p. 171) would be appropriate in the sense as explained by Castro-Gómez (2007) that 
critiques the space of subjectivity that enables colonisation to be produced in 
complicity with the colonised subject.  
Secondly, the fluidity of the interpretation of history in this research can be 
regarded as academically problematic. Historical inaccuracies such as conceptualising 
protectorates as reservations in the context of the implementation of the Aboriginals 
Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act, 1897 (1897 Act) or the debate of 
the discipline of history of the first “black” person to arrive in the Americas can 
disrupt the underlying argument of navigating the processes that assemble the 
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discursive and non-discursive practices. This research is more concerned with the 
processes that enable these subjectifying practices in colonisation rather than the 
historical “facts”; that is, this work engages more with the form rather than the claims 
of ontological nature of its content. Conversely, the historical accuracy of these 
claims can be elusive because this research does not have the intention to be located 
in the discipline of history that, as mentioned in Chapter II Theory, Methodology and 
Method, has a valuable function.  
Thirdly, the translational potential of this research to, for example policy or 
any other pragmatic departure, also remains elusive. For similar reasons, this research 
cannot propose any informed solutions, because at best it only analyses the problem 
in the same way that the mathematician needs to understand any given formula or 
operation before solving it, or a civil engineer needs to understand the nature of the 
materials and their relationships with a given structure before building: this 
archaeology only attempts to understand the operationalisation of colonisation, but 
not provide a “solution” for it. The discipline of history often states that we need not 
repeat the mistakes of the past, yet this research cannot make that claim because the 
problem of colonisation does not only depend on the will of individuals or the 
implementation or abolishment of explicit government laws. Therefore, it is difficult 
to claim any specific translational endeavour that would be explicitly supported by 
this work.  
Many other limitations can be listed and further explicated, such as the use 
and interpretation of this research’s methodology (Foucauldian archaeology), or the 
relevance of this research today considering that some materials date from more than 
500 years ago. However, although they are ethically and theoretically important to 
consider, these, and other limitations, are outside the scope of the overarching 
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research question, which was: How has colonisation been globally and locally 
operationalised? The navigation of this research has drawn a historical map of the 
discursive and non-discursive spaces in which they operated in an effort to turn the 
gaze back onto the machinery of colonisation, in opposition to continuing to research 
and continuing to (re)produce the object colonisation speaks of.  
In summary, this archaeology of colonisation used a transversal approach to 
understand the micropolitics and macropolitics of the fundamentally political 
operationalisation of colonisation. Through unearthing the global origins of 
colonisation and its local command or administration, a critique of colonisation could 
be conducted. This critique found fertile grounds in aesthetics from its initial 
conceptualisation in 1492 to 1538, to the way in which the administrative operation 
was locally enacted in Queensland, Australia (1881-1939) and formed the technology 
of the form of government of colonisation, i.e. the conceptualist movement. Western 
aboriginality and blackness are discursive devices that were formed initially in the 
framework of Western aesthetics that was widely used to administer the subject that 
colonisation spoke of in Queensland, Australia. The Blanket Approach was the pure 
administrative function that threaded specific conceptualising yarns. It can be said 
that the proposed notion of the conceptualist movement aided in forming the 
subjectivity of the subject it speaks through administering the subject in a given 
hierarchy that serves the purposes of the state and conceptualising it with the 
discursive devices that can enable this form of government. That is, the conceptualist 
movement drew a picture of subjectivity and it coloured it with the readily available 
colours that made the colonised discernible. Colonisation is more than a historical 
moment in time that is defined in one word such as invasion: it is a way to see the 
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world locally and globally, a government not only of speech or writing, but a 
government of images and movements.  
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2 61! VICTORIAE, NO. [17]
Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium .Bill.
Interpretation.
Persons deemed to be
aboriginals.
Proclamation of Districts.
Protectors to be
appointed.
the purpose of supporting and continuing any proceeding taken, or of prosecuting
or punishing any person for any offence committed before the commencement of
this Act.
3. The following terms shall, in this Act (unless the context otherwise
indicates), bear the several meanings set against them respectively:—
" Reserve"—Any reserve heretofore or hereafter granted in trust, or
reserved from sale or lease by the Governor in Council, for the benefit of the
aboriginal inhabitants of the Colony, under the provisions of any law in force in
Queensland relating to Crown lands;
"Minister"—The Home Secretary or other Minister of the Crown
administering this Act ;
"Protector "—A Protector of Aboriginals appointed under the provisions of
this Act;
"Superintendent"—A Superintendent appointed under the provisions of
this Act for any Reserve;
"District"—A District proclaimed under the provisions of this Act;
"Regulations"—Regulations made under this Act;
"Prescribed"—Prescribed by this Act or the Regulations under it;
"Liquor"—Liquor as defined by " The Licensing Act of 1885," and any Act 
amending the same;
"Opium"—Opium, whether in the form of gum or liquid, and every
substance, whether solid or liquid, which contains opium, not being a substance
compounded exclusively for medicinal purposes, and every substance which is or
contains the ash of opium, or charcoal of opium;
"Half-caste"—Any person being the offspring of an aboriginal mother and
other than an aboriginal father ; Provided that the term "half-caste," wherever it
occurs in this Act elsewhere than in the next following section, shall, unless the
context otherwise requires, be construed to exclude every half-caste who, under the
provisions of the said section, is deemed to be an aboriginal.
4. Every person who is—
(a) An aboriginal inhabitant of Queensland; or
(b) A half-caste who, at the commencement of this Act, is living with an 
aboriginal as wife, husband, or child; or
(c) A half-caste who, otherwise than as wife, husband, or child, habitually
lives or associates with aboriginals; shall be deemed to be an aboriginal within the
meaning of this Act.
5. The Governor in Council may, by Proclamation, declare any portion or
portions of the Colony to be a District, or Districts, for the purposes of this Act.
6. The Governor in Council may from time to time appoint, for the purpose of
carrying the provisions of this Act into effect, fit and proper persons, to be severally
called " Protector of Aboriginals," who shall, within the Districts respectively
assigned to them, have and exercise the powers and duties prescribed.
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7. The Governor in Council may appoint such and so many Superintendents for the
reserves, situated within such districts as aforesaid, as may he necessary for carrying the
provisions of this Act into effect.
8. Every reserve shall he subject to the provisions of this Act and the Regulations.
9. It shall be lawful for the Minister to cause every aboriginal within any District,
not being an aboriginal excepted from the provisions of this section, to be removed to,
and kept within the limits of, any reserve situated within such District, in such manner,
and subject to such conditions, as may be prescribed. The Minister may, subject to the
said conditions, cause any aboriginal to be removed from one reserve to another.
10. Every aboriginal who is—
(a) Lawfully employed by any person under the provisions of this Act or the 
Regulations, or under any other law in force in Queensland ;
(b) The holder of a permit to be absent from a reserve; or
(c) A female lawfully married to, and residing with, a husband who is not 
himself an aboriginal ;
(d) Or for whom in the opinion of the Minister satisfactory provision is 
otherwise made;
shall be excepted from the provisions of the last preceding section.
11. It shall not be lawful for any person other than an aboriginal, not being a
Superintendent or a person acting under his direction, and not being a person authorised
under the Regulations, to enter or remain or be within the limits of a reserve upon which
aboriginals are residing, for any purpose whatever.
Any person, without lawful excuse, entering or remaining or being upon such
reserve as aforesaid, shall, for every such offence, be liable on conviction to a penalty
not exceeding fifty pounds, or to imprisonment for any term not exceeding three months,
and the proof of such lawful excuse shall be on the person charged.
12. A Protector may permit any aboriginal or half-caste who, before the
commencement of this Act, was employed by any trustworthy person, to continue to be
so employed by such person, and, in like manner, may permit any aboriginal or half-
caste not previously employed to be employed by a like person.
  
13. Every permit, so granted as aforesaid, shall remain in force for twelve months
only, but may at any time, before the expiration of such period, be renewed for any
period not exceeding twelve calendar months, to commence from the expiration of the
previous period of twelve months, and so, from time to time, so long as such aboriginal
or half-caste is willing to continue to be employed by such person. Any such permission
as aforesaid may be revoked at any time by a Protector by writing under his hand, and
thereupon, if such related to an aboriginal, such aboriginal may be removed, by order of
the Protector under and subject to the conditions prescribed, to a reserve, or, at the
discretion of the Protector, the aboriginal or half-caste to whom such license related may
be permitted, in like manner, to enter the employment of some other such trustworthy
Superintendents
to be appointed.
Reserves to be
subject to act and
Regulation.
Aboriginals may
be removed to
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Aboriginals
excepted from
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person as aforesaid.  Such revocation shall not entitle any such employer to claim or
recover any compensation for the loss of the service of such aboriginal or half-caste, or
to maintain any action in respect of any alleged loss or damage that may be occasioned
by such revocation.
14. Any person who, except under the provisions of any Act or Regulations
thereunder in force in Queensland, employs an aboriginal or a female half-caste,
otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act or the Regulations, or
suffers or permits an aboriginal or a female half-caste to be in or upon any house or
premises in his occupation or under his control, shall be guilty of an offence against this
Act, and shall be liable, on conviction, to a penalty not exceeding fifty pounds and not
less than ten pounds, or to imprisonment for any term not exceeding six months.
15. Every person desirous of employing an aboriginal or female half-caste under the
provisions of this Act, shall forthwith, upon permission being granted by a Protector,
enter into an agreement with such aboriginal or female half-caste, in the presence of any
justice of the peace or member of the Police Force, for any period not exceeding twelve
months.  Every such agreement shall contain particulars of the names of the parties
thereto, the nature of the service to be rendered by such aboriginal or female half-caste,
the period during which such employment is to continue, the wages or other
remuneration to be paid or given by the employer for such service, the nature of the
accommodation to be provided for such aboriginal or female half-caste, and the
conditions on which the agreement may be determined by either party.  Every such
agreement shall be in duplicate and be attested by such justice or member of the Police
Force, who shall forthwith forward one of the said agreements to the nearest Protector.
16. Every aboriginal or female half-caste employed by any person, under the
provisions of this Act, shall be under the supervision of a Protector, or such other person
as may be authorised in that behalf by the Regulations; and every employer of such
aboriginal or female half-caste shall permit any Protector, or such other person as
aforesaid, to have access to such aboriginal or female half-caste at all reasonable times,
for the purpose of making such inspection and inquiries as he may deem necessary.
17. Any person who, without the authority of a Protector, by writing under his hand,
removes, or causes to be removed, an aboriginal or female half-caste from one District
to another District, or to any place beyond the Colony, shall be guilty of an offence
against. this Act, and shall be liable, on conviction, to a penalty not exceeding one
hundred pounds, or to imprisonment for any term not exceeding six months.
18. Every blanket issued by an officer of the Government to any aboriginal or half-
caste shall be and remain the property of Her Majesty, and any person, other than an
aboriginal or half-caste, who has in his possession or custody any such blanket or
portion thereof which shall reasonably appear to the justices, from the marks thereupon
or otherwise, to have been so issued for the use of an aboriginal or half-caste, shall be
guilty of an offence against this Act, and shall be liable, on conviction, to a penalty not
exceeding ten pounds.
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19. Any person who supplies, or causes or permits to be supplied, any liquor to an
aboriginal or a half-caste, except for bond fide medicinal purposes, proof of which shall be
on the person accused, shall, for every such offence, be liable to a penalty not exceeding
fifty pounds, or to imprisonment for any term not exceeding three months, and in every case
to the costs of the conviction. In the case of a licensed victualler or wine-seller who is
convicted of such offence, the penalty, by this section provided, shall he substituted for the
penalty provided in respect of such offence by the sixty-seventh section of " The Licensing
Act of 1885."
20. Any person who supplies, or causes or permits to be supplied, any opium to an
aboriginal or a half-caste, shall be guilty of an offence against this Act, and shall be liable,
on conviction, for the first offence, to a penalty not exceeding one hundred pounds and not
less than twenty pounds, one-half of which shall be paid to the person giving the
information which leads to such conviction, or to imprisonment for any term not exceeding
three months, and for the second and every subsequent offence to imprisonment for any
term not exceeding six months, and in every case to the costs of the conviction.
21. Notwithstanding anything in "The Sale and Use of Poisons Act,1891," to the
contrary contained, it shall not be lawful for any person, not being a legally qualified
medical practitioner, or a pharmaceutical chemist, or a wholesale dealer in drugs, to sell, or
in any manner dispose of, deliver, or supply, opium to any other person, or to have or keep
in his possession any opium for any purpose whatever; and it shall not be lawful for any
legally qualified medical practitioner or pharmaceutical chemist, residing or carrying on
business at a greater distance, by the nearest-practicable road, than one hundred miles from
Brisbane, Rockhampton, or Townsville, to have or keep in or upon any premises in his
occupation or under his control, at any one time, any greater quantity of opium than two
pounds weight avoirdupois :
Provided that it shall not be unlawful for a common carrier to have in his possession
opium, for the purpose of conveying the same, for delivery to the person to whom it has
been lawfully consigned.
22. Any person who unlawfully has in his possession any opium, or unlawfully sells, or
in any manner disposes of, delivers, or supplies opium to any person other than an
aboriginal or a half-caste, shall, for every such offence, be liable, on conviction, to a penalty
not exceeding fifty pounds, one-half of which shall be paid to the person giving the
information which leads to such conviction. Any legally qualified medical practitioner or
pharmaceutical chemist, residing or carrying on business at a greater distance, by the
nearest practicable road, than one hundred miles from Brisbane, Rockhampton, or
Townsville as aforesaid, who has or keeps, in or upon any premises in his occupation or
under his control, any greater quantity of opium than two pounds weight avoirdupois, shall,
be liable, on conviction, for the first offence, to a penalty not exceeding fifty pounds and not
less than ten pounds, and for the second, and every subsequent, offence to imprisonment for
any term not exceeding six months.
23. Upon complaint made or laid on oath, before any justice of the peace, by any
person, that he believes that opium is kept or concealed in any house, building, or place,
contrary to any of the provisions of this Act, whether by a person authorised under the
Penalty for
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provisions of " The Sale and Use of Poisons Act, 1891," to sell or deal in poisons or not,
such justice may grant a warrant, to any member of the Police Force, to enter and search
such house, building, or place, between the hours of six in the morning and twelve at
night, and, if admission is refused, to break into the same, and to seize and detain all
opium found therein contrary to the provisions of this Act.
24. Any member of the Police Force, and any person acting under the direction and
in the presence of a justice of the peace, may detain any person, found travelling, whom
such member of the Police Force or such justice of the peace may suspect to have in his
possession any opium contrary to the provisions of this Act, and may search such person,
and may open and search any pack, swag, or other receptacle carried or conveyed by such
person, and may seize any such opium as aforesaid found in the possession of such
person, and may forthwith arrest such person without warrant, and detain him in custody
until he can be brought before justices to be dealt with according to law.
25. If, upon the hearing of a complaint against any person, in whose possession
opium has been found in contravention of any of the provisions of this Act, the justices,
before whom such complaint is heard, convict such person of the offence stated in such
complaint, they shall, in addition to any penalty imposed upon the offender, order that all
the opium so found in his possession be forfeited to the Crown, and the same shall be
forfeited accordingly.
26. In every prosecution for an offence against any of the provisions of this Act
relating to an aboriginal or a half-caste, the averment in the complaint, that any person
named therein is an aboriginal or a half-caste, shall be sufficient evidence of the fact
unless the contrary is proved.
27. All actions and proceedings against any person for the recovery of any wages due
to an aboriginal or a half-caste, who is, or has been, employed by such person under the
provisions of this Act, or for any breach of an agreement entered into by such person
under the provisions of this Act, may be instituted and carried on by, or in the name of, a
Protector, or by, or in the name of, any other person authorised by the Minister by writing
under his hand.
28. Every complaint for an offence against the provisions of this Act or the
Regulations, other than the provisions contained in the twenty-second, twenty-third,
twenty-fourth, and twenty-fifth sections hereof, may be made or laid by a Protector or
Superintendent, or by a member of the Police Force, and the prosecution may be
conducted by the person by whom the complaint is so made or laid. Every complaint for
an offence against any of the provisions of this Act, contained in the sections hereinbefore
in this section mentioned, shall be made or laid by a member of the Police Force or a
justice of the peace only.
29. Any person who shall be convicted of an offence against this Act or the
Regulations, shall, unless hereinbefore or in the Regulations otherwise provided, be liable
to a penalty not exceeding ten pounds.
30. All offences against this Act, or the Regulations, not herein otherwise specially
provided for, may be prosecuted in a summary way before any two justices.
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31. The Governor in Council may from time to time, by Proclamation, make
Regulations for all or any of the matters following, that is to say,—
(1) Prescribing the mode of removing- aboriginals to a reserve, and from one 
reserve to another;
(2) Defining the duties of Protectors and Superintendents, and any other persons
employed to carry the provisions of this Act into effect;
(3) Authorising entry upon a reserve by specified persons or classes of persons 
for specified objects, and defining those objects, and the conditions under 
which such, persons may visit or remain upon a reserve, and fixing the 
duration of their stay thereupon, and providing for the revocation of such 
authority in any case;
(4) Prescribing the mode of distribution and expenditure of moneys granted by 
Parliament for the benefit of aboriginals;
(5) Apportioning amongst, or for the benefit of, aboriginals or half-castes, 
living on a reserve, the net produce of the labour of such aboriginals or half-
castes ;
(6) Providing for the care, custody, and education of the children of aboriginals;
(7) Providing for the transfer of any half-caste child, being an orphan, or 
deserted by its parents, to an orphanage ;
(8) Prescribing the conditions on which any aboriginal or half-caste children 
may be apprenticed to, or placed in service with, suitable persons;
(9) Providing for the mode of supplying to any half-castes, who may be 
declared to be entitled thereto, any rations, blankets, or other necessaries, or 
any medical or other relief or assistance;
(10) Prescribing the conditions on which the Minister may authorise any half-
caste to reside upon any reserve, and limiting the period of such residence, 
and the mode of dismissing or removing any such half-caste from such 
reserve;
(11) Providing for the control of all aboriginals and half-castes residing upon a 
reserve, and for the inspection of all aboriginals and half-castes, employed 
under the provisions of this Act or the Regulations ;
(12) Maintaining discipline and good order, upon a reserve ;
(13) Imposing the punishment of imprisonment, for any term not exceeding 
three months, upon any aboriginal or half-caste who is guilty of a breach of 
the Regulations relating to the maintenance of discipline and good order 
upon a reserve;
(14) Imposing, and authorising a Protector to inflict summary punishment by 
way of imprisonment, not exceeding fourteen days, upon aboriginals or half-
castes, living upon a reserve or within thc District under his charge, who, in 
the judgment of the Protector, are guilty of any crime, serious misconduct, 
neglect of duty, gross insubordination, or wilful breach of the Regulations;
(15) Prohibiting any aboriginal rites or customs that, in the opinion of the 
Minister, are injurious to the welfare of aboriginals living upon a reserve;
Regulations
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(16) Providing for the due carrying out of the provisions of this Act;
(17) Providing for all other matters and things that may be necessary to
give effect to this Act.
32. Such Regulations, not being contrary to the provisions of this Act, shall
have the force of law.
33. It shall be lawful for the Minister to issue to any half-caste, who, in his
opinion, ought not to be subject to the provisions of this Act, a certificate, in
writing under his hand, that such half-caste is exempt from the provisions of this
Act and the Regulations, and from and after the issue of such certificate, such half-
caste shall be so exempt accordingly.
THE SCHEDULE
Date of Act. Title of Act. Extent of Repeal.
55 Vic. No. 31 ...
59 Vic. No. 29 ...
"An Act for Regulating the Sale 
and Use of Poisons"
"An Act to Amend the Laws
relating to the Sale of
Intoxicating Liquor”
Section 13.
So much of Section 13 as is
contained in the words,
"aboriginal native of Australia
or half-caste of that race, or to
any" ; and in the further words,
"of Australia or."
I hereby certify that this PUBLIC BILL has finally passed the Legislative Council
and Legislative Assembly of Queensland.
[H W Radford]
Clerk of the Parliaments
Legislative Council Chamber,
Brisbane,[9 December 1987]
In the name and on behalf of the Queen, I assent to this Act.
[Lamington]
Government House,
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19 00. 
QUEENSLAND. 
REPORT OF THE NORTHERN PROTECTOR OF ABORIGINALS 
FOR 1899. 
Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command. 
TO THE UNDER SECRETARY, HOME SECRETARY'S DEPARTMENT. 
Office of the Northern Protector, 
Cooktown, 1st July, 1900. 
SIR,— Owing to the large amount of police action required in connection with the Northern blacks, 
my operations were originally carried on under the direction of the Commissioner of Police, but about 
last October, in view of his ever-increasing duties, Mr. W. E. Parry-Okeden found himself reluctantly 
compelled to relinquish his supervision. The administration of the Act in the Northern districts of the 
colony has accordingly devolved upon the Northern Protector of Aboriginals, acting directly under the 
instructions of the Minister, and I now have the honour to hand you my annual report on the results of 
of its operation as follows :— 
According to the returns furnished me by the various officers in charge, the following permits were Permits and 
entered in the local registers during the twelve months ending 30th June, 1900 :--Normanton, 303 ; agreements. 
Townsville, 50; Cooktown, 23!) ; Thursday Island (the number of discharges at the shipping office), 241 ; 
Charters Towers, 2 4 ; Mackay, 55 ; Coen, 112; Cairns, i)2. 
Sub-Inspector Garraway, in the Coen and surrounding districts, reports that there are many blacks 
who do not like being put under agreement, and many employers who also object to this being made 
compulsory. A great deal has been left to the tact and judgment of the local protectors in this respect, 
and with excellent results, especially in dealing with " casual" (eg., cutting a little firewood, &c.) as 
compared with " permanent" employment; in the latter case agreements are insisted upon. The protectors 
do not wish to hamper the legitimate employment of aboriginals, but rather to put down abuses, and with 
this object in view I trust that the powers already conferred on them, and which are never unnecessarily 
exercised, will not be abrogated in any future legislative measures. I am well aware that all the different 
tribes of aboriginals in the Northern portions of the colony—from Cape York to Mackay, from the east 
coast to the Northern Territory border—can not be ruled on one and the same hard-and-fast principle, and 
that a great deal must be left to the good sense and discretion of the individual officers in charge. 
All blacks from the Northern Territory of South Australia, who for the time being are within 
Queensland territory, are considered to be " aboriginals " within the meaning of our Act. 
For many reasons I am strongly adverse to any Chinese and other coloured aliens employing 
aboriginals, especially when the blacks can obtain equally good employment elsewhere. On the other 
hand, I cannot conscientiously, on the racial account only, refuse any such respectable and law-abiding 
citizens the right to work them. I have every confidence that in leaving this matter in the hands of the 
protectors, who, according to the regulations, are now acting as my assistants and deputies, there will be 
no necessity for the introduction of a clause to that effect in any future amending Act. 
I t has been realised in many cases that the binding down of an aboriginal to a twelve months' Length of 
continuous service, especially where the labour necessitates prolonged physical exertion, is unsatisfactory, service. 
The cutting down of the articles to six months at the Thursday Island Shipping Office has resulted in a 
diminution of the number of desertions. So, again, in the employment of aboriginals on the mainland, 
an agreement limiting the service to even nine months gives the boy an opportunity of going away for 
his annual "walk about," whence he returns content and refreshed for the following season's work. 
When the Act first came into force up here in the North great care was taken that no trouble or The question 
complaint should arise concerning the amount of wages to be paid by the employer. On behalf of the of wages, 
aboriginal, 1 looked rather to the comforts of a home, coupled with considerate treatment, than to 
pecuniary emoluments. Facts, however, have since prompted me to believe that the trust, implied by the 
execution of these intentions, has been abused by not a few of the employers who have obtained 
C. A. 103-1900. 
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2 
aboriginal labour without return of any money-payment whatsoever. The attractions of a store and the 
prospect of a little cash to spend in it prove no small source of encouragement to a black, and I 
certainly am of opinion that in this respect the Queensland native should be put on an equal level with 
the kanaka, and a minimum wage legally fixed. For boys signing articles at Thursday Island, a minimum 
wage of 10s. a month has been insisted on for some time past. At the shipping office here, the Hon. 
John Douglas has for long authorised that the boys' wages, when paid, should be handed over in their 
presence to the care of the police, with a view to seeing that they were spent to the best advantage. 
Female No women, and no children under puberty, have been allowed to be carried on the boats, and on 
aboriginal this point my instructions have been very emphatic. 
The grant of In addition to the work carried on by the Mission and stations in the way of distributing rations 
food and other to those aboriginals unable to provide for themselves, the Government have established various food-
relief, relieving centres in different parts of the Northern districts of the colony. These centres, with the amount 
of regular monthly expenditure authorised at each, may be tabulated as follows : — 
Atherton 
Boggy Creek (Butcher's Hill) 
Bowen and Dent Island 
Cardwell 
Coen 
Daintree 
Irvinebank and Nigger Creek 
Kuranda 
Macdonnell 
£ 
5 
4 
4 
2 
5 
3 
5 
S 
3 
0 
0 
10 
10 
0 
0 
0 
6 
0 
a. 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
8 
0 
Mareeba 
Maytown 
Mein 
Moreton ... 
Musgrave and Laura 
Palmer ... 
Thornborough ... 
Thursday Island 
I have given instructions that these amounts are not to be exceeded without my knowledge and authority. 
All such aboriginal relief is now distributed under the personal supervision of the police, or, as at 
Macdonnell, Moreton, and Daintree, by the post and telegraph officials. Since the passing of the Act, and 
previous to this superintendence by Government officials, two cases have come to my knowledge where 
the trust imposed on private individuals in the distribution of rations to blacks was grossly perverted. 
The officials now responsible have been impressed with the importance of rendering assistance only to 
those aboriginals who, owing to extreme old age, or youth, infirmity, disease, and other good causes, are 
precluded from obtaining food for themselves. The supply of rations in cases of sickness is referred to 
elsewhere. 
In a few cases relief in some form or another may be supplied for conciliatory and other 
purposes, thus : 1 per month has been allowed to the Cooktown Eight-mile Native Police and Bloomfield 
patrols for the purchase of beads and tobacco. So, again, during the past month the local police have 
been looking after the interests of the blacks in the neighbourhood of Cooktown—the same aboriginals 
who, for reasons stated elsewhere, it has been recently deemed advisable to permanently keep out of the 
township. 
With regard to the distributions at one or two of the above-mentioned food-relieving centres, I may 
mention a few items of interest. At Moreton I found a very good system whereby, in the absence of 
dates, the savages up there manage to come in regularly on one and the same occasion : they are taught 
to put in an appearance when the moon is at the full. The telegraph officer in charge here, Mr. P. S. 
Lindeman, writes to me (7-5-00) as follows: —" Everything is progressing satisfactorily with the 
aboriginals. The monthly bullock in the wet season, and flour in the dry months, is a great treat, and 
also tends towards establishing friendly relations between the different tribes. Some of the blacks who 
meet each other here and spend a friendly evening together, eating, singing, and smoking most amicably, 
would have fought and eaten each other on sight a few years ago. Tomahawks and fishing-lines, supplied 
by Government, enable them to greatly increase their natural food supplies, and I think that the aboriginals 
about here are in a much better condition to-day than they were even three years ago." At Macdonnell, 
the next telegraph station, another sixty miles further north, there are about 150 blacks, who keep fairly 
well to themselves, although the natives from both west and east coasts find their way there, and sometimes 
cause trouble. The nature of the country around being all desert, no large game is procurable, and fish 
is not obtainable in the vicinity. It thus happened that these blacks were often starved, and owing to the 
tribal disturbances consequent on any breaches in the nature of trespass, &c, dared not go down to either 
coast. No wonder, then, that Mr. M. Haskett is now able to report on the " beneficial results " which 
have followed on the inauguration of a food-distributing centre here. 
The advance of white settlement in the more outlying districts will gradually necessitate an increased 
expenditure for rations, a fact with the importance of which I am becoming more and more impressed. 
As each new block of country becomes taken up, the blacks are forcibly hunted from off their water 
supplies and hunting grounds both in it and in its immediate neighbourhood. According to their own 
laws of trespass they are prevented seeking fresh pastures, except at the cost of fightin; they have 
learnt by sad experience that the spearing of cattle is a risky mat ter ; and they will thus, unless we 
allow them to starve, ultimately come to be a charge upon the State. Sub-Inspector Garraway, while 
warning the blacks about killing cattle on the Lower Palmer, &c., last year, was thus forced to 
promise them relief when they came in and asked for it. 
According to regulations, I am regularly furnished with a monthly collective return of all these 
distributions of Government relief to aboriginals. I have recommended an alteration in the present 
method of payment of the corresponding vouchers. 
Blanket For the first time, all blankets have this year been distributed throughout the northern districts of 
distribution the colony by the police only; the few exceptions were in the case of two or three of the Mission stations. 
In reply to a circular despatched at the end of last August, the various inspectors of police, as 
protectors, forwarded me returns of their blanket requirements for the present year; they were each 
asked to furnish the names of the different centres in their respective districts at which they proposed 
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making a distribution, the lowest estimate of blankets required at each such centre, and the approximate 
dates on which they proposed that such distributions should bo made. The following list of requirements 
came to hand :— 
Townsville (E) Police District. 
Where, When, and No. Required 
Townsville (1-5-00) ... 
Ayr (10-
Bowen (1-5 
Cardwell 
Charters Towers 
Eton 
Halifax 
Ingham 
Mackay 
Mirani 
Nebo 
Walkerston 
Proserpine 
Ravenswood 
Total .. 
4-00) 
-00) 
... 
i 
... * ... ... 
, ... ... 
, ... ... 
, ... ... 
, 
150 
80 
161 
200 
105 
25 
50 
330 
50 
25 
70 
12 
25 
50 
1,336 
Cairns (F) Police District, 
Where. When, and No. Required. 
Cairns (1-4-00) ,.. 900 
Atherton 250 
Cooktown „ 1,250 
Herberton „ ... ... 350 
Port Douglas 275 
Geraldton „ 250 
Thornborough 120 
Thursday Is. „ 200 
Total 3,590 
Normanton (G) Police District: 
Where, When, and No. Required. 
Normanton (1-5-00) 
Burketown „ 
Camooweal „ 
Charleston „ 
Cloncurry 
Croydon „ 
Georgetown „ 
Golden Gate „ 
Gregory Downs „ 
Junction Creek „ 
Lawn Hills „ 
Mackinlay „ 
Percyville 
Turn-Off Lagoon „ 
Total 
200 
100 
100 
50 
100 
100 
100 
50 
50 
50 
100 
50 
50 
100 
1,200 
These returns, making a grand total of 6,126 blankets required, were then sent on to the Home 
Secretary, and his instructions carried out by the Government Storekeeper. That this method of 
procedure proved practicable and satisfactory may be gauged from the fact that only one complaint 
reached me as to their non-arrival up to date. 
I t will be noted that the dates of distribution recommended by the protectors did not correspond: 
this was necessitated by varying conditions of climate and was antagonistic to the old idea of issuing them— 
independently of the local seasons—all on the same occasion, the Queen's Birthday. Personally, I might 
be allowed to take the opportunity of expressing the opinion that this annual gift of blankets to aboriginals 
is in many cases a misplaced charity, that its promiscuous grant should not he looked upon as a matter of 
right, but regarded rather in the light of a medical adjunct and comfort for the aged, the young, and the 
sick. I am accordingly impressing upon the local protectors of the more outlying districts the expediency 
of discouraging the able-bodied aboriginals not yet accustomed to them from applying " t o the 
Government " for these articles. Of course, at the present time blankets are distributed only to such 
blacks as are not in regular employment; and I certainly would not recommend any stoppage of the 
supply to those who have thus become regularly used to them. I recognise, furthermore, that the 
promiscuous gift of blankets in past years has tended to the utter disuetude of the native-made opossum-
skin and bark-cloth rugs : during the past seven or eight years I have not come across a single specimen 
of the former, and but with only a few of the latter. Again, up in the Coen, &c, districts of the 
Peninsula, it is of interest to note the concurrence of view of Sub-Inspector Garraway, the local protector, 
with that of Sergeant Whiteford, who, in this matter of blankets, expresses himself as follows :—"The 
blacks up here would be nearly as well off without a blanket as with one ; in fact, in most cases now, the 
blacks who do receive blankets either throw them away or get rid of them before they have had them a 
month." 
I would recommend that for the future the Government Storekeeper be instructed to supply an 
aboriginal blanket which will be immediately distinguishable in colour from any others supplied to 
remaining Government departments, and easily recognisable from those in ordinary use among the general 
public: furthermore, the lettering of the Government brand, the " Q G," should be indelibly stamped 
thereon, and not woven or threaded in as at present. 
At Cairns, two individuals were charged with being in illegal possession of blacks' blankets. 
On the eastern coast of the Peninsula, from its northern extremity to a long way down—certainly The recruiting 
as far as the Thursday Island recruiters would care to go—the aboriginals are, speaking only as a matter and employ-
of comparison, able to take care of themselves. I do not imply that they are on as high a scale of the shelling 
civilisation as the Torres Strait islanders, but having been so long used to the presence of the boats, they and beche-de-
know what drink is ; they recognise and appreciate the monetary value of their women; they suffer mer industries, 
markedly with venereal disease ; they have picked up the vices of their visitors, with the result that they 
are rapidly diminishing in numbers; and, from a practical point of view, too much " protection " on my 
part, though checking abuses, will probably not prove of much permanent benefit to them. 
On the western coast of the Peninsula I recognise three distinct recruiting areas, each requiring 
separate notice:—The 1st, from the Cape to Port Musgrave ; the 2nd, from Port Musgrave to Albatross 
Bay (Duyphen Point) ; the 3rd, from Albatross Bay to beyond the mouth of the Archer River. The 
present consideration of the first may be dismissed for the reason that the same remarks as have already 
been referred to the aboriginals of the east coast apply with equal force to the blacks on this portion of coast 
line. 
With regard to the third, I may mention that the natives here are mostly " myalls " not too 
safe to travel amongst, and that in the absence of contact with civilising influences they can neither 
understand nor speak English; consequently no recruits are obtainable here except by stratagem. I t 
simply means that if unscrupulous people remove boys from here, the next to come will run greater chances 
of meeting with outrage. Being, therefore, only too anxious to take every precaution to prevent such 
occurrences', I have taken the safest means at my disposal to remove all those causes which I know from 
experience to be likely to give rise to reprisals. The recruiting in this particular area has accordingly 
been practically put a stop to. 
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APPENDIX D: Sample of La Fábula de los Caribes, Juan Ignacio de Armas (1884) 
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APPENDIX E: Sample of Probanza de Juan Garrido (1538) 
From Juan Garrido, Ricardo Alegría (1990) 
 
PROBANZA DE JUAN GARRIDO - 1538
Archivo General de Jndias, Sevilla,
Audiencia de México, Leg. 204.
Provanza de Joan Garrido.
En la grand eíbdad deMexieo desta Nueba Espana veynte e syete
dias del mes de setiembre año del señor de mili e quinientos e treynta
e ocho años antel señor Fernando Perez de Bocanegra alcalde en
esta dicha cibdad por su Magestad e en presencia de mi Mart]n de
Castro escriuano publico della paresdo Juan Garrido de color negro
vecino de ta dicha cibdad e presento un escripta de pedimiento con
vn ynterrogatorio de preguntas que es este que se sigue...
Muy Noble señor
Fe!. 1"
Fo!. 2"
Juan Garrido de color negro vesino desta cibdad paresco ante
Vuestra merced e digo que yo tengo nescesidad de hazer una
provanca a perpetuad rey memoria de como e servydo a V.M. en la
conquista e pasificaci6n destaNueva España desde que pas6 a ella el
Marqués del Valle yen su compañia me halle presentt! a todas las
enfradas e conquista e pacificaciones que se an hecho syempre con
el dicho Marques todo lo qual e hecho a mi costa syn me dar salaryo
ny repartimiento de indios ni otra cosa s)lendo como soy casado e
vecino desta cibdad que syempre e ressedido en ella y asi mismo fue
e pase a descobrir con el Marques del Valle las que estan desa
parte de la mar del sur donde pase muchas hambres e nescEsidades
y asi mismo fue a descobrir e pacificar a las Islas de San Juan de
Buriquén de Puerto Rico y asi mismo fue en la pasyficadón y con·
Quista de la Isla de Cuba con el adelantado Diego Velazques en todo
lo qual a treynta años que yo e servydo e syrvo a S.M. por ende a
vuestra merced pido que avyda ynforrnacion de lo susodicho e de
como yo fui el primero que hizo la ysplriel1cia en esta Nueva España
para sembrar [rigo e ver si se dava en ella lo qual hizo)l espirimente
fado a mi cosra y as; hecha la dicha ynformacion vuestra merced me
la mande dar synada y sellada en la qual ponga su avtoridad e decretO
judicial para que yo la presente ante S.M. o antE;' quien e con derecho
deva para que le coste de mis seruicios e de las pocas mercedes que
sus govemadores me a hecho aviendo seruido como e seruido y
sobre todo pIdo cumpllmienro de justicia.
Otro si pido que a los restigos que presentare sean esaminado:t
por estas preguntas.
